Has the Government “Put a Price Tag” on Reintegration?

The government is developing a plan to settle the Transnistrian issue in the familiar PAS manner, where form prevails over substance and the real motives are concealed behind the facade of official rhetoric

About a month ago, the new prime minister, Alexandru Munteanu, caught everyone off guard by announcing that Chisinau, together with its partners, had begun developing a plan to resolve the Transnistrian conflict. Both the authorities and opposition forces return to this issue with a certain regularity, especially during electoral periods or moments of so-called geopolitical “windows of opportunity”. As a rule, they do so under pressure from foreign powers or in order to attract funding and win the sympathies of voters, partners, and other interested actors and groups. However, Maia Sandu and PAS have never shown much interest in this issue, distancing themselves from formal dialogue with Tiraspol. Such a wait-and-see approach has become a kind of hallmark of the current regime. To a large extent, the president’s policy led to the suspension of meetings with the Left Bank leadership, the freezing of the “5+2” negotiation format, and, more broadly, a reduction in the number of mutual contacts. This approach was partly explained by Moldova’s ambassador to the United States, Vladislav Kulminski, who previously served as deputy prime minister responsible for the Transnistrian settlement. He boasted that over the past four years Moscow had been pushed away from the common negotiating table and stated that there was no “strategic rationale” for its return. Overall, the official position is framed in such a way that so-called working groups and political representatives are deemed sufficient for communication with Tiraspol. Meanwhile, Tiraspol has already complained that the new chief negotiator from the right bank, Valeriu Chiveri, is unwilling to hold meetings even at his own level, surrounding them with conditions and demands that can hardly be fulfilled without direct interaction. In his view, the remaining issues concerning the use of agricultural land in the Dubasari district or the provision of a building for a secondary school in Ribnita must first be resolved, and only then can talks be considered. However, there are doubts that even if these contradictions were removed, should Tiraspol agree to this as a “gesture of goodwill”, the negotiations would actually move off the ground. In theory, the task of resolving the Transnistrian issue is, for Chisinau, both constitutional and rational. Especially given the plans to join the European Union, which are difficult to realize amid territorial disputes, de facto dual power, and Transnistria’s pro-Russian orientation, largely linked to the presence of Russian military and peacekeeping forces in the region. At the same time, the central authorities are seeking to dismantle the Gagauz autonomy, a process intended to be finalized through the usurpation of elections to the People’s Assembly and the bashkan’s office. There is also a perceived need to definitively put an end the Transnistrian question by moving toward EU membership as a homogeneous, unitary territory populated by people with a pro-European identity and speaking the Romanian language. The task of integrating Transnistria into this framework is quite tricky and comes with a caveat, but it is easier than changing themselves and risking the loss of their monopoly on power during the transformation. Moreover, Moldova simply loses the authority to determine its own political destiny, as well as its legal and economic foundations, as it adapts to European Union norms and rules. De facto, our officials will soon become mere “heralds of approaches” derived from EU legislation, adding only a certain degree of autonomy in defining tone and presentation. In this sense, the government is now less able than ever to independently and freely draft a settlement plan that would involve a high degree of mutual “adjustment”, flexibility, and consideration of the wishes of the population and elites on the left bank of the Dniester. Tiraspol, for example, is constantly emphasizing on securing the protection of their own identity, including language and educational rights, the preservation of locally shared historical and political interpretations, as well as property rights, personal security guarantees, and so on. Given the existing constraints, finding a mutually acceptable formula for settlement has become far less realistic than 20-25 years ago, when the parties willingly negotiated political agreements and even temporarily organized the work of a joint constitutional commission. In any case, amid Maia Sandu’s usual silence, Alexandru Munteanu and Valeriu Chiveri managed to create suspense around the reintegration plan project, at the very least, convincing experts and journalists to take it seriously. On the left bank, there was also a response, voiced by Vadim Krasnoselsky, with the customary references to the “Transnistrian people”, who “will decide their own fate”. Notably, Chiveri fundamentally does not comment on the actual content of the work being carried out, creating a “fog of diplomacy” around it. However, he did list the partners with whom Chisinau is collaborating in preparing the strategy: the European Union, the United States, and the OSCE. Interestingly, Ukraine, Chiveri’s previous place of work, with which he has many ties, was not mentioned as a partner. Apparently, Chisinau does not consider serious military-strategic or diplomatic support necessary, only financial assistance. Hence, it involves those who have the money. As the saying goes, “nothing personal, just business”. Such public rhetoric creates a negative forecast regarding the substance of the potential plan, which, instead of serving as a genuine roadmap for settlement based on a balance of interests, is likely to become yet another tool for extracting donor funds from Western capitals. And the money is indeed urgently needed – electricity is expensive, the budget deficit exceeds the legally established limits, EU funding has been reduced, and support from the International Monetary Fund appears to have been halted altogether. Meanwhile, Moldova’s partners are trying to make sense of these signals and assess the seriousness of its intentions. Thomas Lenk from the German Foreign Ministry, the main official responsible for the Transnistrian issue at the OSCE, visits the region regularly, including this month, meeting with representatives from a wide range of circles. Nothing particularly noteworthy has been announced publicly, but it is clear that some ideas are being developed. Active diplomacy has been carried out by Nick Pietrowicz from the U.S. Embassy. He recently made a statement that seemed typical for the current American administration, with anti-immigrant narratives. However, his tirade on Moldova’s sovereignty and identity can be interpreted in multiple ways, including as a signal to Moscow that the U.S. will not support the so-called “unirea” with Romania. In this context, attention can also be drawn to a recent statement by European Commissioner Marta Kos, who does not want to see Moldova in the European Union without clarifying the situation with Ukraine’s application: “The development of peaceful negotiations to resolve the war in Ukraine will have a direct impact on Moldova. As candidate countries and neighbors, Moldova and Ukraine remain interdependent on security issues”. At the same time, a “specific solution” for Transnistria, which must also be integrated into the EU, will be found “at the appropriate time”. Thus, no details, no plan, but with the requirement to peacefully remove Russian military presence on the Dniester. From this, one can also infer an intention to participate in the allocation of financial flows for the settlement plan, without emphasis on substantive content or negotiation work.