No “Alternative” on the Ballot

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Christian RUSSU
Behind the attack on Chisinau mayor and one of the leaders of the “Alternativa” bloc, Ion Ceban, lies both personal animosity from the PAS leadership and cold political calculation
In PR theory, one of the basic principles of growth is that “there’s no such thing as bad publicity”. Even negative PR is better than no attention at all. From this perspective, the travel ban to Romania and the Schengen area might seem like a useful incident for MAN leader Ion Ceban ahead of the fall elections. The topic is widely discussed not only in Moldova but also in foreign media. However, in reality, what happened is a serious blow to both Ceban’s personal political ambitions and to the opposition bloc he is part of. The ruling party has decided to secure a monopoly on European integration by resorting to banal administrative obstacles that limit the freedom of movement for its competitors. First of all, in our society, the image of a “victim” is rarely perceived positively. There are always those willing to kick someone who’s down or ridicule the rejected, but stepping in to help takes courage. Therefore, one should not expect an optimistic surge in “Alternativa’s” ratings. As I’ve written before, the ruling party has repeatedly used pressure tactics on the capital’s mayor whenever he crossed the boundaries of acceptable behavior, when he displayed ambitions beyond simply managing city hall. The authorities have accumulated considerable experience in “taming” Ceban. Before the presidential elections and the referendum last year, he was compelled to support the broader European integration agenda. On the eve of the first Moldova-EU political summit, he was targeted by law enforcement to keep him out of sight of top EU officials. Ceban’s willingness to cooperate with external partners was previously viewed as sufficient grounds to tolerate his continued political activity. Talk of a possible coalition with PAS was widespread. However, as Washington’s influence waned, and with the ruling party’s growing authoritarian tendencies and increasing intolerance toward any opposition, even harmless and pro-European ones, they decided that it would be easier to get rid of the primar altogether. Hence the visa ban was lobbied. Ceban himself provided plenty of reasons for such an attack. These include his direct criticism of Maia Sandu and his resistance to certain government events in the capital. Therefore, the authorities didn’t stop at mere warnings or raids – they went for a “low blow”. Ceban’s image isn’t that of a typical opposition figure, but rather that of a “problem solver”. A ban on entering Romania automatically deprives him of many practical opportunities to conduct his duties as mayor. Hence the emerging calls for his replacement, voiced through obedient political projects like the collapsing “Together” bloc. It has been repeatedly noted that the Alternativa bloc’s rating, despite its pro-European rhetoric, grows mainly at the expense of other center-left forces, not PAS. Therefore, the ruling party likely concluded that a more loyal junior coalition partner, if one is needed, might be Renato Usatîi rather than Ion Ceban. This would explain why Usatii is suddenly all over government-friendly TV and was even allowed to organize a massive concert in central Chisinau featuring Russian pop stars. The leader of “Our Party” was given almost everything he asked for, with one clear goal: to chip away at Alternativa’s ratings. Meanwhile, PAS continues its campaign to “de-Europeanize” the image of Chisinau’s mayor, pushing the narrative that he’s a “Kremlin asset”. Support from politicians like Igor Dodon is supposed to reinforce the idea among voters that the MAN leader is still a communist and a socialist at heart. Criticizing Western partners for the visa ban would be ill-advised for Ion Ceban. Moreover, Brussels officials likely weren’t fully informed about Bucharest’s ambiguous decision. Judging by the messaging, Romania’s newly formed government was in disarray and lacked coordination. The Romanian Foreign Ministry initially distanced itself, only to later confirm and actively comment on the matter, editing its own press releases in the process. Initially, it was only about banning three Moldovan politicians from entering Romanian territory, but then Schengen was added too. To many, this seemed like an operation choreographed in real time from the Moldovan presidential office, with Bucharest clumsily carrying out the “requests” of their Prut-side brethren. A crude display of power and influence by the ruling authorities aimed at demoralizing opponents just before the official start of the campaign. In the end, even if what was once Moldova’s most promising opposition bloc makes it into parliament, the lifting of the travel ban to Romania will become a major incentive for its leaders to cooperate with PAS. It’s also not out of the question that legal status issues in the EU could eventually arise not only for Ceban but also for Romanian citizens like Alexandru Stoianoglo, Ion Chicu, and many others.