Chisinau Burns Bridges with Moscow?

Relations with Moscow continue to deteriorate amid the ongoing situation and after a string of scandals with diplomatic consequences. Most likely, the current election year may become in some sense decisive for Russian-Moldovan relations: whether we will continue to drift apart or whether efforts will be made to find a compromise and a mutually acceptable framework for cooperation in the changed geopolitical realities. In the meantime, the tensions are rapidly growing, and there are many signs of this. For instance, over the past month several Moldovan citizens have been found guilty of preparing terrorist acts on the territory of the Russian Federation and working for the Ukrainian security services. Chisinau keeps a mysterious silence and gives no comments on these incidents, fueling suspicions and literally pushing Moldova into the Russia’s list of unfriendly states. Moreover, probably for the first time in more than three decades, Moscow has officially recommended that Russians take into account “discriminatory policies against Russian citizens entering Moldova” when planning trips to our country. At the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry points to the impossibility of consular support from its embassy in Chisinau, as the Moldovan authorities are allegedly denying its staff the necessary access. One of the most recent accusations from the Russian Foreign Ministry concerns Moldova’s attitude within the Commonwealth of Independent States. One of the Russian diplomats noted in this regard that Chisinau, despite its CIS membership, actually ignores its statutory bodies by absenting itself from their meetings and fails to pay its share contribution to the organization’s unified budget. However, despite the regular public exchange of accusations, it seems that in fact contacts between the President’s Office and the Kremlin have been more or less constant until recently. Judging by information from open sources, some reshuffles and redistribution of areas of responsibility have begun in Putin’s administration, but so far Dmitry Kozak remains the direct supervisor of the Moldovan direction. Although in one of the April broadcasts, former president Vladimir Voronin spoke quite openly about Kozak and his recent communication with him, saying that the Russian leadership had allegedly relieved the official of his duties following multiple failures in the entrusted foreign policy area. Yet, we proceed from the official data for now. Back in 2019, Dmitry Kozak played an important role in removing Vlad Plahotniuc from power. According to Voronin, at that time he unwittingly witnessed an episode when, on the sidelines of parliament, Kozak embraced Maia Sandu and Igor Dodon, who later formed the ruling coalition. Could anyone have imagined at that point that Moscow would develop plans for Plahotniuc’s comeback to Moldovan politics? More on that later. Even after the Sandu-Dodon tandem broke up, apparently in recognition of the great contribution in June 2019, communication between PAS leaders and advisers with Dmitry Kozak was maintained, and our government officials visited his office on several occasions. In autumn 2021, Andrei Spinu and Vladislav Kulminski were negotiating complex gas issue in Moscow, in which Kozak was personally involved. It is noteworthy that even the war in Ukraine did not prevent it from keeping in touch with the Russians, as evidenced by Victor Parlicov’s trip to St. Petersburg last year to meet with the head of Gazprom. Thus, in spite of rude altercations, the incumbent regime has been communicating with the Kremlin administration all these years. We would not rule out that in addition to official visits, there were also confidential trips in an attempt to reach at least some common ground. Of course, it is difficult to speak of any shared “game rules” without even minimal mutual trust, but politics, as we know, is the art of the possible. The way the election campaign was conducted last year, when the Kremlin used its entire arsenal to fail the referendum and prevent Maia Sandu from being re-elected for a second term, proves that no true understanding was ever reached. The importance of the forthcoming parliamentary elections can hardly be overestimated; they will indeed, without exaggeration, be of historic significance for Moldova. The stakes are so high that taking risks now to negotiate with the Russians again seems pointless for our ruling elite, even via closed channels. Therefore, it seems that Chisinau decided to go for broke and finally sever ties with the Kremlin contactors, putting their roles in Russia’s power vertical at risk. The other day, a short investigative film about Vladimir Plahotniuc’s secret trip to Moscow in the summer of 2024 surfaced in the Moldovan pro-government media and the PAS-affiliated network. There he allegedly held talks with Dmitry Kozak about his possible return to power. An audio recording of conversations with officials from Kozak’s entourage was made available to journalists and serves as the main evidence. Allegedly, Plahotniuc was accompanied by representatives of Russian special services and, in particular, by Vladislav Darvai, former trade representative in Moldova. If the audio recording is credible, during the fugitive oligarch’s stay in Moscow, they discussed options for launching processes in Moldovan politics that would eventually lead to the ouster of the current PAS regime and the return of the “old guard”. As the authors of the film suggest, the main brainchild of the “Moscow deal” is the Alternative bloc, although the video provides no direct or indirect evidence. It is clear that one of the goals of this investigation is to try to spark disappointment among the supporters of the newly-formed bloc, which has the potential to restore the oligarchic regime in Moldova. In fact, Russian officials are accused of cooperating with figures whom Moscow itself has exposed for serious offences and initiated criminal proceedings. There must have been attempts to draw some “red lines” before the publication of these materials, but apparently in vain, and the recordings became public. After that, the point of no return has been passed, and we can say that the PAS leaders have finally burnt their bridges with the Kremlin’s current group managing Moldova. The near future will reveal the ramifications of this move. The Russian leadership is unlikely to make quick personnel shifts, but we can confidently expect decisive actions, including in the upcoming election campaign. Be that as it may, the mere release of the film suggests that Chisinau, probably with Western intelligence support, successfully implemented a bold recon mission, obtaining valuable information rather sensitive to Russia. At the same time, it is possible that only a small part of the audio tapes was presented to the public and, as the situation around Moldova develops, the Kremlin administration may face new series of compromising materials.