Anton ŠVEC
Chisinau and Kyiv have fallen out over virtually nothing and it could escalate into a trade embargo
In any set of relations, there is the text and there is the context. The radical military escalation around Iran, which our officials welcomed almost as a “humanitarian action to overthrow a dictatorial regime”, will also have tangible consequences for our own economy. The National Agency for Energy Regulation has already warned of a possible rise in utility tariffs. A $200 increase in the price of 1,000 cubic meters of gas on the TTF exchange within a single day, caused by reduced supplies from the Persian Gulf countries, will be a problem for all net importers of raw materials (not only China and the European Union but also Moldova). It is therefore unsurprising that the authorities today introduced a 60-day state of heightened readiness in the energy sector.
From a regional perspective, Moscow, where additional profits from oil and gas exports are already being calculated, will also incur extra costs, since it is Russian money that ultimately pays for natural gas imports into Transnistria. Moreover, these purchases are carried out by the company MET precisely on the TTF exchange at current market prices. The consequences of the U.S.-Israeli campaign in Iran therefore directly or indirectly affect Chisinau and Tiraspol, as well as Brussels and Moscow. In theory, no one truly benefits, but the side with the more resilient political-economic model and more determined partners will be the one able to outlast its opponents.
A similar case of text and context is now unfolding in relations between Kyiv and Chisinau under the formal pretext of a dispute over poultry supplies. At the end of January, the National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) imposed a full ban on the import of chicken products of Ukrainian origin after the banned antibiotic metronidazole was detected in Ukrainian poultry feed.
Before that, ANSA had already banned the import of Ukrainian compound feed (although the antibiotic was found in a shipment from only one specific plant in the Khmelnytskyi oblast, whose certification for exports to Moldova had since been revoked). Following inspections, the agency decided to cull at least 110,000 birds (about one-third of the flock) and to recall from the domestic market meat and eggs that could have contained traces of metronidazole. ANSA’s emergency measures were driven by fears that Moldovan products could face restrictions in exports to the European Union.
Meanwhile, attempts to reach an agreement at the level of relevant agencies over the past five weeks have failed to normalize the situation. Ukrainian assurances and additional testing of poultry products, including in EU laboratories, have not yet convinced Chisinau. Notably, the European Commission has imposed no restrictions on imports of chicken, eggs, or feed from Ukraine. In this sense, ANSA’s actions appear excessive compared with EU regulations, whereas usually the situation is the opposite. The agency’s persistence can be explained by the enormous losses the sector suffered in February, as well as reputational risks. Nevertheless, the situation increasingly resembles a conflict spiral beginning to take on a life of its own.
Given the broader context, Chisinau is showing formal signs of readiness for compromise. ANSA Director Radu Musteata informed his Ukrainian counterparts in writing of his intention to gradually resume imports of frozen chicken meat from the neighboring country, but under certain conditions that local producers consider unfair and excessive. They are required to provide additional documentation, involve certified veterinarians in every slaughter process, while supplying Moldova with their contact details, and allow Moldova to conduct selective online monitoring of the slaughter process.
The Union of Poultry Farmers of Ukraine argues that ANSA’s concerns violate the principles of scientific validity, evidence, and proportionality. In their view, the detection of an antibiotic in a single batch of compound feed has effectively disrupted free trade across several related product categories and undermined the principle of trust between veterinary services. They describe the Moldovan demands as an unrealistic ultimatum.
For quite some time, Kyiv attempted to have the ban reconsidered through negotiations with ANSA, relying on existing international and bilateral agreements as well as on inspections and tests conducted in EU laboratories. However, our authorities misinterpreted this constructive approach as silent acceptance of continued protectionist measures that violate free-trade obligations. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that Ukraine has not always acted as a perfect partner either, for instance, when it imposed massive tariffs on cement imported from Moldova.
Eventually, on Monday the Ukrainian government published a draft resolution introducing licensing requirements for imports of grapes, wine, alcohol, and spirits from Moldova. The document explicitly states that licensing will remain in place until the revision of what it calls “Moldova’s discriminatory measures against Ukraine”. In essence, this amounts to a Ukrainian embargo on Moldovan wine, divins (cognac-type spirits), and grapes, to take effect three weeks after publication. Previously, similar pressure tactics against Chisinau had been used only by Russia’s consumer protection agency, Rospotrebnadzor.
In any case, Kyiv is making it clear that its patience has run out and is giving only a short time to reach a final agreement: the proposals outlined in the ANSA director’s letter at the end of February satisfied no one there. At the same time, the Ukrainian side is leaving open the possibility of filtering suppliers through licensing. In other words, exporters who obtain licenses will not face restrictions. Ukraine, which accounts for about 10% of Moldova’s total exports, is a particularly important market for Moldovan alcoholic products, and Kyiv’s countermeasures would therefore be quite painful.
In this sense, there is a strong likelihood that this problematic dossier will already land on the desks of top leaders next week (online consultations on the mechanism for resuming poultry exports to Moldova are scheduled for today) for a political decision. Given the legally questionable nature of both the Moldovan embargo and Ukraine’s retaliatory measures, the leaders’ decision could realistically be only one: to resume imports of Ukrainian meat without restrictions, including in the interest of preserving political solidarity between the two countries.
Yet in this story not only the forecast and the “text” matter, but also the context. If future scenarios require separating the “European integration” bids of Kyiv and Chisinau (and such discussions arise with suspicious frequency) then precisely these kinds of issues (from veterinary and food safety regulations to export and re-export rules, trade, and mutual trust) could be used as starting points for artificially inflating a crisis in bilateral relations and subsequently revising fundamental approaches.