Will Pragmatism Come to Dominate Russia-Romania Relations?

Sergiu CEBAN

A thaw between Romania and Russia may seem like a fantastical scenario right now. However, in a situation where the United States is gradually stepping back from European affairs and Eastern Europe is growing increasingly weary of the protracted conflict, the possibility of reaching compromises with Moscow is rather possible

In recent years, Eastern Europe has been undergoing tectonic shifts. The security system built after 1991 under U.S. patronage is gradually being restructured. Washington is shifting its focus to Asia, reducing its military presence in the Old World and redirecting NATO’s broader strategic priorities. Against this backdrop, Romania, one of the key countries in the Black Sea region, faces a dilemma: how to preserve its security and economic influence if the American “shield” is being rolled back while Russia is deliberately moving toward the Euro-Atlantic space. Relations between Moscow and Bucharest have alwaysо been complicated. At the same time, mutual political estrangement continues to coexist with certain historical sympathies. Today, both countries are entering a phase in which pragmatism is gradually beginning to outweigh ideological narratives. This is manifested primarily in the ambiguous perception of Russia in Romania: the official elites continue to adhere to anti-Russian rhetoric, while within society there is a growing recognition that defending conservative values and ensuring stability in the Black Sea region are impossible without dialogue with Russia. Though at first glance the two countries may seem like complete opposites, they actually share rather deep cultural and historical ties. Orthodoxy, linguistic borrowings, and joint wars against the Ottoman Empire – all of this makes their relationship far more promising than it might appear from a superficial assessment. Historically, a sharp divergence between the two occurred in the 19th century, when the Romanian elites, influenced by Austria and France, chose to emphasize a “Romance identity”. While Russia was associated with the East, Romania oriented itself toward the West: toward Paris, Rome, and Berlin. Later, the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Russian Empire and subsequently into the USSR only deepened the mutual estrangement. In the 20th century, this estrangement became almost irreversible. The Second World War left deep scars, given that Romania, under Marshal Antonescu, fought on the side of Germany. In the postwar years, Romania kept its distance from its powerful neighbor, criticized Soviet interventions, and sought to pursue an independent course, maneuvering between the Warsaw Pact and the Western bloc. After 1991, the gap only widened, as Bucharest set its course toward the EU and NATO, while contacts with Russia were reduced to a minimum. Post-Soviet Romania turned into an exemplary “eastern showcase” of Euro-Atlantic integration, and after joining NATO (2004) and the EU (2007), it adopted one of the toughest positions toward the Russian Federation. The flamboyant President Traian Basescu openly rehabilitated Antonescu and claimed that, in his place, he “would have done the same”. His successor, an ethnic German, Klaus Iohannis, continued this line, equating the USSR with Nazi Germany and declaring Russia to be “the main threat to Europe”. After 2014 and especially after 2022, Romania became one of NATO’s key forward positions. The American missile defense system in Deveselu, the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, and its participation in supplying weapons to Ukraine – all of this has reinforced Bucharest’s image as the front line of containing Russia. In Romanian strategic documents, Russia has been formally designated as a “source of threat”. However, behind such a hardline stance lies a somewhat different reality. Bucharest’s foreign policy appears consolidated and uncompromising; however, there are indicators that public opinion is gradually diverging from the official course. According to social surveys, support for Ukraine and anti-Russian rhetoric in Romania is lower than in Poland or the Baltic states. Romanians are increasingly preoccupied with domestic issues: poverty, inflation, corruption, and brain drain, rather than foreign disputes. It is known that more than 20% of the population lives below the poverty line, and fatigue from constant crises is strengthening the public demand for (geo)political pragmatism. In 2024-2025, this shift became particularly pronounced when unexpectedly strong results in the presidential elections were shown by Eurosceptic candidates – Calin Georgescu and George Simion. The former spoke openly about the need to “use Russian wisdom as an opportunity for Romania”, while the latter called for an end to military support for Kyiv and a “peaceful settlement with Moscow”. The fact of their high popularity became a warning signal for Brussels and Washington partners. The political spectrum in Romania today is diverse. Liberals from USR and PNL maintain a firmly anti-Russian stance but together gather no more than a quarter of the vote. The Social Democrats (PSD) and the Hungarian party UDMR remain pro-European but avoid extremes. Eurosceptic forces, such as AUR, POT, and SOS, already control about a third of the electorate. While figures like Simion or SosoacA are not ready for direct rapprochement with Moscow, they openly oppose military escalation and advocate for shaping relations in line with Romania’s national interests. If we set aside the usual political clichés, Bucharest and Moscow do in fact have objective points of convergence. Although Romania has traditionally sought self-sufficiency in the energy sector, Russian companies remain key players in the local energy market. Following the decline of interest in Ukrainian transit, the neighboring country may become part of alternative key supply routes, including gas processing, storage, and distribution. We cannot overlook the fact that in recent years the Black Sea region has become a new axis of European politics, after Russia strengthened its military presence in Crimea and Ukraine was weakened by the war. For Romania, this is both a challenge and an opportunity, since its economic interests in the Black Sea are considerable: the Neptun Deep gas fields, the port of Constanta – the main transport hub of the region and the potential for Danube shipping and logistics. Therefore, sooner or later, Romania will be compelled to find its own balance in relations with its de facto Russian neighbor. The recent decision by the White House to reduce the U.S. military contingent in Romania grants the latter greater foreign policy freedom, but at the same time, greater responsibility. This means that Romania will increasingly have to make decisions not only on the basis of “Euro-Atlantic” considerations, but also its own. And these considerations, in any case, require dialogue, because without a stable security environment in the Black Sea and without predictability on the part of Moscow, any economic projects sharply lose their attractiveness. Moldova plays, and will continue to play, a special role in Russian-Romanian relations. Bucharest sees it as a “second Romanian state”, a culturally and historically close space. Moscow perceives it as a buffer and a strategic factor that influences the regional security configuration. Therefore, in the long term, our fate may also become an element of compromise between Romania, which is interested in stability and the absence of escalation risks along its borders, and Russia, which views Moldovan neutrality as part of a broader package of arrangements concerning the Northern Black Sea region. At this moment, a scenario of gradual warming in Russian-Romanian relations still seems almost fantastical. However, given that the United States is now seriously reconsidering its long-term strategy and level of involvement in European affairs, while Eastern Europe grows increasingly weary of the prolonged confrontation, the possibility of reaching certain compromises with the Kremlin can no longer be dismissed entirely. A combination of factors (from the difficult socio-economic situation to the rise of Euroscepticism and the costs of the sanctions confrontation) will push the Romanian elites toward formulating a more autonomous political line. Despite Russia’s negative image at the official level in Romania, society increasingly demands pragmatism, a rejection of strategies imposed from outside, and a shift toward a rational foreign policy. Such a development, one way or another, also gives Moldova a chance to find its optimal place within this complex historical context, allowing it to preserve its current trajectory of development, maintain its identity, and secure a balance between its European choice and the regional interests of major powers.