Moldova and the CIS: An Irreversible Split?

The authorities have announced that Moldova is finally launching the procedure for a definitive withdrawal from the CIS. This move will make it even harder for Chisinau to strike a balance between a clearly anti-Russian line and attempts to preserve certain economic and migration-related interests

In the autumn of 2023, the Moldovan MFA not only lost two letters from its acronym but also its authority to implement the course toward European Union membership. This direction has now been outsourced to the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration and her office, as well as to Maia Sandu’s special envoy for European affairs, Ambassador Nicu Popescu. Mihai Popsoi and his colleagues are now focused on dismantling Moldova’s previously established diplomatic and economic ties in order to “clear the way” for a bright European future. Some steps are a “Hobson's choice”, imposed by Brussels (the withdrawal from the CIS), while others are a consequence of geopolitical transformations that visibly distress our authorities (export duties and U.S. visa restrictions). However, this work is being carried out with enthusiasm and at an accelerated pace, since it is impossible to predict with certainty when the “European window” will suddenly open for Chisinau. With a certain level of assumption, Moldova could become the EU member together with Ukraine as early as 2027. At least, such a clause exists in one of the draft agreements on ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (which is generally supported in Kyiv and in the capitals of EU countries). At the same time, the Kremlin has repeatedly stated that it has no fundamental objections to the membership of these two Eastern European countries in the European Union. Details such as Hungary’s objections to Kyiv’s application or the inability of Ukraine and Moldova to timely or even at all meet the requirements may become politically insignificant against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s peace efforts and the interests of the “coalition of the willing”. Therefore, Mihai Popsoi and the legal department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have plenty of work ahead of them. As can be seen, one of the main areas of their efforts is related to Moldova’s membership in the CIS. On Monday, the minister appeared on the radio with fresh ideas on this matter. According to him, as early as February, Chisinau may officially withdraw from the agreements that underlie the creation and functioning of the Commonwealth: “This will mean that the Republic of Moldova will officially cease to be a member of the CIS. The denunciation of the three frame agreements that form the basis of our participation in the CIS will give us the right to say that, from a legal point of view… because de facto we have long since suspended our participation, but legally we still participated”. Formally, the withdrawal process will be completed within a year, which will only symbolically formalize an already existing reality – the long-standing refusal of Maia Sandu and other PAS representatives to participate in CIS events, which began as soon as they assumed their mandates. Moreover, this stance is largely dictated by ideological considerations rather than by restrictions arising from the conflict in Ukraine or the start of negotiations for EU membership. Over the past three years, Moldova has already withdrawn from 71 agreements within the CIS framework, and another 60 are currently in the process of denunciation. In total, Chisinau had signed 283 such agreements, meaning that it will abandon the remaining half later, closer to the moment when Moldova joins the EU. This primarily concerns free trade agreements, as well as migration and labor legislation, and pension arrangements. A whole layer of work will subsequently involve terminating bilateral agreements with individual CIS countries, above all with Russia. This is expected to be more challenging, as such decisions will require direct negotiations and may entail far more painful consequences. Mihai Popsoi expects the denunciation of the three foundational CIS agreements to take place by mid-February. There is no doubt that parliament will support these proposals. It is likely that not only the PAS faction will vote in favor. At the same time, Dodon has already launched a wave of criticism, promising to develop people-to-people diplomacy, parliamentary ties, and even to “restore key agreements with the CIS” in the future. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also received a wave of accusations that leaving the CIS would negatively affect trade relations, including another blow to the interests of the agricultural sector, and would weaken Moldova’s political position as the legal successor to the MSSR, recognized within the borders of the Soviet republic. These arguments are unlikely to be confirmed by political practice. As for agriculture and trade in general, the inaction of the financial and economic agencies, as well as the liberalization of the market for goods from Ukraine and the EU, pose a greater threat than the political “whims” of domestic diplomacy. Chisinau has still not announced its withdrawal from the CIS Free Trade Zone agreement. The document, signed in 1994, was drafted in such a way that the contracting party that signed it at the time of its conclusion is not obliged to remain a member of the Commonwealth in order to retain the benefits of duty-free trade. This means that these benefits can be used up until the moment Moldova joins the EU, which would automatically annul any bilateral and multilateral trade agreements of Moldova that contradict Brussels’ policy. At least, unless the CIS itself takes some action in this regard. However, everything there is happening in a mode of inertia, which is also likely taken into account by our MFA. On January 19, CIS Secretary General Sergey Lebedev stated that Moldova and Ukraine are legally and factually members of the organization and recognize their obligations under the agreements from which they have not withdrawn. In effect, the CIS Secretariat acknowledged the acceptability of Chisinau’s selective approach to the organization’s legal framework. From a political standpoint, the situation is even more straightforward. Many key provisions, including the recognition of Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and borders, are enshrined in bilateral agreements as well as in multilateral treaties within the frameworks of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and other international organizations. Moreover, both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution contain comprehensive legal interpretations defining Chisinau’s stance toward the Soviet legacy. Undoubtedly, the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not flawless and may entail a range of consequences, yet they are driven by Chisinau’s objective commitments to the European Union. The painful process of dismantling the old legal architecture, as well as long-standing political, diplomatic, and trade-economic ties, will continue and accelerate. This will involve the replacement of preferential regimes with sanctions-based frameworks, the introduction of reciprocal visa requirements, and other features inherent to EU membership. Whether these changes correspond to the fundamental interests of the country and its people is no longer a determining factor – this is the price of European integration.