Political Ramifications of the Energy Crisis on the Dniester

Sergiu CEBAN

The inept administration of the energy crisis and a failed solution could turn into a political fiasco for the government of Dorin Recean and the PAS party

Moldova continues to be in a state of energy crisis. Despite all the encouraging statements by politicians, there are no signs of improvement so far. In the meantime, experts analyze what political effects the current situation will have on each of the banks of the Dniester, as well as in relations between them. One of Maia Sandu’s few trips to “reach out to people” which ended with a very difficult conversation with residents of settlements in the Security Zone, is a vivid example. Those people, as it turned out, see the causes of the crisis somewhat differently and expect more involvement of the authorities. Thus, the head of state saw the real moods of ordinary people, which will only get hotter as the energy shortage intensifies. The situation on the left bank is not much better. Some pockets of discontent can also be seen in social networks. However, they have not developed into any organized public protest, as the residents are mostly focused on dealing with the severe humanitarian consequences of the crisis. This does not indicate an increase in sympathy and loyalty to the local authorities, but to some extent the population solidarizes with their actions. Despite the fact that this energy crisis, unacceptable in today’s world, has occurred in the middle of Europe (although there are no hostilities on the territory of Moldova and it does not require enormous resources for its supply), no one has sounded the alarm yet, except for the international media coverage of this issue. The impression is that everyone in the key capitals is waiting for some decisions to be made by Chisinau and Tiraspol. A week later, it became clear that the dire situation on the banks of the Dniester had not become a political trigger. Nevertheless, the new OSCE Chairmanship hurriedly arrived in Moldova to try to sort things out and, if possible, to offer something to the parties. In any case, for an outside observer, the energy crisis is linked to the unresolved conflict and, ultimately, to the status of Transnistria. However, all statements directly related to the subject of the negotiation process somehow immediately faded into the background. The main attention, of course, was focused on how Chisinau and Tiraspol plan to get out of the complicated energy issue: by applying a cooperative model or, on the contrary, by increasing confrontation and polarity of views. At the same time, it is obvious that with all the uncertainties, Europe is hardly willing to have another hotbed of instability not only in the neighborhood of struggling Ukraine but also right next to its borders and Romania, where, given the recent events, the situation is also heating up. Any crisis is obviously not only about risks, damage and losses, but also about opportunities. If circumstances allow, our authorities will not fail to change the energy balance and reduce the factor of Russian energy resources on the left bank of the Dniester. We do not know the details, but we can assume that the Transnistrian administration has been given alternative sources to cover the gas deficit. It is no coincidence that the European Commission recommended Tiraspol not to refuse Chisinau’s offers. I think in this case Brussels does not take into account the broad picture of the conflict, where the energy sector, occupying an important place, is closely linked to the budget and economy of the left bank, large production enterprises, the Moscow-controlled MoldGRES, and many other points that are difficult to ignore. Therefore, let us assume that it is not so easy to accept even free aid, if the details of such support are not clear. Moreover, the abundant exchange of public messages proves Tiraspol’s readiness to consider the option of purchasing gas outside the existing contract between Moldovagaz and Gazprom. However, terms are put forward to unblock the possibility of currency transactions and to allow Transnistrian traders to enter not only the Moldovan energy market, but also international hubs. On the one hand, it seems to change the long-standing energy configuration between the banks of the Dniester, which will inevitably lead to changes in the political and negotiating nature, which our authorities have been seeking for many years. On the other hand, it may open wider international opportunities for Tiraspol and only strengthen its position in case it gets a flexible, diversified and long-term access to energy resources. Therefore, finding an optimal way out of the current crisis is a very complicated task, which cannot be solved by turning a valve on the gas pipe. To cope with this complex energy gambit will require subtle diplomatic skills and willingness to make some compromises, which were simply unthinkable for both Chisinau and Tiraspol back in December. Given that this year, like the previous ones, has an electoral vein, the solution to the described equation is unlikely to be permanent. Therefore, socio-political and electoral consequences for both banks cannot be avoided. But if for Tiraspol the increase in negative sentiments among the inhabitants of the region will not have a tangible effect in terms of loss of power and control over the situation, for the government of Dorin Recean and the Action and Solidarity party, loss due to the energy crisis may turn into a political fiasco. Continued uncertainty in the energy sector certainly is harmful to everyone. The left bank administration reported a frightening drop in the region’s imports and exports, which will affect the ability to continue various sectoral programmes. It will be much worse if Tiraspol has difficulties in fulfilling its social obligations. In this case, everyone will sooner or later start looking towards Chisinau, and the government has no spare reserves to cover such a deficit. As communication with villagers in the Security Zone has shown, the authorities have frankly lost the information war on this geographical perimeter. The narratives of Tiraspol and Moscow proved to be more stable and preferable, despite the fact that the settlements are under the control of constitutional authorities. Perhaps some believe that citizens living in close proximity to Transnistria may be more influenced by propaganda. But we would not rule out certain rethinking of the causes and perpetrators of the current crisis in other regions, where the position of PAS is already fragile. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask how will the incumbent regime behave if the Kremlin achieves a critical increase in irritation and resentment among Moldovan citizens, and PAS feels that it has every chance to lose power including through the results of opinion polls. Are we waiting for another “Romanian scenario” with the cancellation of the voting results, or a “Ukrainian” scenario, i.e. the continuation of the parliamentary mandate under the pretext of opposing Moscow’s hybrid attacks?