Transnistrian Issue in Strategic Limbo

The authorities are making no real effort to resolve the Transnistrian issue, despite it being an obvious obstacle to Moldova’s ambition of joining the EU within the next five years

Our government and the European Commission have clearly decided that Moldova and Ukraine will move toward EU membership as part of a “single package”. That is, we will bear all the risks tied to Kyiv’s complicated relations with certain EU member states, as well as the ongoing war. Hungary, for example, has long backed Moldova’s European aspirations, yet remains one of the main opponents of Ukraine’s path to EU membership. In fact, a nationwide consultative referendum on the issue is set to conclude soon. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto is already threatening to cut off electricity supplies to Ukraine if Brussels moves forward with plans to ban Russian energy imports. As we prepare to launch accession talks, Moldova faces not only the “Ukrainian trap”, but also a host of its own deeply rooted problems, the complexity of which will undoubtedly come to the fore in the years ahead. And this goes beyond the ruling party’s effective hijacking of the very idea of European integration, which has already led to sharp societal divisions, most visibly during last year’s referendum. There’s also the very real issue of Transnistria – a geopolitical obstacle that clearly stands in the way of any hopes to join the European Union within the next five years. It is encouraging, at the very least, that our media have begun to address this issue, prompting at least some degree of reflection among officials. Earlier this week, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Cristina Gherasimov made several comments on the matter. She acknowledged that the existing legal framework allowing the Transnistrian region to trade with the European Union would become void the moment Moldova joins the bloc. Naturally, this will require new arrangements involving coordinated procedures between Brussels, Chisinau and Tiraspol. At the very least, Transnistria was brought into the framework of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (which replaced the so-called “autonomous trade preferences” a decade ago) through trilateral consultations and under the condition of liberalizing imports from the EU by eliminating customs duties. Notably, Tiraspol also enjoys de facto access to other free trade agreements signed by Moldova (including those with Ukraine, the CIS, Turkey, and the Central European Free Trade Agreement). Yet, in all these cases, it has not reciprocated by opening its own market or adopting any special arrangements. Gherasimov notes that Brussels has no interest in replicating the “Cyprus scenario” (where the island’s northern part, functioning as a pro-Turkish autonomous entity recognized only by Ankara, remains outside the EU and excluded from the common market, both with the Union and with the Greek Cypriot community). The EU, she says, wants to see Moldova integrated as a unified, unitary state. However, a possible arrangement is being considered in which, at the moment of signing the accession agreement, EU legislation would not apply to territories not under the control of Moldova’s constitutional authorities. How exactly this would work, the Deputy Prime Minister does not explain, likely because she herself has no clear vision of how to resolve the possible contradictions. She merely assures that the government will do “everything possible” to resolve the conflict before accession. This statement inevitably raises a number of legitimate questions. There has been no visible progress in resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Negotiations have been frozen for at least five years. The 5+2 format is effectively defunct and frequently criticized by both Chisinau and Kyiv. No official meetings with the Transnistrian leadership have taken place since Igor Dodon’s presidency, and contacts between political representatives have all but ceased, largely due to the refusal of left-bank officials to travel to Chisinau, and vice versa. All calls by the Transnistrian leaders to resume dialogue in traditional formats have gone unanswered, primarily because of Moscow’s involvement, but also due to PAS’s reluctance to engage with specific issues, which could risk normalizing the situation in Transnistria and inadvertently legitimizing the region’s elites. The ruling regime’s specific attitude toward the Transnistrian issue isn’t even tied to the upcoming parliamentary campaign, it shaped much earlier. At present, Chisinau effectively lacks a single official tasked with overseeing this portfolio. With Oleg Serebrian now serving as ambassador, the government has been slow to appoint a successor, potentially until after the parliamentary elections. The Finnish OSCE Chairpersonship, which initially made an energetic push, now shows little sign of further activity, likely after behind-the-scenes consultations with Moldovan authorities. And there are no guarantees that the end of the electoral cycle (especially given scenarios in which no government can be formed and snap elections become necessary) will in any way “revive” the settlement process. Nor is there any realistic prospect for a normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations that might allow for renewed joint mediation by these two key actors. At present, Chisinau insists on excluding Russia from status negotiations, calls for an enhanced role for the European Union, and sets the withdrawal of the Russian military presence as a precondition for progress. Naturally, neither Tiraspol nor Moscow is likely to accept this without resistance. But at the same time, Moldova cannot accede to the European Union while Russian troops remain stationed on its territory. Hoping for progress under these conditions, now further complicated by five years of stagnation, is futile. What we’re dealing with is a fundamentally flawed sense of direction, as a diplomatic resolution to the conflict remains out of reach unless key actors, including Chisinau, fundamentally rethink their strategic approach. Accordingly, Cristina Gherasimov is deliberately entertaining a scenario that is currently impossible, shielding the eurointegration myth that has become the cornerstone of PAS political identity, especially in the run-up to elections. The government is trying to buy time and postpone a serious discussion about how to involve the Transnistrian region in Moldova’s European integration steps and, ultimately, consolidate territorial sovereignty. This is particularly relevant given that residents of Transnistria, who largely hold pro-Russian views, remain essentially excluded from the country’s domestic political processes, a reality that, not coincidentally, suits the current regime quite well in electoral terms. As far as one can tell, no one is seriously addressing this issue, yet it will inevitably come to a head in the coming years, forcing all parties to seek creative solutions, much like they did a decade ago. Whether Brussels, Chisinau and Tiraspol are ready and capable of doing so remains an open question. At some point, the presidential administration may float the idea of simplifying the problem by “uncoupling the Transnistrian carriage” from Chisinau’s “Eurointegration train”. Such a move could well suit both the Kremlin and the local elites. The only thing left would be to deal with the Constitution, which defines Moldova as a unitary and indivisible state within its internationally recognized borders. Then again, when forced to choose between EU integration and the Constitution, PAS has never favored the latter. Under such conditions, the continued rule of the current regime almost inevitably points toward either territorial loss or military scenarios with unpredictable ramifications.