"Quo Vadis?" Where Is the Republic of Moldova Heading For

Moldova is approaching the next independence anniversary presenting disappointing results and its prospects seem even less bright than a year ago, RTA expert Sergiu Ceban stated. Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: Tomorrow Moldova will celebrate another anniversary of its independence and will probably widely celebrate its 30th anniversary next year. The closer such a solid milestone date, the greater the desire to draw some conclusions, to reflect on the reality, on the situation and to probably answer essential questions: where are we still moving for and how to live further. Of course, there are many different forecasts, but the Moldovan society to a greater extent expects a clear position and course from the political elite of the republic. The latter has a whole year ahead to look carefully at the past decades, analyze the (un) done and offer the population a verified trajectory of country's development. This is even more necessary, since, as sociological measurements of the past 10 years show, the overwhelming majority of Moldovan citizens believe that the country is moving in a completely wrong direction. And it's hard to disagree with. However, it is highly probable that no fresh ideas and recipes about “how we can equip Moldova” will appear next year. Political experts predict several difficult electoral cycles for our republic, that will for sure completely capture the attention of both society and the Moldovan politicians. At the same time, the upcoming presidential elections, will not perhaps have a radical impact on the political alignment in the country, especially if Igor Dodon remains as head of state. At the same time, the still possible likelihood of early parliamentary elections in 2021 could lead to significant changes in the political state spectrum and might even push a generation of new Moldovan politicians onto the first line. On the other hand, the brightest expectations often do not coincide with the Moldovan reality, capable of nullifying almost any sound political initiative. A year ago, in a fit of euphoria, many thought that Moldova had finally undergone historical changes, and, due to international consensus, the long-term oligarchic regime was broken. This epoch-making event seemed to open up a completely new path of development for the country without total corruption and lawlessness, but with a wide circle of friends support both in the West and in the East. But over time, it turned out that even a unique geopolitical solitaire was not able to force Moldovan politicians think in categories larger than narrow party and financial interests, that is why the right and the left fragile symbiosis quickly broke down moving the whole system back towards re-oligarchization. As a result, Moldova found itself where it was for three decades, that is in a permanent state of geopolitical and foreign policy priority choice, thus, leading the Moldovan society to an almost equal split. This balance is gradually shifting: one of the important indicators is the focus of the country's young generation, and for its most part it is close to the pro-European or pro-Western socio-political development parameters of the state. Therefore, no matter how strong the influence of the Russian factor is if in the long term, the republic will continue to drift westward. At the same time, there is an opinion that over the past 29 years the state has not really moved anywhere at all, squeezing out the remnants of its scarce resources and Soviet infrastructure. This ultimately led to the country’s terrifying depopulation and de-industrialization. Another vivid symbol of downtime is the Transdniestrian conflict, regarded as one of fundamental problems of the modern Moldovan state. Over the past decades, the real reintegration of the country has not on an iota become closer; and for several decades Chisinau is standing on the platform next to this “suitcase without a handle”, never getting outside help and never fully deciding whether it actually needed it. By the way, the left bank itself, despite all the quarantine measures and growing morbidity statistics, also plans in the coming days to demonstratively celebrate its so-called anniversary, with a special emphasis on historical and memorial symbolism, once again trying to emphasize the deep civil-political and identity differences between the two Dniester banks. And against the background of these competitions between the elites of Chisinau and Tiraspol in their similarities or differences, is increasingly strengthening the opinion that external players will have to resolve the issue and work out a final conflict settlement model. So far, it seems that the international participants have taken a largely wait-and-see attitude and are planning to closely observe the results of electoral cycles, expected to happen both on the right and left banks. Most likely, on the basis of the current internal political configuration, a regional agenda with perspectives for the next few years will further be formed. Thus, it is only in one and a half or two years that any tangible dynamics in the process of the Transdniestrian settlement can be expected. The Republic of Moldova is approaching its next anniversary of independence, being as dependent as possible: on international players’ opinion, on foreign donors’ funding, on oligarchic elements and even on weather conditions. The state and political elites face many difficult situations with a deep history, and only reasonable answers to them, coupled with bold and strong-willed decisions may open up new life prospects for the country. The preserving inertia, the selfless reliance solely on external partners and the country elite’s parasitic model of behavior is likely to bring in further political system erosion and the gradual loss of Moldova's statehood.