Quiet Militarization of Moldova Under Way

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Cristian RUSSU
The increase in Moldova’s military capabilities and its integration into the EU’s military space are being carried out without much publicity in order not to stir public sentiment in the country
For next year, allocations for national defense are set at 1.937 billion lei – 2% of the total state budget. Compared to 2025, spending under this category will increase by 107.5 million lei (+6%), and compared to 2024, by 179.7 million lei (or more than 10%). This dynamic is fully in line with the authorities’ stated plans to reach the level of 1% of GDP in military spending by the end of the decade. It is noteworthy that, in addition to substantial amounts allocated for capital investments and strengthening the material and technical base – that is, for military infrastructure and armaments – nearly 32 million lei are planned to be spent on increasing service members’ salaries. This measure is crucial for the gradual recruitment of an additional 2,000 contract soldiers into the army. The budget line for military expenditures financed from external sources is laughably small – only 10.3 million lei for the entire year of 2026, which clearly does not reflect the actual flows coming from European structures and funds. According to official statements, these amounts are allocated for the ongoing implementation of two unspecified projects for the needs of the national army. Moreover, when commenting on defense funding, the authorities constantly insist on the supposedly insignificant level of state expenditures, unlike in other countries, primarily in the EU. Narratives are circulated in the media about the chronic insufficiency of these amounts and the lack of seriousness of any talk about “militarization.” Judging by the situation, constant information injections are needed to gradually shift public attitudes and foster acceptance of the necessity of increasing military spending. The discovery of Russian‑made drones that have fallen in different parts of our country is meant to create an understanding that the situation is abnormal. Logically, if drones are flying and violating the airspace, they must be shot down! The authorities may be criticized for failing to fulfill promises to turn the country into a security hub, but even such opinions are useful. They serve as yet another justification for purchasing various types of military equipment. The new military strategy also notes that the main challenge for Moldova is “Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.” If one imagines that global players reach a compromise and the madness occurring in the neighboring country comes to an end, would the policy of building up military capabilities change? I doubt it. As an obvious military threat, the Russian presence on the left bank of the Dniester can always be cited, even though the authorities themselves acknowledge that the servicemen with Russian insignia are, for the most part, ordinary Moldovan citizens. Yes, in some cases our president strips individuals of their citizenship, depriving them of the option to serve in Russian forces, but these are rather isolated incidents than a systematic practice. The main reason for the militarization of the country lies in the desire of European officials to have controllable military structures on their borders, which can be deployed based on political expediency and circumstances. To this end, doctrinal documents include the formulation regarding Moldova’s integration into a unified European Union defense space. Brussels intends to accelerate the militarization of the Union and its borders regardless of any potential arrangements concerning Ukraine. This has come to be seen as the only effective tool that can, on the one hand, help improve the economic situation, and on the other, restore the EU’s authority and prestige on the international stage. The examples of Washington and Moscow – both of which successfully address their problems through military means – encourage political elites in European capitals to follow the same path. Especially now, when Europe’s once‑loud diplomacy is no longer being listened to, and in some cases is simply being ignored. Since Europe’s shift toward a military footing is not a political gesture or a threat, but a long‑term strategy for the coming decade, our country is likewise destined to “stay in shape” – to remain in a constant state of needing to increase military spending, build bases, erect barbed‑wire barriers along the border with the Transnistria following the example of the Baltic states, and purchase new weaponry, including air‑defense systems. The authorities are still reluctant to accelerate this process openly, aware of the possible public reaction, and therefore are stepping away from loud political slogans. Hence the formal refusal to apply for participation in the SAFE program – the new European military instrument. The head of European diplomacy even publicly expressed regret that by the end of November, when the deadline for applications was approaching, Moldova had not made a statement. Meanwhile, the program provides up to €150 billion in long-term loans for EU member states – and not only current members, but potential ones as well. This means that Moldova, as a candidate country that last spring became the first to sign a security and defense partnership agreement with the EU, could already next year take part in joint arms procurement together with Romania or Ukraine. Incidentally, such procurement is explicitly envisaged in the military strategy and other new security documents. So why did the ruling regime refuse, given that the funds for armaments are offered as long-term loans, and taking loans is nothing unusual for our country? The reason may lie in an unwillingness to create unnecessary tension in society prematurely. Although opposition politicians are effectively deprived of real leverage, they still retain the ability to stir unrest. All the more so because it is much easier to bring in weapons and expand military capabilities covertly. Let us recall that the delivery of 155-mm Israeli ATMOS self-propelled howitzers from Elbit Systems went completely unnoticed in the country. These artillery systems, costing between 4 and 6 million dollars each, simply became an organic part of our army. There were no public announcements about the contracts. It is reasonable to assume that rearmament in accordance with EU and NATO standards is happening – and will continue to happen – in the same manner. The training of the leadership and personnel of the military and security agencies is being carried out the same way. Information about closed events held under the auspices of the NATO center in Chisinau and other agencies reaches the press only occasionally. One example is the event held on December 3-4 at the Codru tourist complex on combating hybrid threats. No one publicly announced anything about it. The recent meeting of the Security Council chaired by Maia Sandu is also quite telling. According to the official statements, the discussions focused on Russian drones and plans to invest in radars and purchase air-defense systems. But no details were provided – after all, it’s a matter of secrecy. Whereas previously our officials would hold media briefings with loud statements and revelations, they have now shifted to restraint – a sure sign of ongoing work that no longer requires a loud performance for the public.