“Opposition on Standby”

Although the results of the parliamentary elections dealt a heavy blow to the opponents of the ruling PAS party, it is too early to write them off completely

PAS’ victory in the parliamentary elections stabilized the country’s political landscape for a while. For the ruling party’s rivals, however, it was a crushing blow, the consequences of which are still being felt today, especially among the leftists who formed the Patriotic Electoral Bloc. There, old divisions deepened, exposing the lasting problems and contradictions of this flank. This ultimately led to a deep fragmentation of the political field opposing the government. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider the current opposition completely “written off”. But the ruling regime, judging by all appearances, seems to be doing just that, underestimating its parliamentary opponents, even if they are quite weakened. Despite its apparent vulnerability, lack of a unified center, and limited resources, the opposition camp has not lost its most important quality: the political instinct for self-preservation. And if it has even the slightest willingness to fight for survival, this will inevitably fuel the potential for revenge. Most opposition politicians, especially those of the new generation, do not view the current parliament as the end point of their careers, but rather as a springboard for a new leap forward. Participation in the work of legislators is seen as an opportunity to establish themselves in the “big leagues”, maintain visibility, and begin preparations for the next election cycles. This applies not only to presidential or parliamentary elections, but also to local campaigns, which traditionally serve as an important stage for building political capital. Objectively speaking, this logic seems most optimal in a situation where PAS controls virtually all key levers of power and no one is capable of imposing their agenda on it. However, nothing prevents the opposition from working for the future, accumulating discontent among voters, recording the gross mistakes of the authorities, and offering itself as an alternative at the right moment, when public demand for change becomes critical. One of the stimulating factors that led to some revival among opposition forces was the voluntary departure from the political scene of Ilan Sor and his associates. Whatever our attitude to this phenomenon, he had a stable electoral base. According to the most conservative estimates, we are talking about at least 10% of voters – mainly protest voters who are negative towards PAS and ready to vote for left-wing or populist forces. This “orphaned” niche has become the object of competition between several players at once. And although no one yet looks like the obvious beneficiary of Sor’s departure, the very fact that such a resource has been freed up significantly changes the balance of power, given that in our politics, election results are often decided by a few percentage points. The traditions of Moldovan political life serve as additional motivation for the opposition. The history of recent decades shows that no regime in our country can survive more than two terms, because electoral loyalty is extremely volatile, and disappointment with the current government accumulates very quickly. Against this backdrop, the latest news about the indefinite postponement of negotiations with the European Union seriously undermines the PAS’ position. Add to this the adoption of unpopular socio-economic measures related to the unprecedented budget deficit for 2026, and the opposition may find fertile ground for pressurizing the ruling party. Furthermore, according to recent polls, 55% of citizens believe that the parliamentary elections were rigged. Regardless of how well-founded these beliefs are, the very fact that they are so widespread indicates that there is serious potential for delegitimizing the current regime. For the opposition, this is certainly not a signal for immediate protest action, but a long-term factor that could mobilize part of society if necessary. Meanwhile, the authorities are trying to create at least the appearance of constructive engagement with the opposition. For example, by offering nominal positions in the parliament’s leadership. On the other hand, they are deliberately saddled with toxic and obviously losing issues, such as the Transnistrian settlement within the framework of the relevant parliamentary commission. In other words, opponents are given areas that fall into the category of “political quagmire”, capable of dragging down even the most energetic politician and yielding no particular dividends. In the classical sense, expectations of the opposition, if we look at examples from developed democracies, seem fairly standard: careful monitoring of the actions of those in power, analysis, alternative proposals, and a creative vision for solving various problems. But our political reality is much more down-to-earth. Consequently, the main goal of the opposition forces is to weaken the ruling party as much as possible, which is directly linked to future electoral results. And PAS has already made its first strategic mistake, giving the current diverse opposition camp a reason to unite tactically. That very “red line” turned out to be an attempt to amend the rules of procedure of parliament, including restrictions on speeches by MPs. As a result, a joint declaration was issued on the inadmissibility of such changes, in which the ruling party’s initiative was called a violation of the Constitution, a blow to political pluralism, and a threat to democratic debate in parliament. Judging by the reaction of PAS leaders, this was a very painful blow for them. This was confirmed by the emotional statements made from the parliamentary rostrum by Deputy Speaker Doina Gherman, who accused the opposition of seeking “chaos” and “dictatorship”. Despite the attempts by the opposition to fight back, it is still in the process of formulating its own strategies and model of behavior. This is especially true for those forces that have entered parliament for the first time and do not yet have a stable political line. At the same time, external benchmarks are being defined, as key foreign capitals that remain interested in the situation in Moldova are also closely monitoring developments. Having lost its former ties with the Kremlin following the departure of Dmitry Kozak and his team, the PSRM is currently in a state of uncertainty. For the first time in a long time, the party is forced to act without clear external guidelines, relying on internal logic. Whether Moscow is still betting on the socialists remains an open question. However, if we follow the logic of Russian officials’ behavior, there has clearly been no final break. The Alternativa bloc is attempting to occupy the centrist niche, focusing on professional, pragmatic criticism of the authorities and targeting the intellectual middle class, as well as external partners in Brussels, whose favor the bloc still hopes to win. Vasile Costiuc continues to develop his populist project, enjoying political and organizational support in Romania, where the AUR party is not only strengthening its position but also purposefully building up its personnel capacity ahead of another, even tougher battle with the established players. Renato Usatii, in turn, unambiguously hints at some kind of patronage from the US, publicly displaying his 10-year visa to the United States and positioning himself as a politician whose doctrinal views are close to those of the current White House administration. Overall, Moldovan politics is not standing still and is moving forward, despite the confident victory of the Action and Solidarity Party and the obvious weakness of the opposition camp. Apparently, the forces opposing the government are counting not only on PAS mistakes, but also on a possible change in the geopolitical and regional configuration. And, as history shows, a seemingly long-term political monopoly can end very suddenly.