“Between the Lines”: The Core of the New National Defense Strategy

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Christian RUSSU
Despite the reaffirmed status of constitutional neutrality, the new National Defense Strategy adopted by the Government explicitly sets a course towards integration into Euro-Atlantic military structures   
This week, the authorities rather mundanely presented the draft National Defense Strategy of Moldova for the next ten years. It was not the subject of any public hearings and was adopted at a government meeting on 17 July. In scanty news reports, journalists noted our country’s desire to expand cooperation with Western partners and the preservation of the neutrality clause, which at first glance gave the impression of some continuity and even adequacy of the document’s authors. In any case, being told that we will not be straying into military blocs in the next decade has reassured many, discouraging from reading the text itself. It goes without saying that the ruling party’s foreign policy demagogy could not but be reflected in the new defense doctrine. We can recall Dorin Recean’s enthusiastic brouhaha around the National Security Strategy approved last December. Therefore, the copying of many provisions from one document into another was rather expected. For example, mentioning the Russian Federation as the main challenge to Moldova’s security, besides the omnipresent corruption. The factor of Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine with possible expansion of fighting to the Odesa oblast and, of course, threats from the Russian military in the left bank and separatist structures are also listed. At the same time, it states openness to discuss the expediency of maintaining neutrality, given regional trends, including the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Another interesting point is that previously officials never used the national doctrines of this level to shamelessly praise Western development partners in an attempt to show them their loyalty. The current strategy adopted under Igor Dodon welcomes “the expansion of the military presence on NATO’s eastern flank and the resulting consolidation of partnership relations with our country and the promotion of stability beyond the Alliance’s borders”. In the updated version, however, we see explicit praise for NATO. It is described as a “central pillar” of regional security, providing collective defense for member states and “crucial in deterring aggression through its powerful military presence”. The authors of the document recognize the alliance’s “exceptional role in promoting democratic values” and appreciate its “commitment to long-term security, solidarity and cohesion” within its ranks. It would be rather understandable if such bows to NATO were made by candidates for joining this military bloc. But Moldova seems to aspire to join a slightly different union, which, as we can see, does not confuse the authorities at all. It is noteworthy that the release of the new defense doctrine coincided with a regular NATO summit in Washington, to which our country’s officials were invited. There, the chief of the foreign ministry was similarly abundant in compliments to the alliance, calling NATO “the maximum guarantee of security” not only in our region, but anywhere in the world. In his opinion, neutrality cannot be such a guarantee, since it is “a product of Russian propaganda”. All these passages explicitly confirm that our political elite is willing to join the military organization and expects incentives for this. At the same time, the request to accept “temporary inconveniences” on behalf of the Moldovan people “blinded by the information influence of the Russian Federation”, who for some reason still favor Moldova’s neutral status, looks like an apology. By the way, a closer look at the provision of the strategy on neutrality, for the introduction of which the authorities are praised by some journalists, makes it clear that this status is legally non-functional. The reason is, of course, the Russian military presence in the eastern districts. There is also a wording about the international recognition of neutrality. One might think that this is a tribute to Igor Dodon, who promoted this idea during his presidency. However, in fact it is a banal exploitation of terminology that delights the public’s ear. The ruling party takes credit for some merits in this direction, which allegedly failed because of Moscow’s position. It is not clear what efforts Maia Sandu and her entourage made in the process of consolidating the status of neutrality in the world arena. Perhaps Sandu’s early contacts with Dmitry Kozak, a representative of the Russian president’s administration, are meant. However, as we remember, at that time the Russians’ proposal for bilateral talks on the destruction of obsolete ammunition from the village of Cobasna puzzled the Moldovan leadership. But now who among international partners will remember this and say something bad about our rulers who are now “targets and victims of Russia’s aggressive actions”? In general, the new National Defense Strategy is just a product of the PAS and its leader’s research, aligned with the current political conjuncture. This is evidenced at least by the fact that many of the formulations in the document were introduced not by the military, but by the president’s office. This is where the proposals to call NATO ‘a bulwark of stability in the region’ came from. It is not only aimed at the current U.S. administration in order to maximize support during the upcoming election campaigns. The plans to increase defense funding to 1% of GDP will be welcomed by all officials across the ocean, including Republicans if Donald Trump is elected head of the White House. I would like to point out that at the same time no one in our country conceals any intention to increase cooperation with NATO, whether it be activities within the framework of the two-dozen existing programmes or new areas of interaction with the alliance and its individual members. For instance, the recent military agreements with France and Romania. In the latter case, we can see readiness to give the partners in Bucharest the patronage of the Moldovan military within the framework of international missions. Moreover, while the internal governmental documents contain a reservation that in case of NATO Moldova is involved only in operations approved by the UN, there are no such reservations in the agreement with Romania, ratified yesterday by our MPs. Nor can they be found in the 2024-2034 National Defense Strategy. A separate point concerns the aspiration to full involvement in the military structures of the European Union. The timeline for completing this process is tied to the strategy, i.e. until 2034. Given Ursula von der Leyen’s announced plans for a common EU defense union in the next five years, the “fig leaf” in the form of a constitutional provision on neutrality will drop off much sooner.