Sergiu CEBAN
The first round of the presidential elections in Moldova was held to become a prologue to a new political reality. Whatever the 15 November voting outcome, absolutely all stakeholders will have to adapt to secure a “place in the sun”
Moldovan politicians and business are waiting for the tense period of electoral confrontation to end and bring some certainty to build on in making plans for the future. At the same time, there is almost no doubt that the ongoing internal political crisis in Moldova, with now and then varying intensity, will heat up anew following the results of the second round.
Meanwhile, the remaining two candidates have started active preparations for the upcoming battle replenishing their electoral reserves. As to Igor Dodon, his rhetoric has notably changed, becoming more emotional, aggressive and counter-attacking. Such a strategy is apparently designed to win over the protest voters, who are in no event ready to cast their votes for the right-wing politicians.
Renato Usatii, with his third result in the first round, secured a pretty good internal policy position for himself, holding, in fact, a “blocking stake” in his hands. This situation allows the mayor of Balti to set his own conditions, forcing Maia Sandu to negotiate. Their first meeting took place yesterday - in fact, a round of political bargaining. Despite the fundamental coincidence of the agendas, the main constraint in supporting Sandu openly before the second round is the lack of a clear vision of actions to dissolve parliament and hold early elections.
Most likely, politicians as yet have no common understanding of joint efforts not only in the run-up to, but also after November 15. In this situation, Renato Usatii may be the one who is seeking more specificity. He definitely does not want to lose the momentum gained and be content with verbal promises, watching in the post-electoral period as Maia Sandu cleanses the presidency and makes loud statements based on the wait-and-see tactics.
It seems that Usatii, referring to the preceding street protest experience, pushes through the offensive scenario and further political reorganization by forcing the current parliament to resign through mass actions of popular discontent.
Such a radical scenario is certain to meet serious resistance and mobilization: the overwhelming part of the parliamentary establishment is not ready for early elections, and ordinary local officials are not ready for another reshuffle. Maia Sandu seems to be not really encouraged by the prospect of powerful countermeasures from the system, as well as by any peremptory statements that could harm ahead of a decisive fight. On the other hand, the PAS leader risks repeating the fate of the 2012-2019 “nominal presidency” if she refuses to pursue a proactive domestic policy.
Against this background, the process of stabilizing the parliamentary quasi-majority entered its final phase. Its purpose is to ensure the necessary quorum and exclude the possibility of legal grounds for dissolving the deputy corps in case of a three-month failure to pass laws. A group of like-minded people will probably be formed from among the deputies from the PSRM, the Democratic Party, SHOR and the newly formed Pentru Moldova platform, which broke away from Pro Moldova.
Based on the president’s public statements, maintaining the current cabinet with certain personnel reshuffles is the most acceptable scenario, enabling Dodon to retain political control over the situation in the country in any case. However, the developments are rather unlikely to be that inertial. Therefore, the so-called parliamentary majority can resort to non-standard political decisions to discourage the emerging Sandu-Usatii tandem and neutralize the threat of parliament dissolution.
It appears that one of such methods is the highest possible inter-faction mobilization, which implies inviting deputies to a broad cooperation, including the DA Platform MPs. The latter, witnessing Andrei Nastase’s results in the first round of elections, have most likely completely lost faith in their chances to overcome the six percent barrier in the next parliamentary elections and are ready for any form of political cooperation.
In this scenario, it should also not be ruled out that further crisis exacerbation and the Moldovan government possible resignation to mitigate the risks may force Andrei Nastase to once again show initiative and negotiate with Maia Sandu his nomination for the post of a head of the cabinet, if she is elected. This will put his companion in a somewhat delicate position. On the one hand, it will be difficult to refuse Nastase and not provide him with the votes of the PAS faction MPs, because his candidacy as the second acknowledged leader of the pro-European opposition will seem to the utmost logical. On the other hand, she understands that most of the people’s deputies will follow their sense of self-preservation and certainly vote for such an “anti-crisis government” led by the DA Platform chief, which will break Sandu’s entire strategy to dissolve the parliament.