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Nicolae TCAÇ
The approaching settlement of the Ukrainian conflict and the establishment of a new logic in Russian-American relations will deal another blow to countries that prefer outdated principles of a “rules-based world”
Development in the Ukrainian settlement has gained considerable momentum in recent weeks. American diplomats are actively shuttling between Russian and Ukrainian representatives, and contacts between the intelligence services of the opposing countries have been confirmed. However, apart from the “28 points” that leaked online, no details about the progress of the negotiations have been released, which experts have interpreted positively. Only today did information appear in the media about Donald Trump’s revised plan, now consisting of 20 points – and, it must be said, it has not undergone any major changes in key points. Moreover, although the content of Vladimir Putin’s nearly five-hour talks with Trump’s special envoys on December 2 was classified, it received positive reviews from both Russians and Americans. The backdrop to the diplomatic efforts of Russia and the US is the Russian army’s takeover of more than 700 km2 of territory and the key city of Pokrovsk, regular exchanges of strikes on energy infrastructure, and attacks by Ukrainian surface drones on merchant ships in the territorial waters of NATO member Turkey. Of course, the corruption scandal involving Vladimir Zelensky’s inner circle, which has been widely covered by the world media, also fits into the overall context. Today, there is a clear sense that the process of restoring Russian-American relations launched in Anchorage will be completed in the short term, opening up opportunities for normal political, diplomatic, and economic interaction between the two countries. In turn, the outcome of the military confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, as well as the post-conflict fate of the Northern Black Sea region, will be determined by the divergence of interests between Russia and the US. In a sense, the situation will return to that of autumn-winter 2021. At that time, the geopolitical confrontation between the Russian Federation and the “collective West” led to Russia issuing an ultimatum to NATO and the US to provide security guarantees, including Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) non-accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the cessation of arms supplies to these countries. Then, a month after the US rejected these demands in January 2022, the so-called “special military operation” began. Now, however, the elimination of these “sensitive points” in Russian-American relations is enshrined in the American peace initiative (in all its iterations), leading to a win-win situation. Donald Trump will be able to prove with his actions that he has recreated the conditions under which “this war would never have started” during his presidency. And Vladimir Putin will prove that Russia is achieving strategic victories, even if this requires supporting diplomacy with weapons. The European Union remains another significant player in the Northern Black Sea region. This union, or more precisely its political leadership, which consistently constructs an image of Russia as an adversary and aggressor, completely ignores its own role in provoking the armed conflict. At the same time, the support of the “Weimar Triangle” for first ending the Euromaidan while maintaining Viktor Yanukovych’s powers, and then for the new “revolutionary” authorities of Ukraine, has completely disappeared from view. The statements by Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande that the Minsk agreements were signed not for implementation but to arm Ukraine and bring it into NATO are foreshadowed. Against this backdrop, the EU’s exclusion from negotiations on the future of Ukraine and the Northern Black Sea region seems entirely logical – Russia and the US are unwilling to agree on the principles of a “rules-based peace” that suit the EU. Moreover, Washington is publicly pointing out to European bureaucrats that their interest in continuing the fighting can only be realized independently – at the expense of European funds. However, years of juggling the interests of the EU’s “second-tier” countries to suit the leaders of the union and Brussels officials have made it impossible to reach a consensus on finding new funds for Ukraine. The “icing on the cake” was new US security strategy. Russia is no longer America’s second main enemy, but a country with which strategic stability must be restored. NATO, meanwhile, is no longer a constantly expanding alliance. On the other hand, with regard to relations with Europe, the same document suggests forming resistance to its current path of development and calls on the EU to stand on its own two feet, including in terms of responsibility for its own defense. Thus, there are currently no prerequisites for changing the current balance of interests. The US is preoccupied with domestic issues and gaining new levels of prestige for Donald Trump’s team. Russia has carried out a series of economic reforms that have allowed it to secure sufficient funding for the coming year (even if the war continues). The EU, meanwhile, is facing increasing resistance from its own members in its attempts to blame any domestic problems on Russian aggression or threats. The public statements made by American and Russian officials following the publication of the strategy, as well as the hysterical criticism from the European establishment and Ukrainian politicians, fully confirm the logic behind the formation of a new paradigm in Russia-US relations, consigning the phrase “collective West” to the past. Ukraine (and Moldova, which is following in its footsteps) will probably be allowed to join the European Union after peace is concluded. In principle, rapid accession to the EU is being presented as a key bonus for Kyiv in order to conclude a peace deal. However, both countries, especially Ukraine, will demand continued infusions of foreign funds, and in much larger amounts than before. Given the obvious reluctance of the US to resume support, the EU will once again be the main payer, which will only accelerate the centrifugal processes within the union. But even if the Union refuses to expand, European taxpayers will still be forced to pay for multi-billion dollar Ukrainian and Moldovan loans with little hope of full repayment. After all, countries with depressed economies and one-sided foreign policies are, as a rule, a very dubious investment. Hints of precisely this distribution of efforts between the US and Russia to resolve the Ukrainian conflict and rebalance interests appeared as early as February this year, with the Trump administration signaling its clear readiness to restore relations with Russia. Moreover, the EU, Ukraine, and even Moldova were given sufficient time to review their political and economic aspirations. Now, however, the point of no return has been passed. Leaders who disagree with the new Russian-American approaches will simply be thrown out of the circle of winners of the biggest European crisis of our time. The only consolation prize for this “failed alliance” may be the belief in the preservation of a “rules-based peace” in the new realities of political rationality and economic expediency, towards which key international actors are gradually moving the world.