Who Will Enjoy the US Backing in Parliamentary Elections?

The political force that will seize the opportunity and “invite” the new American administration into Moldovan affairs will have intriguing prospects  

Anton ŠVEC The ruling system designed by Maia Sandu and her entourage with the decisive role and support of the United States is now being seriously tested. The endless credit of trust and generous funding from Washington is no longer available. Not only subsidies to the budget, but also the maintenance of the so-called “civil society”, which in many respects determined the political lone of the country taking into account the overseas orders, has ceased. The president’s office and government are in a tight corner. Dereck Hogan, who supervised the transit of PAS from the opposition to the majority party, was fired from the US Department of State and has no influence on anything else. At the same time, the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau still employs Democratic Party proxies, whose appointment Hogan was personally involved in. Therefore, Maia Sandu is not able to make a sharp political turnaround - this would destroy many years of informal ties and agreements without guarantees of restarting relations with Washington on new principles that would be favorable to Moldova. Our country is absolutely peripheral and uninteresting for the new US administration: we have no rare-earth metals or other minerals, no prospects for the development of artificial intelligence, traditional energy and crypto-industry. But there is a potential point of tension that could hinder the establishment of pragmatic relations with Russia. This is, of course, the unresolved Transnistrian conflict and Russia’s military presence in the region, which might be used to provoke problems between Moscow and Washington. This was the scenario played by the US embassy in our country during the gas and energy crisis in January, orienting the ruling regime towards confrontational actions, which eventually led to problems even for the European Commission. And the Democrats’ influence on the Moldovan leadership and personally on Maia Sandu, who is regularly rewarded by various US funds linked to the Democratic Party, still persists, which constrains their ability to establish contact with the White House. PAS cannot support the new American course for other reasons as well. Its neighborhood with warring Ukraine and its understanding of the Kremlin’s hypothetical intentions in Transnistria in the event of Kyiv’s capitulation restrain any attempt to solidarize with the Trump administration by publicly opposing the office of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Such a demarche, especially amid the presentation of credentials by Ukrainian Ambassador Paun Rohovei, who has solid ties in Chisinau, could have serious negative consequences for relations with our eastern neighbor. This is largely why Moldova has recently supported an anti-Russian resolution in the UN to mark the three-year anniversary of the start of the conflict, and why the Moldovan ambassador to the US actively participates in pro-Ukrainian rallies in Washington organized by the Democratic Party. In addition, the integration into the European Union has been declared the strategic goal of the country’s foreign policy. This is confirmed by the results of the referendum, which, despite the specific counting of votes, are now reflected in the constitution and, of course, in the PAS programme. The Brussels bureaucracy and the leadership of a number of national partner states of Moldova are still ready to support the continuation of military actions in Ukraine and de facto President Zelensky, which was recorded during the recent “EU diplomatic landing” in Kyiv. Our authorities are simply unable to clash with the position of the EU establishment, as the lack of external legitimacy may provoke the dismantling of Maia Sandu’s power structure in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. In the near future, the Moldovan leadership will be forced to loop and follow the course of the European bureaucracy, waiting either for the failure of the Russian-American negotiations or for the partial restoration of the Democrats’ position in Washington in 2026. This arrangement provides unique opportunities for competing political projects to establish a common language with representatives of the new US administration. No party, except PAS, can expect Brussels’ support. Therefore, there is nothing to lose in this sense, especially when the sympathies of Donald Trump’s media and diplomatically active team will be at stake. The electoral bloc Alternativa has the biggest prospects. The White House has already backed another Alternative - ‘for Germany’ - in the Bundestag elections on 23 February, where it received the best result in its history. The right-wing populists are still out of power but will continue to grow in popularity amid an unstable coalition led by Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz. And Washington will continue to pressure the FRG, especially if the future federal chancellor does not reconsider the pro-Ukrainian and anti-American rhetoric of recent days. But so far, he has only reneged on his campaign promises to strengthen migration control, which will only further anger critics from Donald Trump’s entourage. The White House is promoting another “alternative” in Romania with maximum persistence. It is about the non-party candidate Calin Georgescu, who, under pressure from Washington, should be allowed to participate in the presidential election and is likely to win it. Vice President JD Vance, billionaire Elon Musk have already spoken out against the cancellation of the vote and in favor of Georgescu’s success, and Robert Kennedy Jr., the new head of the US Department of Health, even wanted to come to Bucharest and participate in the protests. The Alternativa bloc is probably already looking for common ground with the new American administration in order to propose a vision for Moldova that could interest Washington. The formation has its own “trump cards”: a pragmatic foreign policy with a willingness to play on the contradictions between Brussels and Washington, an intention to return to normal cooperation with Russia, including by abandoning sanctions, and the background of a number of bloc members who have never been known for their sympathy for the democratic agenda. Ion Ceban has traditionally shunned LGBT issues and clashed with specialized NGOs. But the main advantage of Alternativa will be the chance to build relations “from scratch” without being constrained by previous agreements with the Democrats. Thus, the American factor in the upcoming parliamentary elections may turn out to be significant and at the same time unpredictable, if Washington pays attention to Moldova at all. The political force that will take advantage of the opportunity and “invite” the new American administration into Moldovan affairs will have intriguing prospects. And it’s obvious that this force will not be the party in power, which needs to think about a political deal or a “departure” to the opposition.