What Is Maia Sandu’s Presidency to Turn into for Moldova?

Anton SHVETS In Moldova, being a parliamentary republic, president’s powers are significantly limited and therefore the possible Maia Sandu’s victory on November 15, is only the first step towards gaining full power within the country. At the same time, the republic’s positioning in international relations can quite quickly change.   The first presidential elections round results in the Republic of Moldova proved to be predictably unpredictable. Both favorites - incumbent president Igor Dodon and PAS leader Maia Sandu, confidently made it to the second confrontation round. However, the fact that Sandu in the first round already "overtook" her recent partner in the "anti-Plahotniuc coalition" was a surprise even for her supporters, as it seemed. The political parties of the right flank, non-governmental sector and public organizations together with a number of embassies carried out an artillery preparation aimed at non-recognizing the election results. Anyway, it got promptly curtailed immediately after voting results being published. Now, Maia Sandu can prepare for Sunday November 15th, calmly and with a focus on avoiding serious mistakes. Already before the first round, key controversial and conflicting theses were indicated by her right spectrum ideological supporters. So there is no point for Maia Sandu to “head for trouble” making sharp statements - she will hardly miss her first electorate round votes, as well as those of outsider candidates and the diaspora. On the contrary, she might need several centrist conciliatory theses to win the sympathy of Violetta Ivanov’s and Renato Usatii’s voters. It is enough to "bite off" about half of any of the two candidates’ votes to ensure the victory in her bag. Nevertheless, after the potential victory in the second round, Maia Sandu will have to go a very long and not necessarily successful path to consolidate power in Moldova. It is obvious that she will seek holding early parliamentary elections by all available means but a significant part of the Moldovan parliamentarians is to inevitably oppose this desire. On the other hand, becoming president, Maia Sandu will be able to play a more active role in building relations between Chisinau and international partners, with Transdniestria and will as well receive unique communication channels with society to implement her ideological doctrine. First of all, relations with the European Union straightening should be expected. The first symbolic visit of the newly elected President of Moldova will predictably be to Brussels (as a last resort, if the pandemic intervenes, to Bucharest). EU structures are ready to quickly unfreeze access to funding for Moldova, which is so much in demand given the economic crisis due to COVID-19. Likewise, Maya Sandu’s team will probably be able attract funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, United Nations structures and the US government. It is expected to intensify support measures from the European Union states development agencies (ADA, SIDA, DANIDA, etc.). The streams of criticism against Moldova from various European cabinets will temporarily stop or will be channeled in such a way as to facilitate the newly elected president's plans implementation to "liberate" the institutions of power, carry out reforms, etc. Meanwhile, one is most likely to forget about the 200 million loan from the Russian Federation and about the Eurasian Development Bank funds. It becomes extremely uncertain Moldova’s participation in the structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States and particularly in the Eurasian Economic Commission, under which the Republic of Moldova became an observer in 2018. It is possible that renouncing this status, which is largely artificial and contrary to Moldova's obligations under the Association Agreement with the European Union, will become one of the first symbolic gestures of Maia Sandu. Or it will become one of the topics that public polemic is to unfold around between her and Ion Chicu’s government. The PAS leader position on the Russian language status and the future of Russian-speaking educational institutions in the Republic of Moldova will not add optimism to Russian-Moldovan relations. Another topic of contention may be the Transdniestrian settlement. The watershed between the incumbent president and Maia Sandu was formulated very clearly: Igor Dodon supported Transdniestrians participating in voting and called for the prosecution of those who hindered access to polling stations, including parliament members; his counterpart openly demanded not to recognize the votes of approximately 14,000 Transdniestrians who participated in the November 1 elections. There is an opinion that the team of Maia Sandu will not want taking responsibilities on the agreements with the Transdniestrian administration that were reached by the previous authorities. The tonality and frequency of meetings with the leader of the left bank might change up to a complete contacts freezing at this level. At the same time, relations between Kiev and Chisinau will significantly improve. Being prime minister, Maia Sandu willingly interacted with Ukrainian partners who were extremely negative about Igor Dodon’s personality because of his close ties with Moscow and his specific position on Crimea. Sandu will as well be able to organize a pragmatic and partner dialogue with Bucharest, since she is categorically the exponent of the unionist electorate will and has repeatedly been seen in sympathy (admittedly, mutual) towards Romania. One of the main characters in Moldovan politics may change this month and that could have a quick effect in some areas, especially in foreign policy. However, to reach real transformation in key areas (according to Maia Sandu’s election program), Moldova will have to go a very long and thorny path - and it is far from certain that Sandu will ultimately be able to win back enough power for this.