Expert: Russia Won’t Retreat from Moldova

Sergiu CEBAN

Russia is replacing its ambassador to our country amid building up its soft power while launching and actively engaging with local political projects

Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing a new Russian ambassador to Moldova yesterday. An experienced diplomat Oleg Ozerov will be new ambassador, who started his professional career in the Soviet times. He specializes mainly in the Middle East and Africa, having worked in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia. He was also a senior adviser and deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. His last job was at the secretariat of the Russia-Africa Forum. Ozerov will replace Oleg Vasnetsov, who has been in charge of the Russian diplomatic mission for the past six years. This was undoubtedly one of the toughest periods in the history of Russian-Moldovan relations. Against the backdrop of open confrontation between Russia and the West since 2022, Chisinau has made a well-known strategic choice, which could not but affect contacts with Moscow. During his office, Vasnetsov was regularly summoned to our foreign ministry to listen to complaints about the statements by Russian officials and politicians, violations of our airspace, and the opening of polling stations on the left bank of the Dniester for the Russian presidential elections. Numerous scandals and demarches led to a significant reduction in the embassy staff of both countries. It is hard to say how a person with such a career profile as Ozerov’s will be able to understand the specifics of Moldova and post-Soviet processes in general. Perhaps, the Kremlin’s choice was based not only on the concrete specialization of the candidates. Be that as it may, if the new ambassador has really come with the task of reviving relations between Russia and Moldova, he has a lot of work to do. The directives and instructions the diplomat has received from his superiors will become clear in the coming months, unless he decides to make himself and/or Moscow’s considerations known at the height of the presidential race. We have already discussed many times what is happening between Chisinau and Moscow. The deterioration of ties has been going on for the past few years, and there are no signs of stopping this trend in the near future. The authorities have not yet decided to make a sharp escalation or a complete break with the CIS, but at the same time it seems that our agencies are constantly monitoring and identifying the remaining “connecting lines” in order to cut them quickly after “hedging the risks”. The most recent example: the termination of the Russian payment system Zolotaya Korona, the last one that enabled money transfers from Russia to Moldova. Nevertheless, Russia is not ready to accept Moldova’s categorical departure to the western harbor, counting on revenge. Thus, it continues to invest actively, if not in the absolute and unconditional victory of local political forces loyal to itself, then, at least, in the overthrow of the current regime and the formation of a structurally more complex and balanced configuration of power, with which it can try to negotiate something, even amidst the complexity of the international situation. The fact that our country was never included in the list of “hostile” states is a sure sign that Moscow is still hoping for something. According to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, this does not happen because the Russian Federation distinguishes between the unfriendly actions of the Moldovan authorities and the position of the people. The opinion is more than original – it will be extremely interesting to observe what will be said in the Russian capital if our citizens re-elect Maia Sandu and, in addition, confidently validate the pro-European referendum. The appointment of a new ambassador on the eve of important electoral processes is hardly a mere coincidence. As if Moscow is sending a message to our electorate that it is not only ready but is also waiting for a new climate in relations with Moldova. In return, it expects a proper reaction from Moldovan voters at the polls, which will lead to serious political shifts. No matter how much the Kremlin strategists want it, tactically they should hardly rely on a rapid change of the situation in the Moldovan direction. Despite the desire of a considerable number of our citizens to have tolerable relations with the Russian Federation, there is little doubt that the majority of the population still has a pragmatic mindset and considers joining the European Union a much more promising option for its future. Under the current conditions, only a politician who is extremely distant from the actual realities can seriously talk about Moldova’s integration into the EAEU. From strategic point of view, however, things are not so gloomy. It is obvious that Russia is extremely encouraged by the experience of restoring relations with Georgia, which seemed absolutely beyond Russian influence. But against the backdrop of the aggravation with the West, Tbilisi is showing an unprecedented readiness to renew cooperation even on the most difficult issues, and is receiving reciprocity. Moldova, in this respect, is actually much more prone to return to Moscow’s influence, as there are simply no insurmountable problems between the two countries. A change of an ambassador, albeit a rotating one, is always a certain gesture, including on the part of the host state. The fact that Chisinau decided not to suspend the issue until after the presidential elections and not to “behead” the Russian embassy speaks volumes. As does the fact that, having agreed on the candidature of the new ambassador, Sandu decided to accept his credentials in person, which will be signed by Putin and Lavrov. It is hard to imagine what exactly the Kremlin could offer to improve our relations right now. Alas, in many ways their future depends on how the conflict in Ukraine ends. Until then, they will remain virtually frozen, with the risk of further decline. If we try to predict Russia’s actions, based on the totality of the remaining and currently created additional opportunities, then, most likely, it will try to somehow get a grip on Moldova in order to “prevent it from becoming a second Ukraine”. Over the last six months, one could notice a change in the forms of work in our direction. We are talking not only about cooperation with specific politicians and the launch of various political projects, but also about a real build-up of “soft power”: targeted work with young people, professional associations and non-governmental organizations. This suggests that Russian officials are still learning and trying new methods of achieving their goals. Therefore, it is obvious that Moscow will not accept the new reality for a long time and will continue to persist in Moldova.