Will Chisinau Finally Break Up with Moscow?

Sergiu CEBAN

Russian-Moldovan relations are still exposed to regular spying and diplomatic scandals, majority of which may push one of the parties to take drastic steps

Just a year ago, a large group of Russian diplomats, who were declared persona non grata amid the “antenna” spy scandal, left Moldova. This was the strongest blow to Russian-M as recently as oldovan relations in all three decades of post-Soviet history. A sharp downturn in relations between Chisinau and Moscow began after the election of Maia Sandu as president and also when in 2021 the Party of Action and Solidarity was granted the monopoly to define foreign policy priorities. Since that moment, cooperation with the Russian Federation and work in the CIS bodies has been methodically scaled down. After the start of hostilities in Ukraine, our authorities, although not immediately, minimized communication with Moscow, taking a fully solidarity position with the Western coalition of Kyiv’s allies. And as recently as in April, foreign minister Mihai Popsoi admitted that relations with Moscow are “at the lowest point since the proclamation of the republic’s independence”. Moreover, Moldova officially awarded Russia the status of the “biggest threat” after the parliament in 2023 adopted the National Security Strategy, which was updated accordingly. In order to boost the effect and reaffirm this principled stance, in July the government again designated Russia as the key threat to the country’s security in the new National Defense Strategy. The main argument is Moscow’s intention to build a military-land corridor to Moldova’s borders, which would pose direct risks to constitutional order and statehood. In addition, the document states that the Russian peacekeepers located on the left bank of the Dniester constitute a danger to our country. The Kremlin still refrains from any drastic steps, although it closely monitors the military and political situation and Chisinau’s actions. For example, yesterday the Charge d’Affaires of the Moldovan Embassy in Moscow was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry. According to official reports, the conversation was about the alleged intention of our authorities to deploy F-16 aircraft for Ukraine on Moldovan territory. In response, the Foreign Ministry advised its Russian colleagues to obtain information about Moldova from official sources. However, it is clear that all this was just an excuse, and it seems that there will be more such demonstrative gestures. These situations should be viewed as seriously as possible. It is no coincidence that a day earlier Russian parliamentarians made public comments about Moldova being considered as a hub for military aircraft and as a F-16 basing airport. Threats were voiced that aircraft which would take off from Moldovan airfields and strike Russian territories and troops ran the risk of retaliation. All this summer aggravation was preceded by several other high-profile cases, which clearly did not optimize the relations between the two states. In January, our ambassador to Moscow, Lilian Darii, was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry, where he was declared a protest against “unfriendly actions of Chisinau”. Specifically, there were accusations of discrimination against incoming Russian citizens and harassment of media. Concern was also expressed over information about plans to assist in the training of Ukrainian military personnel in Moldova by NATO instructors. Moscow responded by closing entry to its territory for some Moldovan officials. Then in March, another Russian diplomat was expelled because Moscow did not heed the recommendations of the Moldovan authorities and opened polling stations on the left bank for the presidential elections. As a result, the consular service of the Russian Embassy was disrupted. Russia’s retaliatory measures reduced the capacity of our consular section in Moscow. A delegation from the State Services Agency was even sent to the Russian capital in order to get things going. Earlier this summer, investigative reporters posted a story alleging that former Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan was linked to Russia’s military intelligence service. The evidence was reportedly obtained through access to his Telegram account. The general was accused of providing information about the political situation in the country, as well as details regarding the visits and conversations of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s representatives during their stay in Moldova. Less than two months later, another spy drama broke out. This time, the head of the parliament’s legal department, Ion Creanga, suspected of treason, got in a heap of trouble. According to the investigation, Creanga and one of the Border Police employees imparted information about the activities of the parliament and the Chisinau airport to the Russian deputy military attaché in Chisinau. As a result, the foreign ministries of the two countries expelled one more employee each, bringing their embassies closer to imminent paralysis. Undoubtedly, all these spy stories are clearly political, creating an appropriate image of Russia. In addition, they are designed to strengthen the ruling regime’s electoral ties with its loyal electorate, which is largely anti-Russian. After the cleanup of the Moscow embassy last year, the authorities find it equally important to demonstrate how seriously the Moldovan state system is pervaded by Russian spies, who are embedded even in the closest entourage of the country’s top officials like Igor Grosu. When there are no more “spies” and “secret agents” left, chill in Russian-Moldovan relations is likely to be further maintained by occasional operational media leaks and so-called journalistic investigations, which will motivate the Moldovan leadership to take new sanctions measures. Thus, just at the beginning of August, an investigation appeared in the press that several firms registered in Moldova were found to be running sea vessels and helping to transport Russian oil through dubious schemes. According to the investigation, there are 12 companies that may be linked to each other. The Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance has already demanded additional data from them. It can be assumed that they will meet roughly the same unfortunate fate as the companies that supplied aircraft parts to Russia. In terms of political logic, we can understand the ruling regime. But no matter how hard our politicians try to break ties with Moscow, it does not work, because citizens still have a public demand for balanced relations with both the East and the West. This factor cannot be ignored, especially in the run-up to the presidential election. However, it appears that Maia Sandu’s election headquarters is betting not on an equidistant foreign policy, but on the mobilization of right-wing anti-Russian groups and the reduced activity of voters with balanced political views. The Kremlin is probably counting on changes in the political configuration in our country following the results of the autumn vote and parliamentary elections next year. This can explain the fact that, despite all the above-mentioned scandals and demarches, Moscow still has not included Moldova in the list of unfriendly countries with a corresponding set of sanctions and restrictions.