Sergiu CEBAN
The summer heat creates an illusion of calm, but in reality, Moldova’s energy system is in a state of tense anticipation. Another heating season – set against a backdrop of geopolitical turbulence, electoral battles, and the ongoing war in Ukraine – promises new and serious challenges
Given the past few winters, it would be wise to start understanding now what to prepare for and whether the outward calm of our officials is hiding any troubling prospects. One is immediately reminded of last autumn: back in September, Prime Minister Dorin Recean assured the public that gas tariffs would not increase, yet by November they jumped by 30%. Eventually, some officials lost their positions, but it’s unlikely that this brought much relief to our citizens.
At the end of June, the Ministry of Energy published its plan for the 2025-2026 heating season. The document outlines 48 specific measures covering key areas: the import of gas and electricity, control over energy flows in Transnistria, improving energy efficiency, and emergency actions in case of supply disruptions. The central focus, of course, is diversification. Drawing on recent years’ experience, the authorities aim to avoid reliance on a single gas supplier. Therefore, the document mentions various sources and alternative routes. It also includes a classification of non-household consumers into categories – large, medium, and small – and, accordingly, a plan to regulate supply volumes in the event of a shortage. At the same time, priority will naturally be given to the population and social institutions.
Separate measures are outlined in case the left bank is left without gas. In particular, financial assistance of €60 million from the EU is planned. For the first time, the document also officially includes a gas supply monitoring mechanism for the region, to be carried out by both ANRE and the Ministry of Energy, as well as licensed suppliers.
No matter how detailed and well-developed the plan may be, its efficiency will depend on a wide range of external and internal factors. As is well known, the stability of electricity imports from Romania is subject to seasonal fluctuations, and Ukraine’s energy sector, despite its high resilience, remains vulnerable to what have become almost daily air strikes. Meanwhile, MGRES, the main electricity supplier for the right bank in previous seasons, is operating at a loss and, by all appearances, will be subsidized from the Transnistrian budget, which is already facing hard times.
The political context surrounding the energy sector remains tense for several reasons. On one hand, Moldova continues to deepen its integration into the Romanian and European energy systems. On the other hand, with elections approaching, pro-Russian forces have become more active, betting on a renewal of cooperation with the Russian Federation. For example, this was discussed by a delegation of opposition politicians during a recent visit to Moscow in talks with the relevant Russian Deputy Prime Minister. Such a scenario would imply a return to direct gas supplies and, likely, a revival of previous arrangements for using MGRES capacities, including preferential terms for both banks of the Dniester.
Meanwhile, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has allocated a new credit package of €400 million, intended for the purchase of gas and electricity on European markets, as well as for providing payment guarantees to traders on behalf of the state-owned company Energocom. On the surface, this sounds promising, but it is yet another loan on top of previously received funds, and this reflects not the strength of our officials’ strategic planning, but the country’s chronic dependence on external financing. Moreover, unlike long-term contracts, all the risks of potential speculative price spikes fall on the shoulders of consumers. It’s important to understand that Europe itself is facing energy challenges due to the war in Ukraine. Therefore, hoping that European traders will prioritize uninterrupted supplies to Moldova in critical situations is extremely naive.
Another key point in the authorities’ strategy is the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau power transmission line by the end of the year. The idea is that it will mark the final step in overcoming dependence on Moscow and ensure a physical connection between our country and the EU’s unified energy network. However, in fact, the project carries not only technical but also significant political and economic risks. First and foremost, consumer tariffs may increase due to instability in the Romanian and Ukrainian markets. Moreover, the idea of a complete break from the eastern energy vector is presented as a move toward sovereignty, but in reality, it merely replaces one dependency with another. Finally, the accelerated construction process, accompanied by political slogans, simply does not rule out technical flaws, overloads, or failures during winter peak periods, which could prove very costly for the state and its citizens at the worst possible moment.
In the coming months, Moldova’s energy situation will unfold amid ongoing vulnerabilities and growing political tension ahead of the upcoming elections. Despite official optimism and EU support, the country is entering the autumn-winter season facing a number of serious risks. The commissioning of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line, combined with the potential complete shutdown of MoldGRES, could destabilize the entire regional energy system, especially during peak consumption periods when emergency purchases at extremely high prices may be necessary.
Transnistrian factor remains an unpredictable variable. For now, gas supplies continue and MGRES provides electricity to the left bank. However, any external shock, from military escalation in Ukraine to industrial accidents, could easily disrupt this fragile balance. Of course, the most likely scenario is the continuation of the current supply arrangements in the region, but any potential crisis there would inevitably affect the right bank as well.
Overall, the forecast for the next six months remains cautiously negative. Despite international support and political efforts to integrate into the European energy system, the country still has limited capacity to achieve real energy resilience, let alone independence. Moldova and its energy sector are more vulnerable than ever to external shocks. The upcoming elections are likely to increase volatility and uncertainty, with the main threat being not so much a shortage of resources as their cost, accessibility, and the state’s ability to protect socially vulnerable groups.