Why Strikes on Odesa’s Infrastructure Pose a Threat to Moldova?

Sergiu CEBAN

The current situation can be interpreted not only as a military but also as a political signal from Moscow, which in this way demonstrates the vulnerability of the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania transit corridor, while simultaneously expanding the conflict zone right up to our country’s borders

Russian attacks on infrastructure facilities in Odesa region in recent weeks go far beyond a purely military narrative. The issue is not only about putting pressure on Ukraine’s economy and logistics. A new regional reality is taking shape, in which we are shifting from a peripheral observer to a target of influence, albeit indirect for now. Strikes on bridges, roads, and transport hubs have highlighted the longstanding problem of weak infrastructural connectivity between Moldova and Ukraine. Its history goes back to the early post-Soviet period. Over the following three decades, a fully developed network of modern transport corridors never materialized, and operations continued on infrastructure built during the Soviet era. An additional factor was the Transnistrian issue. The loss of control over the central section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border instantly meant that several key transport arteries fell outside state administration. Subsequently, all potential plans to modernize logistics between Moldova and Ukraine invariably ran into political and financial obstacles, either being postponed or implemented only partially. A symbol of these unfulfilled expectations was the $200 million cross-border road bridge project at Cosauti-Yampil. The agreement for its construction was signed back in June 2023, with a two-year completion timeline. However, by May 2025, construction was halted due to a lack of funds on Kyiv’s side. Despite recognition of its strategic importance, the realities of war inplied their own logic, requiring resources to be redirected toward priority defense needs. At the same time, the condition of existing bridges remains unsatisfactory, while alternative routes are overloaded and vulnerable. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that last week Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Bolea met with Ukrainian Ambassador Paun Rohovei to discuss the future of the European initiative “Paths of Solidarity”, aimed at supporting the export of Ukrainian agricultural products and developing cross-border logistics. They discussed the modernization of roads and railways, the construction of bridges, and increasing the capacity of existing transport arteries. Considerable attention was given to the high-speed highway project Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau-Odesa and, in particular, the continuation of the Cosauti-Yampil bridge construction. Our representatives directly linked these plans to Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s port infrastructure on the Danube and the Black Sea, emphasizing that expanding routes through Moldova to Romanian ports is a priority for us. However, such optimism stands in stark contrast to the harsh reality. For several weeks now, Russia has been striking not only port facilities but also logistics hubs linking the western and eastern parts of Odesa oblast, as well as connecting the central and southern parts of our country with Ukraine. Of particular importance are two land routes that link southern Bessarabia with the rest of Ukrainian territory. The first is the highway and bridge in the Maiaky area across the Dniester. The second is the bridge in Zatoka, located at the junction of the Dniester Estuary and the Black Sea. Both facilities were built in the Soviet era with a high margin of durability, making their complete destruction a difficult task. However, disabling them for an extended period is a very real prospect. In practice, traffic through Maiaky and Zatoka is already extremely constrained, despite periodic statements about the restoration of transit. Until recently, the Odesa-Reni highway remained virtually the only shortest route to Moldova and Romania. Its closure led to the suspension of operations at border crossing points on the right bank of the Dniester in Palanca and Starokazacie-Tudora. The economic consequences, however, are far more serious. The key challenge is the growing uncertainty for logistics and energy across the entire region. Not only transport corridors are under threat, but also energy projects, including power transmission lines and gas flows that both Chisinau and Kyiv are counting on. It was precisely along the Odesa-Reni route that the main transport flow to the Danube ports of Izmail and Reni passed. According to expert estimates, up to 60% of Ukraine’s total fuel imports moved along this corridor; therefore, a prolonged shutdown of traffic at the bridge near Maiaky risks triggering higher petroleum product prices and temporary fuel shortages. In addition, administrative problems have emerged: around 400,000-450,000 residents of the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, Izmail, and Bolhrad districts have effectively been cut off from the regional center in Odesa. Against the backdrop of intensified strikes near Moldova and the events that followed, discussions of military risks have also gained momentum. “Forecasts” of a possible “Russian landing in Bessarabia” or an “attack” from the Transnistrian region have once again begun to spread. Such rumors emerge every year and have never been confirmed. Nevertheless, the very fact of attacks on bridges objectively heightens the sense of threat and destabilization across a broad regional perimeter. In any case, the situation can be interpreted not only as a military but also as a political signal from Moscow, which is thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania transit corridor while simultaneously expanding the conflict zone right up to our country’s borders. It cannot be ruled out that the objective may be a complete disruption of Ukraine’s supply routes through Moldovan territory. Consequently, similar strikes could also be carried out against other key facilities, such as the Mohyliv-Podilskyi bridge in the north. Among other things, I believe that through these actions Russia is also outlining the contours of its geopolitical interests, making it clear that plans for its final displacement from the eastern part of the post-Soviet space and the Northern Black Sea region were premature. The future of this region, according to the Kremlin’s logic, should be determined with due regard for its position and strategic interests. This constitutes a serious challenge for the European Union, as further support for Ukraine may be undermined by strikes on critical nodes in the absence of security guarantees for adjacent territories. In effect, this amounts to a stress test of the entire regional security architecture, especially given that, starting in January 2026, Romania plans to launch operations at NATO’s second-largest logistics hub, which will coordinate and supply arms deliveries to Ukraine. Within the emerging military-strategic configuration, the role of the Transnistrian region as a transit territory is also increasing. Moscow may be modeling a new regional logistics framework: on the one hand, disrupting alternative routes, and on the other, providing the possibility of controlled humanitarian flows into Ukraine through territory under its political and military influence. Such a design simultaneously reduces the risks of military escalation around the left bank of the Dniester and partially narrows Chisinau’s ability to exert economic and political pressure on Tiraspol. For Moldova, the consequences may prove long-term, since without physically entering its territory, the Russian army is beginning to implement military-political scenarios capable of becoming a significant domestic political factor. Amid limited progress in the EU integration process, the emergence of new external irritants and the need to make difficult decisions in Ukraine’s interests will undermine the resilience of the authorities, while also providing additional arguments to political forces advocating a revision of the country’s foreign policy priorities. Thus, the systematic strikes on infrastructure in Odesa oblast appear to be not a localized episode, but an element of long-term plans that intertwine transport, energy, and military logistics into a single knot. And Moldova, unfortunately, regardless of its own intentions, will become an involuntary participant in this complex and dangerous game.