Sergiu CEBAN
Moldova, which until recently was presented as a model post-Soviet republic, now risks becoming a symbol of questionable practices of direct electoral influence from Brussels. Notably, the suspicions tinged with accusations of “illegitimate power” are no longer coming from so-called “Kremlin agents”, but from influential American members of Congress
If just a few years ago someone had suggested that Washington would publicly voice suspicions against Brussels over interference in elections in European countries, many would have dismissed it as either a joke or sheer fantasy. Yet at the beginning of this year, this is exactly what happened, officially once again confirming the classic “Overton window” principle. The reference is to the interim report of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, which has become one of the most serious reputational challenges facing European institutions, with repercussions felt far beyond Brussels, including in Chisinau.
We have previously noted signs of a serious cooling in US-Moldova relations, and at this point nothing suggests a swift recovery. Maia Sandu’s recent statement that no visit to the United States is planned for this year sounded rather logical in this context, especially considering the reception that Grosu and Popsoi late last year. An equally puzzling episode was Sandu’s effective refusal to meet with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Smith (reportedly due to her trip abroad), which added yet another dark shade to the overall picture. Such a coincidence cannot, of course, be ruled out but in this case, it appears that the “coincidence” may have been carefully arranged.
The explanation for the president’s behavior, in essence, lies on the surface. It is no secret that a significant portion of the European establishment is currently consolidating into a kind of anti-Trump alliance. For many politicians in Eastern Europe, including our leadership, solidarity with Brussels implies maintaining a certain distance from the current U.S. administration. The problem with this position, however, is that the United States remains the world’s largest donor and an international arbiter in a wide range of processes. As such, demonstratively ignoring the White House could entail painful consequences for small countries like Moldova.
But let us return to the report itself. Republicans, emboldened by Trump’s return to the Oval Office, have moved from philosophical reproaches of European elites to more tangible measures. The report claims that after the Digital Services Act entered into force, the European Commission maintained constant contact with major platforms and, to put it mildly, persistently urged them to take a more active stance against “harmful” content. Such “appeals” were reportedly intensified ahead of elections in several European countries, including, notably, Moldova. Moreover, in Moldova’s case, the report describes a specific episode: the EU Support Hub summit held roughly a month before the 2024 presidential campaign. Formally, the discussion centered on the risks of disinformation. In reality, however, it amounted to a conflict of interest, as Prime Minister Dorin Recean, affiliated with a well-known candidate, took part in deliberations about what exactly should be restricted in the media space and how.
The irony of the situation is that for several years our officials and their European counterparts, supported by an entire industry of “experts” and media pundits, have been teaching us how to identify external interference, usually pointing firmly toward Moscow. Now, however, Washington’s finger is directed at the Europeans themselves, calling into question the very methods they employed. Moreover, the American document specifically notes that no convincing evidence of Russian interference was found. This practically undermines the entire framework on which much of our authorities’ domestic and foreign policy rhetoric has rested. If the “main villain” suddenly loses the status of the accused, an uncomfortable question arises: on what grounds, then, were harsh measures taken against opposition politicians, parties, and media outlets?
The panic among pro-government commentators, who rushed to argue that everything had been taken out of context and that the report is merely an “interim, raw, and subjective document”, has perhaps been the clearest indicator of how sensitive this issue is for Sandu and PAS. For now, the official line amounts to a carefully measured pause, since even the most balanced comment risks drawing additional attention to the matter and amplifying its public and political resonance. Yet, in our view, the bet that the information wave would simply dissipate on its own has not paid off. On social media and in non-government-aligned outlets, the document has generated considerable discussion, against which the official silence appears less like prudence and more like fear and confusion.
If one follows the logic of American politics, the publication of the report may be only the beginning of a prolonged political campaign. The next steps could include requests for documentation, demands to disclose internal guidelines, and hearings involving European officials and platform representatives. The legal consequences may not be immediate, but they could be politically significant: for example, through discussions on the conditions for funding programs related to electoral support, including those in our country, as well as media and civil society initiatives. Congress is well known for its ability to scrutinize, at length and in detail, the (mis)use of American taxpayers’ money. For Moldova, this would mean continued mention of the scandal in a negative context. A country that until recently was presented as a model post-Soviet republic aspiring to EU membership now risks becoming an example of questionable practices of direct electoral influence.
For Brussels, such a move by the United States is also a painful reputational blow. For decades, the European Union has cultivated an image as a guardian of democratic procedures only to now face accusations that it itself engaged as an active player in gray-zone electoral schemes. European skeptics and right-wing parties in the European Parliament have received a gift they could only have dreamed of. Undoubtedly, they will seek to capitalize on it to the fullest, shaping their own mainstream agenda while demanding investigations and restrictions on the European Commission’s powers.
For our opposition forces, the current developments also open up additional political opportunities. In essence, the narrative is already prepared: “Your European patrons interfered in our elections, the authorities were aware of it, and the elections were rigged”. The key point is that regardless of how legally sound these accusations may or may not be, politically they will work against the ruling regime. If the opposition does not waste time, we can expect in the near future initiatives to establish parliamentary commissions, calls for resignations, and attempts to review decisions made after the elections. And even in the absence of any tangible legal outcomes, the very process itself will, in effect, erode public trust in the current authorities.
It is worth noting that the publication of the report was hardly accidental, coming as it did on the eve of the Munich Security Conference. Last year, J.D. Vance already allowed himself to deliver sharp assessments of European policy. This year, one may assume, the vice president will appear before the European political audience armed with a weighty folder of specific facts and examples, and another round of accusations will cement the issue on the international agenda.
Ultimately, Moldova has found itself within the broader context of a transformation in transatlantic relations. A rigid alignment with Brussels amid growing disagreements between Western allies makes balancing almost impossible, and Maia Sandu is handling relations with the United States in a way no far-sighted politician would. Moreover, the peculiarity of the current situation is that suspicions carrying a distinct undertone of “illegitimate power” are now coming not from agents of Moscow, but from respected American congressmen. This significantly complicates the routine models of response, since it will no longer be possible to dismiss everything, as usual, as “Kremlin propaganda”.
Of course, many are now wondering what the document’s fate will be: whether it will develop into tougher political and procedural steps, or gradually fade amid the intensifying campaign for the midterm congressional elections. However, in our view, this is far from the finale. It is merely the prologue to a story that could become a very serious test of Moldova’s geopolitical resilience.