Chisinau Is to Decide: Is Russia a Friend or a Foe?

Until yesterday, it seemed that relations between Chisinau and Moscow had already hit rock bottom, but the confrontation is likely to continue “until the last diplomat”.

Sergiu Ceban, RTA: The start of the year was marked by several incidents, and it seems that until the elections, we will see many more episodes that will push Moldova and Russia even further apart in (geo)political terms. After the February incident involving the crash of Russian UAVs on our country’s territory, the overall situation in Moldovan-Russian relations never entered a state of remission. Instead, within just a few weeks, tensions once again escalated to the breaking point. Several serious examples further strained the situation, pushing the relationship ever closer to the brink of a complete diplomatic rupture. First and foremost, this refers to the high-profile detention of the Governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, whose calls for help were met with a response from the Kremlin in one way or another. Moscow informed the UN Security Council about Gutul’s detention, while Russia’s permanent representative to the OSCE, during a meeting of the organization’s Permanent Council, called on the High Commissioner on National Minorities to put pressure on the Moldovan authorities and ensure the Governor’s swift release from custody. A particularly painful blow for Chisinau was the Russian government’s decision to ban Moldovan freight carriers from entering Russia, including for transit, starting March 28. This decree also reduces the list of goods that carriers from so-called ‘unfriendly countries’ (a category that Moscow now seemingly includes Moldova in) are allowed to transport through Russia. The expedited court rulings against deputies Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, who could not be found within the country, also caused a stir. After facing harsh criticism from the media and public opinion, the head of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) held a press conference yesterday morning, showcasing video footage as proof that security agencies had been closely monitoring the Russian embassy. The footage also revealed that Nesterovschi was transported to the left bank in a vehicle belonging to the Russian diplomatic mission.  Strangely enough, despite such extensive surveillance and the intelligence resources involved, none of our powerful institutions managed to prevent this ‘diplomatic operation’, allowing the convicted individual to be taken across the Dniester. Let us recall that earlier, on March 19, the territory of the Russian embassy in Chisinau was blocked by law enforcement officials due to an alleged bomb threat. Apparently, the disappearance of the two deputies and the entry of our security forces onto the premises of the diplomatic mission under the guise of demining technicians were more about ‘search operations’ than actual security protocol enforcement. Nevertheless, the embassy was quick to label yesterday’s video evidence from the SIS as unfounded and unacceptable, citing that the Moldovan authorities had not sent official requests for legal assistance under the existing international agreements. At the same time, Russia deemed it possible, under these circumstances, to urge Chisinau to return to a pragmatic dialogue on the entire range of bilateral issues. We don’t know what Oleg Ozerov was expecting, but a few hours later, the foreign ministry handed him another note of protest and declared three embassy employees personae non gratae. What stands out here is not so much the number of expelled diplomats, but rather their identities – most notably, Russia’s co-chair of the Joint Control Commission, which is responsible for overseeing the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester. In Moscow, the decision of the Moldovan authorities to expel diplomats was predictably called unfounded and part of Chisinau’s anti-Russian course, aimed at the complete destruction of Russian-Moldovan relations. Unlike the Russian embassy, which neither confirmed nor denied the presence of the convicted ex-deputy on its premises, the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the embassy in Chisinau does not interfere in Moldova’s internal affairs. And, of course, there were threats of an inevitable harsh asymmetrical response. During one of yesterday’s broadcasts, Maia Sandu mentioned that the constitutional authorities had addressed Tiraspol with a demand to hand over the fugitive deputies to justice. However, later, the political office of Transnistria issued a public response stating that the region’s responsible bodies had no information regarding Nesterovschi’s whereabouts on its territory. It can be assumed that if the former deputy was indeed taken to the left bank using diplomatic transport, he is most likely under the protection of the relevant Russian authorities and military forces stationed in the Transnistrian region, especially given earlier reports that both Nesterovschi and Lozovan had acquired Russian citizenship. In addition to the fact that another round of departing diplomats will further limit the embassy’s operational capacity, the authorities have, for the first time, seemingly decided to expel Russia’s senior representative in a key peacekeeping structure. Just last week, the JCC (Joint Control Commission) overcame a prolonged crisis and decided to resume full-scale operations. This development did not go unnoticed in Vienna, and at the level of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office’s Special Representative for the Transnistrian settlement, it was described as a step toward normalization, given that the functioning of peacekeeping mechanisms plays a crucial role in upholding the provisions of the 1992 ceasefire agreement and maintaining peace in the Security Zone. However, it is reasonable to assume that stabilizing the situation on the Dniester with Russia’s active involvement and military presence does not align with the plans of other international players –  particularly those who do not welcome Russia’s presence in our regional space. This likely explains the specific choices made by our Foreign Ministry when compiling the list of diplomats designated for expulsion from Moldova. Ultimately, we are witnessing a strange configuration in Moldovan-Russian relations, which seem to be in a state resembling some rare psychological disorder. On the one hand, there’s a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, and at least for now, no one has formally questioned or denounced it. On the other hand, the current nature of interstate relations more closely resembles a state of war than peace. Moreover, while Chisinau has apparently granted agrément to Oleg Ozerov, the president shows no urgency (and seemingly no desire) to accept his letters of credence. And this pattern applies to nearly all areas of the bilateral agenda. It’s still difficult to understand what exactly triggered such a sharp escalation. It’s possible that PAS has decided to pursue the toughest scenario and begin clearing the pre-election field of the most obvious Kremlin-backed political projects. Although, to be honest, it’s unlikely that these forces could have significantly influenced the final outcome of the elections. We also don’t believe that Shor’s toxic projects would realistically prevent the current ruling party from forming a ruling majority in the next parliament and continuing to run the country. It’s important to note that Moldova has recently started to be viewed in Moscow through the lens of the “unfriendly countries” list, something that hasn’t been the case in previous years. This could be an indicator that a sort of takeover of the Moldovan dossier is underway in the Kremlin, with a particular group actively pushing for a tougher Russian policy toward Chisinau. If things keep going like this, the current phase of the Moldova-Russia crisis will retrospectively seem a relatively mild form of misunderstanding.