How Can the Opposition Win Votes?

Ahead of the decisive struggle for power, PAS finds itself in a challenging position: crises in various sectors of the economy, stalled reforms, ambiguous political decisions, and a series of scandals related to international affairs and attempts to control the judiciary. The party still retains its core electorate through ideological mobilization and the support of its most convinced supporters, as well as increased backing from European Union bureaucratic structures. However, ratings are steadily declining – the current polling offers no guarantee of securing even half of the mandates in the XIIth Parliament. A potential victory by George Simion in the second round of elections in Romania, after which an early parliamentary campaign cannot be ruled out, could add to the problems for PAS. Once again, they have backed the wrong candidate in an allied country’s election, not to mention Chisinau’s historically complicated relationship with the frontrunner in Romania’s presidential race. Moreover, Moldova could become the target of media attacks by Simion and of active political efforts aimed at strengthening the base of local unionist parties. Despite the ruling regime’s objective difficulties, the opposition still fails to show the ability to seize the opportunity to take power. The electoral base of the Socialists is shrinking, prompting Igor Dodon to explore a shift toward the now-popular ‘sovereigntist’ agenda. Renato Usatii’s Our Party traditionally hovers around the electoral threshold, unable to translate its leader’s personal popularity into broader political support for the party as a whole. As of this spring, the Alternative bloc has also proven to be a disappointment. It consists of Ion Ceban’s MAN, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu’s Party of Development and Unification of Moldova, Mark Tkaciuk’s Civic Congress, and is bolstered, at least theoretically, by the strong figure of former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who gave Maia Sandu a tough time during last year’s presidential elections. Sociological data from April polls gives the Alternative bloc 7–9% of the total vote (10–12% among decided voters), which is 3 to 4 times less than the projected result for PAS, and lower than that of the PSRM and even the Victory bloc associated with Ilan Shor. Despite the ruling party’s crisis, a broader European demand for political transformation, and the bloc’s well-developed programs and platform, Alternative’s rating remains modest – something that undoubtedly causes concern for the architects of the upcoming campaign. The situation appears as though this project has not only failed to capitalize on Stoianoglo’s high popularity, but is also dragging down Ion Ceban personally – someone who could have counted on similar polling numbers and clearer positioning within his own MAN project. According to survey results, under the current circumstances, Alternative can at best hope to become a junior partner to PAS in the next parliamentary term, if the ruling party ever chooses that path rather than opting for a minority faction (while attempting to sway the missing MPs) and tactical, case-by-case voting. With four months remaining until the parliamentary elections, the bloc must significantly ramp up its campaigning efforts, especially in the regions, and work toward a more effective media presence. This role should fall to the four leading figures of the project, who need to be more assertive in criticizing the government and shift from complex political messaging (often hard for voters to grasp) to energetic campaigning based on clear slogans and concrete electoral promises. It is crucial to find ways to counterbalance the ruling party’s primitive electoral handouts, funded in recent months through the state budget, donor aid, and the use of administrative resources. Alternative decided to gamble on the PAS ‘field’ and win over pro-European voters who are tired of the ruling regime’s excesses. However, this plan is objectively failing. The bloc now urgently needs to find new sources of electoral growth. According to April polls, the number of undecided citizens ranges from a quarter to a third of the electorate. This segment could become a key asset for the opposition – comparable in importance to the diaspora vote, which is predictably expected to go in favor of PAS. However, to attract and mobilize those who have yet to make their choice, Alternative will need targeted, largely propagandistic initiatives that clearly align with the expectations of a broad audience. These could include promises to expand social support, curb migration, normalize the functioning of the transportation system (including the Chisinau airport), and launch a nationwide dialogue on strategic issues. Many of these elements are present in the bloc’s platform, but they haven’t been clearly conveyed in language accessible to the general public. Ion Ceban is bogged down in a positional struggle with the regime at the Chisinau level, while Alexandr Stoianoglo, Ion Chicu, and Mark Tkaciuk continue to engage in overly academic and dull discourse that fails to resonate with voters. Another resource that is very likely to boost the ratings of several parties, excluding PAS and its spoiler groups, is the electorate of the Victory bloc. Given the composition of the project and its affiliations, the ruling regime will almost certainly, through the intelligence services, the Central Electoral Commission, and/or the courts, ban any structures associated with Shor from participating in the upcoming elections. This would mean that over 200,000 disenfranchised voters will be ready to cast their ballots for other parties, primarily as a vote against PAS. A project that succeeds in attracting the majority of these votes will receive a substantial boost. To achieve this, Alternative will need to significantly intensify its confrontation with the regime and offer support, including legal assistance, to those who have suffered from lawlessness, including fabricated accusations of vote buying. Whether the bloc is ready for a more active and risk-taking campaign will become clear over the summer. But if its leaders are genuinely aiming for a successful campaign and entry into power, they need to act urgently.