A Deal on Territory for Security and EU Integration?

Any strategic processes in Moldova are directly tied to the Ukraine’s case. This is the course the current regime has chosen both rhetorically and in practice. The implementation of state policy priorities is not an end in itself for the government and does not fall within its core objectives; rather, it is treated as a secondary matter, merely a byproduct of the course of hostilities and peace negotiations, with a limited adjustment for local specifics. This link is evident with every new statement from the authorities. For instance, earlier this week, the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration traditionally justified Chisinau’s inaction by citing the need to clarify the situation in Ukraine. Commenting on the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria, Valeriu Chiveri called it an obstacle to reintegration: “Continuous international pressure on Russia is important for us, and a durable and just peace in Ukraine would create the conditions for the withdrawal of these troops… There is increasing talk of a peacekeeping or monitoring mission in Ukraine, which could also help create the conditions for the withdrawal of Russian forces”. Chisinau has no independent vision on this matter, nor is it ready to discuss the issue with Moscow (which itself proposed such talks 5-6 years ago) or Tiraspol. In other words, the authorities simply intend to wait for any outcome of the war and copy conflict-resolution formulas instead of taking responsibility and beginning the process of the “frozen conflict” resolution right now. Last week, Maia Sandu outlined the priorities of state policy for the coming year. In short, these are security and European integration. Predictably, and fully in line with doctrinal documents, Moscow was named as the security threat, supposedly capable of approaching our borders (a direct hint at Russia’s potential seizure of Odesa oblast, which clearly does not follow from the current logic of the war). Cooperation with partners, including NATO, and Ukraine’s resilience were identified as the safeguards against this threat. The same applies to European integration – Moldova and Ukraine are moving toward EU membership exclusively in tandem. Whenever experts or individual bureaucrats in Chisinau or Brussels publicly express doubts about this approach, an immediate rebuke comes from Kyiv, setting the record straight. Volodymyr Zelensky recently spoke about this personally during a meeting with Sandu. For the Ukrainian ambassador to Chisinau, Paun Rohovei, this is practically a favorite topic. Our leadership makes almost no effort to resist this logic and is going all in, knowing that the possibility of joining the European Union as a “political appendage,” without carrying out real reforms, exists. At least, Ukraine’s EU membership scenario in 2027 is explicitly outlined in draft agreements on ending the war. In essence, the achievement of Maia Sandu’s long-cherished goals is made fully contingent on what Kyiv decides to do. And this is happening in a context where relations between the two countries, simply by virtue of geographic proximity and the complexity of the shared environment, are fraught with certain contradictions. Thus, the authorities have officially accused Ukraine of arms smuggling; then imposed bans on imports of poultry meat, eggs, and feed; and are now hinting that Ukraine’s growing needs could trigger shortages and higher fuel prices in Moldova. For its part, the Ukrainian leadership is also facing serious challenges. Media outlets are spreading versions according to which Washington is persistently offering Zelensky a formula of “security in exchange for territory”. In other words, the White House is splitting the signing of a bilateral agreement providing U.S. security guarantees, demanding the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donbas, which is a key condition put forward by Moscow. Even if one assumes that the actual configuration is far more complex, in broad terms the picture looks as follows: the Ukrainian Armed Forces leave the required territories, a series of agreements is signed, and under their terms Ukraine joins the European Union as early as next year while receiving security guarantees from NATO countries, the United States, the so-called “coalition of the willing”, and others. If one applies this logic to the state priorities outlined by the president, the picture that emerges is grim but internally consistent. Chisinau is unlikely to resolve the Transnistrian issue peacefully in the coming years, largely because it is not even trying to do so. Last week, Chiveri admitted that Chisinau cannot have a reintegration plan at all, since Tiraspol would never agree to it. As a result, the Russian military presence in Transnistria and the conflict itself will remain long-term obstacles to the country’s European integration and its formal security. Within this line of thinking, abandoning the left bank of the Dniester appears to offer an almost immediate solution to every problem: it satisfies Russia’s ambitions, removes the main obstacles to EU membership, eliminates the issue of a Russian military presence, and spares the government and parliament the need for legislative changes, reforms, or a painful process of mutual adaptation. Much like Washington’s approach to relations between Kyiv and Donbas. Framed as an attempt to replicate Ukraine’s experience, such a decision would not be presented as capitulation, but rather as a means of safeguarding the pro-Western course. With local specifics in mind, where discussions of unirea have entered yet another phase of renewed activity, the logic becomes even more linear. For years, the Transnistrian settlement has been dominated by the understanding that the region retains the right to self-determination in the event of Moldova’s unification with Romania, since any reference to territorial integrity and sovereignty “within the borders of the Moldavian SSR” would lose its legal and political meaning. Should unirea be launched, through either a referendum or a parliamentary vote, the Transnistrian issue would inevitably recede into the background, as such a project presupposes an entirely different scale of financial mobilization (estimated by some at up to €40 billion) and opens up sweeping political horizons for Maia Sandu. Moreover, while one can still at least theoretically envisage Moldova’s EU membership with a Russian military base on its territory, provided there is a clear understanding of a phased withdrawal, the idea of Russian troops stationed in Romania, a NATO member state, borders on the absurd. Romania’s President, Nicusor Dan, attempted to distance himself from the public debate triggered by Maia Sandu and her team by stating that unirea is not supported by Moldovan citizens. Yet the idea has already taken on a life of its own. Opinion polls have followed, showing that a majority of Romanians would support unification with the left bank of the Prut (56% in favor and 37% against). Such allusions are already causing irritation in parts of the EU (Hungary has begun raising the issue of the rights of the population of Transylvania) and within the EU bureaucracy more broadly. Yet Chisinau clearly expects that Brussels’ unease over the prospects of unirea can be turned to advantage, using it as leverage to intensify dialogue on EU membership and on funding Moldova’s security. In any case, the political and ideological alignment with Ukraine, coupled with accelerating regional dynamics and the deliberate stagnation of the Transnistrian settlement chosen by Chisinau, increasingly point to the need for new approaches, including consideration of a “security and EU integration in exchange for territory” logic. It is starting to seem that the country’s leadership is already psychologically and politically prepared for such a scenario.