Expert: Moldova Starts 2026 Under Chronic Energy Pressure

The country still lacks a meaningful margin of safety in the energy sector, while the proclaimed “diversification” of supplies remains largely decorative

As we have already noted in our previous forecasting materials, the world is rapidly losing predictability. The number of factors influencing the global economy and energy sector is not only failing to decrease, but continues to grow, overlapping and reinforcing one another, thereby amplifying overall instability. The beginning of 2026 has clearly brought little calm. For countries such as Moldova, this means the persistence and, in some cases, even the intensification of an already highly vulnerable position. International energy markets are, as is well known, a highly fragile mechanism, where any abrupt move or conflict can trigger a chain reaction, primarily of a price-related nature. In this regard, close attention is being paid to developments around Venezuela and Iran, two significant players in the global oil and gas market. An uncontrolled escalation involving these countries, especially if it affects the energy sector, could immediately be reflected in oil prices. And rising oil prices, as recent years have shown, automatically pull gas prices up as well. Moldova, which lacks long-term contracts with appropriate price-indexation formulas, risks facing an increase in the cost of its entire energy basket amid market volatility: fuel, electricity, and heating. The regional context also offers little cause for optimism. According to Gas Infrastructure Europe, as of early January 2026 gas reserves in European underground storage facilities stood at 62.5 billion cubic meters, corresponding to a fill level of 61.6%. This is 10.7 billion cubic meters less than in January last year. Formally, these figures are not critical. However, they indicate that Europe’s “safety cushion” has been significantly reduced, meaning that any climatic or other shocks could once again drive gas prices up to unsustainable levels. The ongoing uncertainty surrounding Ukraine is another factor that, unlike for EU member states, carries particular significance for Moldova. Severe damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, widespread blackouts in major regional centers, and the recent attack on strategic gas storage facilities all create unprecedented risks. Although the authorities have confirmed that around 22 million cubic meters of gas stored on Ukrainian territory were not affected by the strike in the Lviv oblast, many questions remain regarding how securely these volumes are actually protected. Their exact location has not been disclosed, and it cannot be ruled out that this gas is not part of a conventional long-term reserve in underground storage facilities, but rather fuel located within the gas transmission system. Thus, despite the reassuring statements from the Ministry of Energy, amid ongoing military escalation any confident assertions about the complete safety of Moldova’s energy reserves in Ukraine are, to put it mildly, insufficiently substantiated. Particularly noteworthy in this context is Romania’s decision to reduce natural gas exports starting January 9. Bucharest, itself still dependent on imports, is compelled to prioritize domestic needs and fulfill obligations to larger and more financially resilient partners. For official Chisinau, which in recent years has made Romanian gas and electricity the cornerstone of its new energy strategy, this should serve as a sobering signal. The reality is that even the friendliest neighbor, in conditions of shortage, will act primarily on the basis of its national interests. Unfortunately, solidarity always has its limits, especially when social stability and a country’s own economic security are at stake. This example once again clearly demonstrates that relying on a single partner, even the closest one, does not constitute diversification, but merely represents another form of dependency, with all the attendant risks. Undoubtedly, this year has begun more calmly for Moldova than the previous one, which “gifted” the country one of the most severe energy trials of recent decades. Last winter, we managed to avoid a collapse through emergency measures and external assistance, albeit at the cost of significant pressure on households and businesses. The key lesson of that crisis is that the state needs genuine diversity in functional supply routes. Yet a year later, what we are seeing is rather a shift from one channel to another. A telling example is the much-touted Vulcanesti-Chisinau power transmission line, which was repeatedly promised to be commissioned by the end of 2025. However, the project was not finalized, and the absence of any reassuring comments from the authorities looks, at the very least, alarming. Equally unconvincing are the statements by sector officials about the lack of alternatives to market-based tariffs and the impossibility of returning to purchases from the MoldGRES power plant. An increasing number of signs point to an existing split within the highest levels of government on this issue. Apparently, one group is betting on imports from Romania and insists on maintaining the current scheme. Others, however, advocate a more pragmatic approach and see potential in resuming supplies from MGRES. This is also reflected in signals from Tiraspol indicating the plant’s readiness to ramp up generation. Such a decision could partially stabilize the electricity market and provide both the economy and ordinary consumers with much-needed “breathing space” through more moderate prices. Moreover, returning to a contract with MGRES would also reduce risks for the Transnistrian region itself during this and subsequent heating seasons. However, it is clear that such a move would deprive Chisinau of an important leverage over the left-bank administration, and is therefore perceived as an undesirable political-reintegration scenario. Moreover, the resumption of cooperation with MGRES would almost inevitably be tied to a package of conditions set by Moscow and Tiraspol, including the extension of the contract with Gazprom, which expires this autumn. In the current geopolitical context, our authorities are most likely not yet ready for such compromises. For this reason, the decision announced last week for Moldova to join U.S. sanctions against Russian oil companies appears far more symbolic. Overall, it can be stated with confidence that the country’s strategic vulnerability in the energy sector has not disappeared. Claims that gas has been secured until September 2026 may indeed provide some reassurance, but only in the short term. Unfortunately, Moldova still lacks a meaningful margin of safety, and diversification remains largely decorative. Consequently, abrupt shifts in the external environment, whether a spike in prices, a new escalation of conflict, or a decision by partners to revise their priorities, immediately impact our resilience. As a result, Moldova enters 2026 in a state of chronic energy tension. A combination of global, regional, and domestic factors continues to keep the country on an “energy stretch”, which is being dressed up with various epithets, from energy independence to European integration. Escaping this state requires not only political will, but also a readiness to take unpopular, pragmatic measures and demonstrate strategic flexibility that have been largely absent from the authorities over the past five years. For now, experts share the impression that, in the medium term, the country will continue to move forward largely by inertia, closely watching the signals from Brussels and Bucharest, which, in turn, are increasingly focused on themselves and their own challenges rather than on saving the “Moldovan drowning man”.