Results of the mayoral elections in Chisinau: the Rubicon is passed

Elections of the Chisinau mayor on May 20 and June 3 became a kind of Rubicon for Moldova in the domestic political struggle for power. After the unseen victory of a single pro-European candidate from the right-wing opposition Andrei Nastase, the court of Chisinau on June 19 ruled to recognize these elections invalid and refused to recognize the mandate of the elected mayor. Not surprisingly, Nastase’s attempts to legitimately challenge the courts’ decision did not lead to the desired result. Experts believe that the unofficial master of Moldova, the leader of the ruling in Moldova Democratic Party (PDM) and the most influential oligarch V. Plahotniuc is behind it. The leader of the PDM enjoys an extremely toxic reputation as a semi-criminal politician-businessman, not only in the Moldovan and Russian media, but also in the Western information environment. European officials openly acknowledge that Moldova is a country where corruption flourishes at all levels. This is clearly demonstrated by the sensational article of CoE Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland, published on August 10, 2015 at the New York Times, in which Moldova is described as a weak state captured by oligarchs that brings with it financial black holes (meaning notorious stealing of a billion dollars from the banking system of the Republic of Moldova), organized crime, trafficking and uncontrolled migration. Later in 2017 the author of the article stated that nothing had changed in Moldova. Although the document does not directly mention the name of V. Plahotniuc anywhere, in Moldova no one doubted who it referred to. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, the Democratic Party consistently did away with its rivals in the political field of Moldova. In 2015, V. Plahotniuc got rid of his major rival, the second most influential oligarch of the country, Vlad Filat, making him one of the main official culprits of the ‘theft of the century’. After Filat was arrested, the Liberal Democratic Party he led became a ‘ghost’. Then Plahotniuc lured (or bought) many members of the Liberal Party and the Communist Party, and after the 2016 presidential elections, as many experts believe, managed to negotiate informally with President Dodon and his socialists party about the division of spheres of influence. As a result, in 2017, the Democratic Party has become the dominant force that can make decisions at is sole discretion. Since Moldova is a parliamentary republic, the legislative body forms the government, appoint judges, the prosecutor, directors of key state enterprises and the media. Considering that V. Plahotniuc is the largest oligarch of Moldova, he actually concentrated all power in the country in his hands. For several years, the American research center Freedom House has been publishing reports Nations in Transit and Freedom in the World, in which Moldova retains the status of a partially free nation with a hybrid regime and the highest risk of slipping towards authoritarianism. In a study published in April 2018, Moldova retains 4.93 points out of 7 (where 1 is the most democratic state and 7 is the least democratic state). The corruption level in the Republic of Moldova from 2016 to the present is at 6 points out of 7, the independence of the media from 2012 is still at the level of 5 points, the index of independence of the judiciary has been constantly falling since 2009, the lack of democracy component of this indicator has increased from 4.75 points in 2014 to 5 in 2017 and 2018. On April 10, 2018, the human rights organization Jamestown Foundation (works closely with the US intelligence community, its publications are used by US government analysts and lawmakers on a regular basis) published a report “High-Level Corruption Threatens Moldova’s European Aspirations”. The document emphasizes direct Plahotniuc’s participation in covering up of the Orhei mayor Ilan Shor in the case of the theft of a billion; and the text reads that the criminal tandem of Plahotniuc-Shor is embodiment of off-scale corruption that get the EU leaders more and more disappointed in Moldova. To mention, since 2017 Moldova cannot receive macro-financial support from the EU exactly because of the failed justice reform, high level of corruption and the undemocratic mixed electoral system established during the recent reform. In this respect, even the personnel reshuffling in the Moldovan government did not work at the beginning of 2018, when the people who ‘enjoy the trust’ of the EU politicians took positions related to the promotion of European integration. It should be noted that Mr. Plahotniuc is competing with his opponents with hardly legal means. For example, in Russia last November, the leader of the PDM was arrested in absentia and put on the international wanted list for the contract on life of Russian banker German Gorbuntsov, who in his turn was wanted by the Moldovan authorities allegedly for preparing an assassination attempt on Renato Usatii, chairman of Our Party, a left-wing party. By the way, the ruling regime in the Republic of Moldova did not allow Usatii’s party to participate in the parliamentary elections of 2014, and on the eve of the presidential elections of 2016 the age limit was changed so that Usatii could not take part in the race. In 2018, the Bălți town administration was consistently under pressure, because the members of Our Party had majority there. Thus, today Moldova is indeed a captured state in which Plahotniuc makes it clear: if you do not play by his rules, anything can happen. In this respect, the refusal to recognize the election results of the Chisinau mayor is a demonstration of only a small part of the pressure tools that Plahotniuc has today. If this demonstration lesson is not learned, we do not know what to expect from