Sergey Cheban: Moldova’s Neutrality To Open the Way for Removal of Russian Weapons from Transdniestria

The RTA expert assumes that the consolidation of the neutral status of Moldova will allow Chisinau to approach the problem of removal of Russian weapons from depots in Cobasna on the left bank of the Dniester Sergey Cheban, RTA: Yesterday, President of Moldova Igor Dodon approved the appointment of Brigadier General Victor Gaiciuc as Secretary of the Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova and advisor to the head of state in the defense sphere, as well as national security. From 2001 to 2004, Gaiciuc served as the Minister of Defense of Moldova, then for several years as the representative of Moldova to NATO, and was also the Ambassador of Moldova to Belgium. Victor Gaiciuc, who got into the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova from the presidential Party of Socialists, advocated the strengthening of Moldova’s neutrality even before his appointment to the Security Council. The former Defense Minister publicly stated that this status should also be incorporated in an international agreement with the UN, the European Union, the OSCE and the Russian Federation. “Conflicting parties always choose the third to resolve their disputes. I believe that the factor of Moldova’s neutrality, including in the Euro-Asian region, would help us to negotiate between the East and the West,” said Gaiciuc, whom President Igor Dodon unsuccessfully proposed for the head of the Defense Ministry in 2017. Interestingly, the theme of Moldova’s neutrality, along with the Transdniestrian settlement, has remained among the main priorities of Igor Dodon and his Party of Socialists in recent years. Pro-presidential forces and he personally especially actively pushed both topics in 2017-2018, but then could not compete with the hype from the actions of the Plahotniuc’s government. Back then Chisinau at various sites, up to the UN rostrum, advocated the withdrawal of Russian troops from unrecognized Transdniestria, and also delivered several powerful blows at the Russian presence in the unrecognized enclave. Having received the necessary leverage in 2019, Igor Dodon will obviously try to intensify the issue of securing the neutrality of Moldova at the international level. In the current circumstances, this may become a topic for the President and the PSRM that will allow them to compete with the ACUM bloc for popularity among the Moldovan population. As a rule, any issues related to the security and strategic course of the country cause heated discussions in society, and this is a good chance for the PSRM to intercept the media agenda. However, the intentions of the President in 2019 must have an ‘international’ component. Experts have repeatedly noted that the EU and the US in recent years have gradually increased attention to the Russian military presence in unrecognized Transdniestria. Depots of expired ammunition on the left bank of the Dniester in Cobasna are a particular interest of Western officials. They are guarded by an Operational Group of Russian Troops, which today has a little more than a thousand people. The agreement to remove arms has long been in existence, however Moscow directly specifies that to make it through the territory of Ukraine is impossible in modern environment. In turn, the United States began to modernize the infrastructure of military depots in neighboring Moldova, which, according to some analysts, is a preparation for the disposal of ammunition from Cobasna. In this case, consolidation of the neutral status of Moldova can serve as an impetus for a joint international initiative to the Kremlin: to remove or dispose ammunition under the joint multilateral control of representatives of Russia, EU, USA and NATO – but through the territory of Moldova. At the same time, the current situation can become a serious challenge for Moscow, as in the future it will definitely be transformed into demands to reduce the military contingent in Transdniestria. It is interesting that a few years ago the Dodon’s interpretation of the neutrality contained a paragraph on the withdrawal of any military bases from the territory of Moldova. Some experts pointed out that this “ill-considered” initiative could backfire – on purpose or by mistake – the OGRT stationed in unrecognized Transdniestria. In the current situation, it can be all the more assumed that the neutral status of Moldova will be directly aimed at reducing the number of the OGRT, since if the arms are removed from Cobasna, the Russian military will simply have nothing to guard. Such a scenario must have been seriously considered in Moscow as one of the likely. Moreover, it is impossible to postpone forever the problem of Cobasna depots located inopportunely near the Ukrainian border also. In this sense, today it is important to understand how far Moscow, Brussels and Washington are ready to go in cooperation on the Moldovan track. It cannot be ruled out that the consolidation of Moldova’s neutrality and the subsequent changes have already been previously agreed in the capitals, which means that they are part of the overall plan for the reset of trilateral relations and the settlement of conflicts in Europe.