Romania aims to become the main operator of the “New Moldova”

SERGEY CHEBAN

Over the last years, Bucharest's policy towards Moldova was inertial. After the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, the “elder brother” intends to make up for lost time. The proposed aid package recently presented by Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu is nothing more than an attempt by Romania to get involved in the process of internal reconfiguration within Moldova in order to increase own influence on the new political leadership and the country generally.

During today's first session, the elected parliament formed the governing and working bodies. The next step will be the appointment of a new government, as well as the heads of other public institutions and agencies. Next month, the PAS will be mostly busy with personnel appointments, since it is unlikely that it will be possible to demonstrate quick and tangible results in a short time. Nevertheless, when implementing ambitious plans for a deep reformatting of the state system, the new authorities will firmly rely from the very first day on their main international development partners, i.e. the United States, the European Union and Romania. A visit of Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu to Chisinau at the end of last week was not occasional. During a joint press conference with Maia Sandu, the Romanian diplomat noted that recent interaction between the two countries has slowed down significantly, however, now Bucharest expects to revitalize the Moldovan-Romanian cooperation. The first step in this direction, most likely, will be the conclusion of a new agreement on providing Moldova with a gratuitous financial assistance program for the implementation of various branch projects. It is fitting that the Romanian Foreign Minister was the first person who decided to pay the first official visit after the parliamentary elections in our country. By doing so, Bucharest apparently demonstrates to other international partners its willingness to become the main operator while constructing the “New Moldova” and one of the main assistants while implementing reforms. Meanwhile, despite the trip was routine, there is reason to believe that it marks the beginning of a reassessment and building of a qualitatively different strategy by Romania's foreign policy towards its neighbor. In recent years, Bucharest's policy towards us has really sagged a lot due to the lack of a clear course. In most cases, it maneuvered and adjusted to the dynamically changing internal political situation in Chisinau, inter alia, reflecting overtures to the governments and political forces associated with Plahotniuc's regime. As a result, in June 2019, the Romanian embassy was actually forced to remain in the shadow of American diplomacy, watching from the sidelines the triumph over the main Moldovan oligarch. During the pre-election period, Bucharest demonstrated a dispersed position, trying to support various political forces, but failed to consolidate the unionist camp. Bucharest intends to change its approach to Moldova. That is why the hasty "intelligence" visit of Aurescu to Chisinau, according to experts, was more than expected. Most likely, the main purpose of the visit was to convey a set of offers on assistance, as well as to bring back from Chisinau counter requests and wishes that could be responded by our closest neighbors following the recent elections. According to several experts, Romania is not just a neighboring state for Moldova, but also a kind of “elder brother” looking out for a long time on the “younger brother” and eventually achieving the role of the political “guardian” of our country. Through the long-term expansion of its influence, Bucharest has nurtured new generations of Moldovans with a Romanian identity for all thirty years of the post-Soviet “independent” Moldova. This reality is reflected more and more evidently following election campaigns every year. Political actors aimed at the ideas of national statehood and independence from external forces are systematically and inevitably losing popularity in a society brought up on the common “history of the Romanians” and the political concepts of the forcibly divided single Romanian people. A significant part of Moldovan politicians has long come to terms with this reality, since this kind of “surveillance” is accompanied not only by mentoring and financial injections, but also by opens access through the “Romanian corridors” to the European Union. This geopolitical reason will allow Bucharest playing a primary role in Chisinau's pro-European aspirations. Romania's activity may result in the near future in “raising” Moldova's place in the foreign policy agenda of Brussels and transferring to a group of countries with a firmer perspective of European integration. Bucharest will resume its financial support within a new program of irrevocable donor assistance with, apparently, increased volume. At the same time, we should expect a tighter approach to targeted use of these funds for specific branch projects, which can generate an additional positive effect and strengthen the image of Romania. Considering Bucharest's claims to the role of a leader in “Moldovan affairs”, we can expect incorporation of a Moldovan targeted international “development fund” where the Romanian authorities can make the first symbolic contribution. Not far off is the strengthening expansion of the Romanian business, whose representatives, perhaps, are the best in orienting themselves and know how to work in Moldova. The main advantage of Moldova, which attracts Romanian business community, is the association agreement with the EU, which provides liberal and duty-free access to European markets, as well as no strict regulatory requirements applied in the territory of the European Union. There is no doubt that Bucharest can focus on strategic projects that should economically, energetically, financially, infrastructurally and logistically link Moldova with the “European continent”. Despite the complexity of such a task, nevertheless, Bucharest and Brussels have quite enough power for it. Moreover, such a tight connection can become the main guarantee of the republic's irrevocable course to the West. Of course, the Romanian neighbor has many plans in stock for the new “pro-European” Moldova, but even more hopes and positive expectations. The long-term internal political crisis has been overcome; hardly anyone from the newly minted center-left opposition is able to seriously prevent Bucharest from managing the erring “younger brother” who took the reform path on July 11. This explains the activity of the Romanian diplomacy, which does not risk missing a “unique chance” and puts forward its own version of the Moldovan agenda. The proposed aid package, handed over by Minister Aurescu, is nothing more than an attempt to get involved in the process of internal system reconfiguration in order to strengthen the role of Romania, including personnel, while, as you know, “it’s all about the people. In addition, Bucharest probably realized that there is a clear demand from the Moldovan and Romanian societies to modernize the formula for the reintegration of the two states. As the election results showed, people no longer view emotional aggressive unionism as a demanded political project. For this reason, we should expect from Bucharest a reshaped model of building relationships with Chisinau: if the Moldovan society wants “unification”, then the old “two states – one people” concept may well be transformed into “one people – a single space”.