“In Search of the Center”. Presidential Chances for Stoianoglo

Anton ŠVEС

The recipe for the “democratic overthrow” of Maia Sandu this autumn is to find the optimal balance to attract the sympathies of all voters who form a significant anti-rating of the current president. What are Alexandr Stoianoglo’s chances then?

Presidential elections, despite the remaining questions about the legal nature of the return of this procedure during the rule of Vladimir Plahotniuc, are again an entrenched tradition in the national political system. Moreover, they significantly increase the value of the mandate received by the elected head of state. The post-partisan principle of voting is, in theory, an element of competition, unpredictability and orientation of the political process towards the needs of voters, allowing the president to act freely and play a key symbolic role in a parliamentary democracy. The October vote will be a kind of referendum (in addition to the referendum on constitutional amendments, scheduled simultaneously with the first election round), which will show the population’s attitude to the current government. The victory of Maia Sandu will untie the hands of her team to finally form an authoritarian regime and make key decisions without regard for alternative opinions and political competition. Currently, the opposition, by maximizing the number of rivals, is more or less effectively tackling the issue of pulling the incumbent president into the second round. The goal is clear – to turn the vote into a competition not of ratings (Sandu has no adequate competitors in this term, since the level of her support remains a sequence higher in comparison to her closest competitors), but into a competition of anti-ratings. And the head of state has one of the worst anti-ratings in the country (more than half of the population has a negative attitude towards her). This is the main difference with the elections of 2016 and 2020, where Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu fought for the support of the electorate, and the main chance for the opposition. In the fall of 2024, the people will vote in the second round not for their candidate, but “for” or “against” the ruling regime. If Alexandr Stoianoglo manages to advance to the second round (which is not guaranteed, since many candidates, from Irina Vlah to Ion Chicu, can take his votes, while Maia Sandu can count on her stable core electorate), he will have quite serious potential in this sense. At the same time, he was not even included in rating polls for many months. Now his team is working on promoting the candidate, relying on the support of mainly left-wing party projects - the Socialists, the Civic Congress. The task is to increase the opportunities that Stoianoglo has due to his insignificant anti-rating, as well as to secure the support of other election participants before the second round. In turn, if Maia Sandu fails to get at least 40% of the votes on October 20, then a feeling of her possible defeat will arise, mobilizing the dissatisfied electorate. The key point is to find a balance – between an active campaign and the role of a shadow favorite, between the left and the right, between a pro-European and multi-vector foreign policy. He needs to develop meanings that unite society and are acceptable to the widest possible circle of people. Visually, the swing of Alexandr Stoianoglo as the candidate is stalling. Igor Dodon does not take him around the districts, does not introduce him to the very stable electorate of the Socialist Party, whose support would certainly ensure participation in the second round. This cautious tactic is dictated by the intention to avoid the Central Election Commission, controlled by the President Office, from having a reason to remove the candidate due to violation of the electoral rules (the official start of which is scheduled only this week) and illegal campaigning. It is clear that Maia Sandu has been campaigning for a long time with an emphasis on the diaspora, while PAS members are actively lobbying in the districts. But these violations involving the use of official position should not mislead the team of Alexandr Stoianoglo. After all, Gods may do what cattle may not. The Central Election Commission has not voiced any intention to prevent him from elections so far, and Stoianoglo is a rather successful choice in this sense, since he is an official with an impeccable reputation, supported by confirmation of European structures, including the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, now the former Prosecutor General is focused on solving the minimum task – to achieve his own participation in the presidential elections and to collect (with the help of mainly the Socialists) enough votes to get to the second round. Only two weeks between the voting rounds can be used for more aggressive campaigning with an emphasis on criticism of Maia Sandu personally, as well as the mistakes and corruption committed by her team. In these two weeks, many of the participants in the first round can also call on their voters to vote for Alexandr Stoianoglo as a “lesser evil” and a chance to change the current terrible social and economic situation in the country. Candidates need to take into account the potential significant transformation of the composition of voters between the first and second rounds. Maia Sandu’s team has done everything to mobilize supporters of Moldova’s European integration by holding a referendum, but this mobilization will show up in October. At the same time, several parties have called for a boycott of the plebiscite, which allows us to predict a decrease in the activity of their supporters. The same applies to voters from the Gagauz autonomy and the Transnistrian region. The authorities in Tiraspol will fiercely not want to interfere in the vote on Moldova’s accession to the European Union, but in the second round, if the prospect of Maia Sandu’s failure seems real, they may, including at the request of Moscow, change their strategy and try to influence the process. Alexandr Stoianoglo is still extremely cautious in his public statements – he does not speak out against the European vector, does not agitate for strengthening relations with Russia, and adheres to peaceful and constructive rhetoric. He criticizes only the ruling regime. This tactic, with the usual left-of-center motive of “loyalty to Moldova” (and not to the East or West) and a commitment to delve into social and economic issues, may attract additional sympathy from voters. The main thing for him will be to find and maintain a balance allowing to count on the maximum neutral voters dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in the republic.