the future parliamentary elections. The election campaign in Chisinau, including the courts’ refusal to recognize results of the elections, has become an official confirmation of the Dodon-Plahotniuc tandem. The leader of the Democratic Party, in words supporting the concept of a single pro-European candidate and urging voters to vote for anyone other than the socialist Ion Ceban, in practice launched a disruptive information campaign against Nastase, while hardly touching the candidate from the socialist party. Long before the voting day, the majority of information resources in Moldova disseminated results of public opinion polls, where the main competitors were the informal PDM candidate Silvia Radu and the socialist Ion Ceban, while Nastase was at best placed third. The most surprising fact in this situation is the following. In an interview to Tribuna.md on June 11, Plahotniuc said that the Democratic Party wished victory for A. Nastase in the second round and that the party was satisfied with the results of the vote. After that, on June 19, the Chisinau court (and all courts unconditionally are controlled by Plahotniuc) issues a decision on recognizing the elections as invalid. Such a development may be a consequence of the Democrats’ failure to negotiate with the leader of the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (Romanian: Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr) on cooperation with the PDM or creation of a pro-European coalition for parliamentary elections, as well as Plahotniuc’s desire to show who the boss is. At the same time, Nastase’s desire to challenge the court’s decision, both legally and through protests, is extremely ridiculous. Vlad Plahotniuc made it clear that Nastase is more of a small fry, which really does not influence on anything than a serious leader of an extra-parliamentary opposition that enjoys public support. This impression is even stronger when, instead of the promised thousands protests, only several hundred supporters of the Dignity and Truth Platform and Party of Action and Solidarity (Romanian: Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate, PAS) went out onto the street. The situation partly resembles similar actions of Moldovan President Igor Dodon in the first year after his election, when he threatened to bring masses to the streets and organize a revolution in Moldova. As in the case of Nastase, it was limited to modest demonstrations, which clearly showed the true level of support and influence of Dodon, and today Nastase. There is another vivid example. When in autumn 2017, I. Dodon refused to appoint a new Minister of Defense, E. Sturza, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova suspended him from office and appointed Speaker of the Parliament, member of the Democratic Party A. Candu as Acting President. Other attempts by the president to oppose Plahotniuc were sharply cut off, for example, the blocking of the consultative referendum on transition to the presidential form of government, which the Socialists wanted to hold on September 24, 2017. Since then, the protest on the part of Dodon was only formal convictions of the current regime, and he himself participated in the division of the information market of Moldova (in January 2018, it became known about the agreement of the Plahotniuc’s Casa Media Sales House and the Socialists’ Exclusive Sales House on granting an additional discount to those customers, who will use only their services). Democrats and socialists also divided foreign policy spheres of influence (Dodon – the Russian direction and certain CIS countries, Plahotniuc – Western countries). This became apparent in Dodon’s position on the Transdniestrian issue, when he first recognized expediency of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border control with Transdniestria, and then, when the issue of freedom of movement between two banks of the Dniester has mainstreamed on the negotiations agenda, Dodon repeated the government’s position on the need to dismantle Transdniestrian posts on the left bank. Thus, Igor Dodon and the socialists ensured their political survival, while the issue with Nastase remains open. According to the Moldovan electoral legislation, after recognition of local elections as invalid, the CEC of the Republic of Moldova within two weeks should organize a repeat voting with the same candidates and on the same electoral lists. The new elections cannot be organized in the last year of the mandate of the mayor of Chisinau, that is, from June 14, 2018. At the same time, in case of early termination of the mayor’s mandate, temporary suspension of his office or inability to exercise his powers, his duties are assigned to either one of his deputies or to a person nominated by the municipal council. Thus, V. Plahotniuc has every opportunity to remove Nestase and Ceban away from the post of mayor and appoint his confidant as acting Chisinau mayor (as was the case with Silvia Radu) until the next ‘regular’ elections in the summer of 2019. Elections of the mayor of Chisinau really became a kind of projection of the autumn parliamentary elections. In this regard, as Maksim Andreev from Newsmaker.md rightly points out, today there is a dilemma before Andrey Nestase: either obey the rules of Plahotniuc’s game, admit defeat at the mayoral elections, but ensure unhindered passage to parliament in the autumn elections, or start a political war against the current regime, spending considerable resources on a secondary issue, long before the start of the official election race. Plahotniuc made it clear by his actions that anything can happen with his opponents: removal of the party or individual candidates from the elections, arrest, accusation of violating the voting rules, cancellation of the votes and many other options, because only one player sets rules in the captured state.