Moldova Adrift in a Shifting “Foreign Policy Environment”

Sergiu CEBAN

The collapse of the “rules-based world order” in favor of the law of the strongest makes Moldova’s place in global and regional power dynamics increasingly unpredictable

The state of global relations remains one of the key factors determining the development trajectory of any country. The speed at which events are changing, the increasing level of conflict, the erosion of international institutions, and the growing role of force-based and ad hoc decisions make the foreign policy environment less predictable, while simultaneously more significant for the internal stability of states. This is especially true for countries like Moldova, which do not possess substantial military, economic, or political resources to independently influence global processes. Being a small, non-aligned country, we have to keep a close eye on how relations between key power centers are developing and what strategies Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and other capitals are adopting. This is because any sudden change in priorities can directly affect Moldova’s security and diplomatic maneuvering capabilities. Judging by the current situation, our republic will spend 2026 in conditions of increasingly blurred external benchmarks. The behavior of key actors, as we can see, is becoming increasingly harsh, cynical, and less sensitive to the problems of peripheral countries. That is why it makes sense to try to understand in advance what international context Moldova will find itself in soon and how its relations with its main foreign partners will develop. Let’s start with the US, which continues to set the tone for the international agenda, and with Moldovan-American relations, which, based on last year’s results, appear to be problematic, to say the least. Formally, we maintain a strategic partnership, but judging by its substance and quality, it has deteriorated significantly. The strange and inexplicable visits of our high-level delegations, as well as the ambiguous diplomatic activity of the new ambassador Vladislav Kulminski, give no reason to seriously talk about the existence of a clear line or real promotion of Moldovan interests in Washington. Meanwhile, the US entered the new year in a mode of geopolitical acceleration, with the current administration demonstrating a tendency toward sharp, ambitious decisions focused primarily on global positioning and domestic electoral impact. This logic of the White House requires us to be constantly vigilant and able to quickly adapt to Washington’s changing priorities. This is particularly important for Moldova, as any discussion of issues that affect us directly or indirectly, but without our participation, risks turning the country into a bargaining chip in “big deals.” The problem, however, is that there is essentially no one in Washington today who can systematically convey Moldova’s position. Our ambassador’s behavior shows that he is under the tight control of American opposition circles, while his institutional ties with Chisinau are essentially nominal. Therefore, the main risk is that if diplomatic consultations on the geopolitical status of the greater Black Sea region begin this year, Moldova may simply not have a trusted channel for communicating its own position. An additional factor contributing to international uncertainty could be the results of the US midterm elections scheduled for fall 2026, when Americans will vote for their state representatives in both houses of Congress. This vote is traditionally seen as a referendum on confidence in the current administration, and its outcome could seriously affect Washington’s foreign policy, including its willingness to take radical steps for domestic political purposes. Unlike relations with the United States, relations with the European Union are likely to remain relatively stable from a strategic perspective. Our authorities are still waiting for the official opening of accession negotiations, as the process of European integration seems to have been put on hold, which is not good for the ruling party’s ratings. However, it is clear that the main obstacle is Hungary’s veto on the start of EU negotiations with Ukraine, which automatically slows down our European prospects. Regardless, in 2026, interaction with the EU will most likely enter a phase of “deep and complex accession negotiations”, even if they are not formally opened yet. However, at this stage, the combination of political support and increasingly stringent technical requirements will become more noticeable. Integration will cease to serve as an electoral slogan, finally becoming what it should have been from the outset: a laborious, institutional process requiring large-scale and often unpopular reforms. PAS perceive it as one of the most serious challenges in recent years, as limited human resources, the growing complexity of reforms, and the need to implement them simultaneously in different areas may lead to a slowdown and a “fatigue” effect, and, as a result, to a longer negotiation period. Romania remains one of Moldova’s most reliable and committed partners. It consistently acts as our main advocate in Brussels, providing political support, expertise, and lobbying for Moldovan interests in European institutions. In fact, the closer we get to the EU, the closer the cooperation between the two countries becomes. Even despite the pause in the official opening of accession negotiations, further rapprochement in energy, transport, logistics, trade, and investment can be expected this year. At the same time, the domestic political situation in the neighboring country, which entered 2026 with heavy socio-economic baggage, a high budget deficit, and the need to introduce tough austerity measures, threatens to become a certain obstacle. All this ultimately exacerbates social polarization and opposition sentiment. If the crisis worsens, Bucharest may simply not have time for Moldova, which means we risk losing one of our diplomatic footholds. Ukraine remains a crucial country on which security, territorial integrity, and European integration depend. However, signs of complications between us are becoming increasingly apparent. Kyiv has tense relations with virtually all of its neighbors, but in the case of Moldova, the situation is somewhat more delicate. For obvious reasons, we cannot afford to use confrontational rhetoric towards Ukraine. In addition, the increasingly complex backdrop of military confrontation is likely to force Chisinau to gently distance itself from the Ukrainian issue so as not to get drawn into it with extremely undesirable ramifications. Although Russia continues to be squeezed to the periphery of Moldova’s foreign policy, its role remains quite significant, and in some areas even decisive. Nevertheless, the ruling regime has long since defined its diplomatic format, relying on the absence of direct communication with the Russian Federation and counting on the mediation of Western capitals. Judging by current trends, dialogue between Moldova and Russia is unlikely to reach a plateau in 2026, continuing to decline in a controlled manner. Much will also depend on the Kremlin’s new strategy towards the post-Soviet space and what signals it is willing to send to Chisinau after internal personnel changes. If Russia continues its inertial line, the state of cold confrontation will remain. But if it recognizes the geopolitical loss of Moldova and does not interfere with its political course, conditions may arise for the formation of a completely new framework for relations. Unfortunately, the overall conclusion is disappointing. The collapse of the “rules-based world” in favor of the “tried-and-true rule of force” makes our country’s prospects in global and regional power struggles very unclear. Overall, this combination of circumstances is dangerous for Moldova and requires not only an active foreign policy, but also the ability to make decisions that may seem ambiguous at first glance, but will be the only correct ones in the long term.