Depopulation as a National Challenge for Moldova

Vladimir ROTARI

The preliminary results of the 2024 census expectedly show a depressive picture for the country

Moldova’s demographic landscape, outlined by the 2024 national census, reveals a set of interrelated crises. Each of them - from population decline to increasing regional disparities - forms a “demographic trap”, the consequences of which will grow like a snowball. Getting out of the trap is extremely difficult without major national measures - and there is no guarantee that even these will help. Current trends Yesterday, the National Bureau of Statistics presented, with a slight delay, the preliminary results of the 2024 census. The presented indicators hardly surprised experts and the public, given that Moldova’s demographic problems are well known. Nevertheless, almost all figures from yesterday’s report reflect negative trends, to a greater or lesser extent, and there are no reasons for even minimal positive mood at all. So, in ten years the population of the country has decreased by almost 400 thousand people or about 14%. That is somewhat less (in percentage terms) than in the period from 2004 to 2014, but still very much. To understand, that’s about four times as many as live in the second most populous city in the republic (excluding the left bank). Another not-so-good comparison: Russia and Ukraine have lost less in combat during the three years of full-scale war than we did during a decade of peaceful life. At the same time, the changes are structural in nature. First of all, the growth of urbanization draws attention. But in our case, it is not a sign of development, but a symptom of the crisis of rural areas. The capital absorbs already 30% of the population (+16.7% in 10 years), becoming a kind of “state within a state”. The problem is that this is ensured not by natural increase (the birth rate in Chisinau, as elsewhere, is very low), but by internal migration, i.e. the flight of rural residents and residents of other cities from poverty and lack of prospects. As a result, the success of the capital overshadows the collapse of the rest of the periphery, which inevitably becomes empty. In all regional zones, except Gagauzia (where the birth rate is slightly higher and labor migration is less “irrevocable”), a drop of 20% or more has been recorded. The worst situation is in the south, which is also connected with another crisis, the agrarian one. In addition to regional imbalances, there are age and gender problems. There are even fewer men per 100 women than in 2014 (89 vs. 93): an obvious consequence of labor migration. The share of the elderly population over 65 has risen sharply, while the “15-64-year-old” group has slipped by 4.1%. This is equivalent to the loss of one hundred thousand workers. Even the increase in the percentage of children, unfortunately, is not a sign of the “baby boom”, but a consequence of the overall population decline. Causes and effects It is well known why Moldova is losing its citizens at one of the fastest rates in the world. The first reason is the radical decline in the birth rate in the post-Soviet period. The corresponding coefficient has more than halved since the late 1980s to a level of 1.3, which cannot ensure population reproduction. Both socio-economic barriers (high housing costs, low incomes, underdeveloped support system, lack of kindergartens) and cultural and mental changes characteristic of the whole Eastern Europe and connected with the increase in the average age of marriage and the growing number of childless couples play a crucial role. The second reason is migration abroad. This includes both those who simply leave for good in search of a better life and our guest workers. As a result, at least one million Moldovans are now permanently living abroad - and these are mostly people of working age, who could not only be useful in their homeland (if the economy allowed it), but also create families, have children, etc. The negative trend is that while in the 2000s migration was mostly temporary, now it is increasingly becoming irrevocable. The same poverty, high unofficial unemployment, loss of faith in Moldova’s prospects are the reasons for the outflow of population. The consequences of falling into a demographic hole are multifaceted and seriously threaten the future of the country. The erosion of the age group that is supposed to drive the country’s development leads to an acute shortage of personnel in key sectors, which is already being felt now. Thus, labor productivity will decline, enterprises will shut down, especially in labor-intensive sectors, and investment attractiveness will drop - no one will open a production facility if there is no one to work there. If the population continues to age (and by 2030 the share of the elderly may increase to 25%), reducing the number of workers relative to pensioners to a one-to-one ratio would mean a huge increase in the burden on health care and, especially, on the pension system, making it financially unviable. After that, there are only a few options left: a new increase in the retirement age, a reduction in payments down to token ones, or a radical reform (for example, a transition to self-sufficiency), which threatens an explosion of