The Breakdown of Moldova’s EU-2028 Strategy

In an attempt to push forward a clearly stalled EU integration process, Moldova’s authorities now appear willing to settle even for a form of second-tier membership

During last year’s election campaign, the EU accession was presented by the ruling party as an almost settled matter. According to their most cautious projections, negotiations were expected to conclude by 2028 at the latest. Maia Sandu invoked the word “Europe” almost with every breath, while PAS turned European integration not merely into a state policy but into its own political brand. However, by early March, the picture looks fundamentally different, as Sandu’s words, spoken on Jurnal TV just a few days ago, eloquently demonstrate. The president stated that joining the EU does not mean that “we will be 100% safe” and does not mean that “our economic problems will be solved”. Hearing this from the leader of a country that, just a few months ago, was “selling” European integration to voters as a major national project sounds like a forced admission. It is worth recalling that Moldova submitted its application for EU membership four years ago, on 3 March 2022. Candidate status followed in June of the same year, while official negotiations were opened on 25 June 2024, simultaneously with Ukraine and within the same geopolitical framework. However, by the end of last year Brussels had still not begun actual accession talks, replacing them instead with technical consultations. These consultations appear designed primarily to sweeten the bitter pill of political stagnation and to create at least the illusion of movement where, in reality, little progress is being made. By and large, these consultations are only needed as a bureaucratic prop to record “progress” in European Commission reports, which do not require the political consensus of all 27 member states. Well, for Moldova’s ruling regime, this is at least some way to save face and maintain the narrative that “we are continuing to integrate into Europe”. A simple indicator helps illustrate both the distance already traveled and the scale of work still ahead. To maintain a steady pace of integration, Moldova’s authorities would need to adopt roughly 130 legislative acts each month. Yet between January and mid-February of this year only 19 were approved. In light of such a “robust” performance, EU representatives publicly attempt to gently bring Moldovan politicians back down to earth, describing the goal of concluding negotiations by 2028 as ambitious, though theoretically achievable with sufficient effort. Behind closed doors, one may assume the tone of these assessments is far less diplomatic. The next European Council meeting is scheduled for March 19-20, and we certainly have certain expectations for it, especially since Cyprus, which currently holds the presidency, has identified enlargement as its priority. However, even the preliminary draft agenda does not give cause for optimism, as it focuses largely on Ukraine, its military financing, and a peaceful settlement. Consequently, the likelihood of negotiations officially starting is once again being postponed. Thus, Ukraine remains a priority for European foreign policy. At the same time, Brussels is increasingly reluctant to rush to open its doors to Kyiv (and Chisinau) while hostilities continue, although formally it is Hungary that continues to block Ukraine’s application. As a result, the fate of Moldova’s European integration has effectively become hostage to this deadlock, not least due to the Moldovan authorities themselves, who initially chose a package approach, hoping to accelerate the process by tying their bid to Ukraine’s. The current situation is further exacerbated by events in the Middle East. Cyprus has found itself directly affected by the crisis, which has already led to the postponement of an informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Nicosia following an attack by an Iranian drone. Under these circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that the European Council meeting may be canceled altogether. For Moldova, this would mean not only another postponement, but also a gradual shift in European policy towards security, with a focus on the south rather than Eastern Europe. Against the backdrop of the protracted deadlock, Maia Sandu literally opened up and effectively agreed to join to membership with limited rights. “Our goal is to become part of the EU as soon as possible. Of course, with full rights... but what interests us more? Security and development”, she said, adding that “we should not place too much emphasis on when exactly Moldova will get the right to vote and the right to veto”. This represents a fundamental shift in the position of the ruling authorities. As recently as October 2025, Sandu had insisted that Moldova considered “only full membership”. Now, apparently under the pressure of both internal and external circumstances, that position has changed. Her latest remarks amount to an implicit acknowledgement that the plan of joining the EU by 2028 has failed. In this light, the idea of integration with reduced rights no longer looks like an ambitious European course, but rather a forced compromise designed to soften political disappointment. For most people, even those who are not well versed in politics, it is quite obvious that the “second-class membership” scenario is nothing more than (geo)political subordination without rights, wrapped up in a pretty package. It should also be noted that Brussels itself views Eastern European candidates with a certain degree of skepticism. Leading European capitals are genuinely concerned that these countries might halt reforms immediately after obtaining membership. The traumatic experience of Hungary, which joined the EU in 2004 and later emerged as one of its most disruptive internal actors, has served as a harsh lesson. Moldova is likewise perceived as a state with a complex and volatile political landscape, where the possibility cannot be excluded that forces sympathetic to the Kremlin might one day return to power. For this reason, even the most confident assurances from Sandu about Moldova’s unwavering European orientation are unlikely to fully convince Paris, Berlin, and other influential players. As a result, the stalling of European integration and further stagnation in the form of technical consultations with Brussels will inevitably lead to increased fatigue among the public and lower political expectations. If Moldova does not have a tangible European perspective by the 2027 local elections and the quality of life does not improve, Eurosceptics will gain a powerful electoral resource. Not because they are absolutely right, but simply because PAS has failed to deliver on its promises. Several scenarios for the development of the situation can be identified here. The first is “pessimistic”: the pro-European consensus in society is eroded under the pressure of failures, and the next election cycle could either lead to a comeback for pro-Russian parties or bring forces equidistant from the West and the East to the political Olympus. The second is “moderate”: technical membership, which implies integration into the EU in an “incomplete” format. The third is “negative”: the window of opportunity closes as the EU becomes weary of expansion, and Moldova finds itself in a gray geopolitical zone. In essence, the current hesitant maneuvering of Moldova’s leadership amounts to little more than a capitulation to political reality, a reality shaped in part by the strategic flaws of the ruling elite. Maia Sandu and PAS turned European integration into little more than a political brand, hoping that external promotion would compensate for the lack of substance. Now they are forced to explain why that brand is not functioning as promised. True European integration requires far more than an abundance of EU flags on government buildings, endless summits, and photographs with European leaders. It requires institutions that inspire trust both among citizens and among external partners. So far, all this exists in our country mainly not even on paper, but only in the sweet speeches of politicians.