A Hot Election Summer Ahead

Sergiu Ceban

European, alternative, or sovereign – Moldova prepares for parliamentary elections

Despite the gusts of cold geopolitical winds whose impact on Moldova remains uncertain, we are facing a very heated political summer – and possibly an equally intense autumn if the parliamentary elections fail to quickly produce a ruling coalition and a new government. But for now, spring is in the air, and we are watching the final preparations in campaign headquarters before the active election period begins. Nevertheless, the parliamentary majority is in no hurry to set a date for the vote. According to the Constitution, it can be held between July 26 and October 26. Some lawmakers from the ruling party lean toward holding the elections in September, while others believe the electoral process should be postponed until the latest possible date. While PAS is in no particular rush to set the election date, it has made significant progress in shaping the rules of the electoral race. Legislative initiatives are coming one after another, each more striking than the last. One proposal suggests banning political entities that are successors of parties declared unconstitutional. Another bill aims to tighten internet censorship, introducing penalties for ‘online disinformation’ and expanding the powers of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) to conduct monitoring. All of this comes after a significant portion of Moldova’s political journalism migrated to open internet platforms, where it has been effectively influencing public sentiment. In fact, PAS is carrying out the directives outlined by the EU ambassador through these very measures. Earlier, Janis Mazeiks warned that Moldova’s European integration process could be slowed down or even halted if the parliamentary elections are not free and fair. To avoid this, he stressed that the authorities must fast-track legislative changes to address electoral corruption, foreign interference, disinformation on social media, and cyberattacks. Over the past month, polling results have shifted somewhat, and the number of parties with a chance of entering the next parliament is gradually changing. According to the raw numbers from a poll published today by a well-known sociological service, left-wing and centrist parties could collectively secure a parliamentary majority – excluding votes from the diaspora and the Transnistrian region – potentially pushing PAS into the opposition. Undoubtedly, the Party of Action and Solidarity and the Party of Socialists remain among the main favorites. It is still difficult to assess the electoral dynamics of the National Alternative Movement Party bloc, as it influences almost the entire political spectrum and has the potential to drastically reshape the political landscape. In March, PAS officially launched its election campaign, and in the coming months, a steady increase in its pace is expected to reach a consistent rhythm of pre-election agitation. In general, as the experience of the presidential race shows, the ruling party will not surpass its limits, meaning the main focus will be on the diaspora, where most voters, despite everything, are pro-European in their views. When considering the prospects of PAS, what truly deserves attention is Andrei Spinu’s specific courting of the party’s leaders. Through both open and closed communication channels, he offers himself and his skills set, signaling readiness to return to the government – that is, to Maia Sandu’s team and inner circle. Currently, we can hardly tell whether this is done from the position of “I am guilty, I have understood everything” or with a hint of “I ask you all to think carefully again”.  However, regardless of anyone’s wishes, it is unlikely that such a figure can simply be discounted. Too much is connected to and dependent on him, and persistent attempts to completely marginalize Spinu will most likely have serious consequences for the unity of the ruling party. The Socialists have also enlisted the efforts and are beginning to engage with the election agenda. The main problem of the PSRM is that it is essentially PAS’s alter ego. The party is moving by inertia, relying on its core electorate without offering new ideas, projects, or development concepts for the country. The lack of a proactive agenda that aligns with reality automatically puts the Socialists on the sidelines, even if they manage to gain more votes than the rest of the opposition. National Alternative Movement Party remains a mystery to experts, as it has only just begun to reveal details of its program. Due to its moderate pre-election pace, it is very difficult to predict the real chances of this ‘political hodgepodge’. We can agree with some analysts who believe that if the bloc continues at this slow pace, it risks failing to reach the high-speed mode necessary for this particular electoral campaign. Despite the clear chances of Ilan Shor’s group entering the next parliament, there is a high probability that all political projects linked to the fugitive oligarch will be removed from the electoral process. PAS has taken a firm stance, going as far as setting specific prison terms for deputies affiliated with Shor. As a result, his parties will either be absorbed or pushed out of the political arena. A sovereignist bloc is also taking shape, consisting of the communists, Irina Vlah, Vasile Tarlev, and others, to be potentially joined by some of Shor’s former cronies. Among them, Vlah is perhaps the only one with a realistic chance of passing the electoral threshold. However, it is possible that, based on polling data, a decision will be made to unite into a single bloc in order to maximize their electoral results. And finally, we want to mention the lineup of spoilers and revanchists. It is evident that the left-wing opposition is now striving to consolidate its electoral resources rather than wasting time on micro-projects. Therefore, any emerging structures led by Marian Lupu, Nicolai Dudoglo, and others look like an attempt to win over at least some group of voters. These particular examples clearly seem to be the brainchild of PAS and oligarchs seeking revenge. If the presidential elections and the referendum were considered historic and pivotal, the parliamentary elections represent a true geopolitical battle for survival. While much attention is given to the Kremlin’s plans to influence the voting process and its outcome, one cannot ignore the obvious fact that the EU will be just as actively involved in the electoral process to advance its tactical and strategic goals in the growing confrontation with Moscow. Therefore, while the U.S. remains focused on its foreign policy priorities, Moldova will, for at least the next six months, be a key battleground in the intense Russia-EU rivalry. In conclusion, the main assumption is this – the shape of the key pre-election agenda by summer will largely determine the outcome of the autumn vote. For the Kremlin and the opposition, the goal is to steer voters toward a protest-driven narrative, calling for internal political restructuring. At the same time, Brussels and PAS will focus on stabilizing the situation to reassure voters that the current political course, and by extension the regime, is controlled and irreversible.