social discontent. It is hard to imagine any economic breakthrough without people, as the current Minister of Economy, Dumitru Alaiba, talks about. On the contrary, dependence on remittances will only grow, creating a relative illusion of stability and discouraging change. However, a situation in which large numbers of citizens make money abroad, often working illegally, is itself fraught with risks, both in terms of failure to return it and possible crises in the host countries. Another important factor is the marginalization of rural areas and, in general, territories outside the capital. Without people, they will only face degradation of local infrastructure, closure of schools, hospitals, shops, deterioration of living standards and increase in crime. And this, in turn, will further encourage the population to flee. It is a vicious circle. Is there any way out? Unfortunately, despite the evidence of the demographic crisis, the country’s political elites have not even tried to seriously address it. The loss of human capital is not something that can be banned through the Commission for Emergency Situations or “flooded” with EU grants. It requires a national strategy and the full attention of the state. But even though the authorities recognize the problem, and the opposition often emphasizes it, a comprehensive demographic policy has been absent as a class for the past decades. At the same time, it cannot be denied that success cannot be achieved by administrative methods alone. Targeted support measures must necessarily go hand in hand with the overall recovery of the state, primarily economic. Perhaps that is why even the current authorities, under which the issue of depopulation is more acute than ever, prefer to focus on democratic reforms and integration into the European Union, considering them a magic pill for all the country’s ills. Although the EU accession will probably only accelerate the population’s departure, given the open borders and opportunities for legal employment in richer countries. Obviously, simply turning a blind eye to the problem and shifting it to Brussels or the next generations is a way to nowhere. If we continue to leave the situation to itself, by the next census we will arrive at a population of about two million people, a large number of pensioners and a small number of workers, young people and women of fertile age, and an “extinct” rural area. Under such conditions, the prospects of Moldova as an independent state entity will become frankly futile. It should be honestly said that it is almost impossible to correct the demographic situation in Moldova completely. But there are ways to at least mitigate it with non-standard and systemic solutions. The first thing that should be done is to start developing (necessarily involving the EU expert assistance or individual European countries) a national long-term strategy in the field of demography with a budget of at least 1.5-2% of GDP (and preferably more), involving the mobilization of available resources of society and coordinated actions at all levels: from state policy to local initiatives. It should first of all “hit” two key problems - birth rate and migration. Support for families must become an absolute priority with a multiple increase in basic payments (childbirth allowances, care and education allowances, etc.) and the creation of programmes such as maternity fund. It will be necessary to modernize and build the relevant infrastructure - schools and kindergartens. No less important is the information component: propaganda of family values, publicly available programmes to prepare for parenthood, help in raising children, and psychological support for young fathers and mothers. These measures coupled with others could have an effect within the next decade. The demographic situation can be improved even faster by encouraging repatriation. How? For example, by exempting “returnees” from income tax, subsidies for starting a business, building special housing, job offers, compensation for relocation, etc. The current calls by officials for people to return are certainly good, but they should be backed up by concrete bonuses. Most likely, labor force from abroad will have to be attracted as well. Although migration is closely associated with social problems, it is possible to rationalize the integration of foreign workers into Moldovan society in order to minimize negative aspects. The above is only a tiny part of what can be done to solve “problem №1”. Moreover, there are many countries with quite successful experience in implementing demographic projects. Finding those that would be suitable for Moldova and trying to apply them in practice in our country is by no means an impossible task. But for its own reasons, the current ruling regime has not shown much desire to deal with demography in four years, although it should have. Because if nothing changes, in the next decades we risk to find ourselves in a situation when Chisinau will be the only island of relative prosperity surrounded by depressive subsidized regions with crumbling infrastructure. It is time for the authorities to ask themselves whether they want Moldova to become a “ghost country” - formally existing but gradually disappearing from the map of Europe.