A “Peacekeeping Dilemma”. Does Chisinau Need an Operation That Involves Russia?

Anton ŠVEC

Yesterday marked 32 years since the beginning of the peacekeeping mission on the Dniester. For the last fifteen years at least, official Chisinau has demonstrated a rather negative attitude towards this format

The armed phase of the Transnistrian conflict, as well known, ended with the signing of a peace agreement between the presidents of Russia and Moldova on 21 July 1992. A week later the first meeting of the Joint Control Commission, the governing body of the peacekeeping mission on the Dniester, took place. On 29 July, Russian peacekeeping units entered the so-called security zone, which included most of the territory of Transnistria and a number of districts on the right bank. Initially, the number of the Russian contingent alone exceeded 3,000 servicemen (now, taking into account both conflicting sides, the peacekeeping forces number about 1,500), 72 posts operated in the security zone (15 at present), the city of Bender was declared a high-security area and the site of JCC meetings (the curfew was cancelled in 2001). For 32 years, the JCC meetings have been held almost every Thursday (over 900 protocols have been signed), and if necessary on other days in the format of emergency or extraordinary meetings. Delegations from Russia, Moldova and Tiraspol, as well as representatives of Ukraine and the OSCE Mission, sit on the Commission. Moscow and Tiraspol insist that the peacekeeping mission should continue until a final political settlement of the conflict on the Dniester. The left bank often refers to the joint statement of Vladimir Voronin, Igor Smirnov and Dmitry Medvedev, issued in 2009, which points to “the expediency of transforming the current mission into a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the OSCE following the results of the Transnistrian settlement.” The central authorities, in turn, are urging the withdrawal of Russian troops and the launch of a civilian or police mission with an international mandate, without directly linking this goal to the course of the political negotiation process. This line became dominant 15 years ago after the “Twitter revolution”. So far, Chisinau continues to participate in the peacekeeping operation – a delegation to the JCC has been formed, there is a senior military chief acting as part of the joint military command, the largest contingent and military observers. However, the country’s leadership “keeps its powder dry” and uses every opportunity to criticize the current peacekeeping format. No wonder that the right bank representatives have long avoided the festive events organized by Transnistrians on the anniversaries of the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The point of no return was 2017 when a plane carrying Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who planned to attend the 25th anniversary of the peacekeeping mission in Bender was denied entry to Moldova. 7 years ago, Vlad Plahotniuc’s regime took the toughest possible position against the Russian presence on the Dniester. At that time, declarations were issued at the level of the Constitutional Court, Parliament and the Government calling for the withdrawal of troops. In subsequent years, similar statements were made by Maia Sandu, including from the rostrum of the United Nations. At present, the ruling regime goes even further by doctrinally fixing its anti-Russian course, which implies political demands to disband the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria (OGRF), to dispose the Soviet ammunition stored in Cobasna, and reformat the peacekeeping operation. The national security strategy adopted late last year lists as one of the main threats “the illegal military presence of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian region and control over the separatist formation”. Formally, this provision refers to the OGRF, as the peacekeeping mission is regulated by the 1992 agreement and the JCC documents, which were signed by Moldova. However, Moscow claims that the OGRF is needed precisely to enable rotation of the Russian peacekeeping contingent (as well as guarding arms depots). The National Defense Strategy until 2034, recently adopted by the Parliament, considers the presence of Russian troops as contrary to Moldova’s constitutional principle of neutrality, as well as a threat to sovereignty: “The military of the Russian Federation illegally deployed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the armed formations of the unconstitutional regime in the Transnistrian region, have significant operational capabilities. Individually or jointly, they constitute a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova in advancing their objectives”. In fact, the trilateral peacekeeping format under the auspices of the Russian Federation is a problem for Chisinau, which implements 18 cooperation programmes with NATO, participates in international exercises (there have already been about 15 of them over the last six months) and is developing partnership with the EU and the US. Against this background, the peacekeeping mission is almost a relic and a kind of anchor that keeps it from finally breaking off relations with Russia. After all, despite the anti-Russian sanctions and denunciation of numerous CIS agreements, communication within the peacekeeping mechanism is forced to continue. In addition, it obviously restricts the freedom of maneuver with regard to Tiraspol, since any attempts to impose constitutional order using force or police methods would be tantamount to a conflict with the Russian Federation. At the same time, sooner or later the leadership of the republic will have to determine its attitude to the peacekeeping process in terms of a specific set of actions. After all, the current format of the mission does not fit into the legislation and doctrinal documents at all. It is clear that no one will do this right now, as Maia Sandu intends to be re-elected in the autumn and is not interested in an escalation on the Dniester. However, already before the parliamentary elections, the situation may sharply deteriorate if it becomes clear from the polls that PAS (together with potential members of the right-wing pro-European coalition) loses its majority in the representative body and the right to form a government. Last year, the ruling regime seriously considered the possibility of withdrawing from the 1992 agreement, but decided at the last moment not to take any risks in order to try to pass the electoral period without shocks and to see how the situation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict develops. A kind of pragmatic opportunism amid endless anti-Russian rhetoric and attempts to strengthen its own military readiness through accelerated militarization. At the same time, under the current circumstances, the trajectory of the PAS policy on peacekeeping on the Dniester is almost a foregone conclusion. A serious crisis may arise even before the 33rd anniversary of the mission, either before the March parliamentary elections or immediately after them if a radical right-wing coalition is formed. For this purpose, it would be enough for Chisinau to announce the withdrawal of its signature from the 1992 peace treaty (it was not ratified by parliament, hence the opinion of the president is sufficient) and to stop participating in the JCC. The problem remains the same - the impossibility of predicting Moscow’s reaction. As long as the 5+2 format - the only platform where it is possible to discuss the withdrawal of Russian troops by political methods (within the framework of the so-called third package) - does not work, the Kremlin is unlikely to be satisfied with such unilateral and drastic steps. If Russia decides to “entrench” on the left bank and continue to defend the actual border of the Transnistrian region, Chisinau will have to resort to military instruments to reintegrate Transnistria and eliminate the Russian presence. Of course, if in the course of the European integration process such a task will be set at all.