“Collateral Damage”: The U.S. and Its Strain on Moldova and PAS

The Donald Trump administration does not view Chisinau as a natural partner or even a client worthy of any attention. Yet Washington’s actions, driven by the internal logic of U.S. policy, repeatedly inflict political and economic damage on Moldova

Maia Sandu appointed her top recruit, Vladislav Kulminski, as ambassador to Washington, subjectively regarded within the PAS team as a communications guru for dealing with difficult interlocutors. Nevertheless, in nine months on the job, his talents have failed to achieve anything of real significance. Relations with the U.S. administration remain stalled, and its specific decisions often directly harm Moldova. From any perspective, Washington does not see us as a country deserving of special treatment or diplomatic flexibility. On the contrary, Chisinau automatically suffered from the illegal (according to the competent judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court) customs tariffs imposed by Donald Trump, which resulted in a decline in bilateral trade turnover. Kulminski was unable to secure exemptions for Moldovan citizens on visa and immigration matters. Those who had previously violated U.S. entry laws have either already been deported or are awaiting expulsion in the coming weeks. The United States is arguably the only country in the world where the Moldovan diaspora has been shrinking over time. Another highly painful measure for a whole layer of so-called “independent media”, experts, and NGOs was the cessation of U.S. funding, primarily from USAID. No one in Chisinau even counts on these funds anymore, having shifted focus to Brussels, Bucharest, or domestic donors (the President’s Office and PAS). This transfer has led to a noticeable adjustment in the political and media line, with a pronounced emphasis on EU membership, support for Ukraine, criticism of Russia, and most importantly an artificial “revival” of pro-unirea ideas. Diplomatic and working contacts, despite the fact that our leaders make regular visits to the U.S., are characterized neither by outcome nor by a high level of representation. Often, such meetings involve staff from bureaucratic bodies and expert structures, as well as non-governmental organizations, most of which are closely affiliated with the Democrats. In a sense, the Moldovan ambassador is looking ahead, since Trump’s and the Republicans’ position appears quite unstable, especially with the onset of the spring military campaign in the Middle East. The lack of dialogue seems to suit both capitals, which are objectively on opposite sides of the ideological barricades (despite the Moldovan elites’ enthusiastic support for the colonial war against Iran unleashed by the U.S. and Israel). This is most clearly demonstrated by the White House’s lack of interest in appointing an ambassador to Chisinau for more than two years. Even the opposition has not mentioned plans to build a new embassy complex (on the site of the former Republican Stadium) in recent years. And yet, Washington’s indifference to Chisinau does not mean that its policies have no consequences for us. Many actions and ambitions driven by Donald Trump and his team’s internal logic rebound to the detriment of Moldovan authorities. For example, earlier this week, reports emerged citing opposition party “Democratia Acasa” deputy Vasile Costiuc about an alleged FBI mission to Moldova that could accuse the government of misappropriating $60 million in U.S. donor funds intended for reforms and infrastructure. Clearly, such initiatives, unless they are merely another instance of a “creative exaggeration” by a parliamentary figure, may be dictated by the dynamics of the Republican-Democrat confrontation ahead of the U.S. House elections and are unlikely to have long-term consequences for Chisinau. At the same time, another decision by the U.S. (taken jointly with Israel) carries radical consequences and triggers instability on a global scale. This is especially true for net importers of energy resources, such as Moldova, which is highly dependent on external supplies of gas, electricity, and all types of fuel. The attack on Iran, followed by retaliatory strikes in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has initiated a crisis in the global energy market that worsens with each day of ongoing hostilities. The daily shortfall of oil and gas in terms of global supply is at a record level for the past fifty years. Some stability is maintained only due to expectations of a swift diplomatic resolution and the existence of reserves, which, however, will gradually be depleted over time. For example, in Moldova itself, petroleum product reserves are estimated to cover just two weeks. At the same time, electricity prices in the country are expected to rise, as noted by the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE). Meanwhile, the sharp surge in gas prices on the TTF exchange has already impacted the situation in the Transnistrian region, where consumption has been drastically reduced. The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) also notes that current payments will cover the needs of the left bank only until the end of the week. On the right bank, the gas supply situation could likewise worsen if the Middle East conflict persists until a new procurement contract is concluded. Meanwhile, several opposition deputies are using the situation to criticize PAS for missed opportunities to save costs by purchasing electricity from the MoldGRES in Dnestrovsc. However, the greatest immediate pressure on the economy is coming from the changed prices of crude oil and petroleum products. Since the onset of military actions, the cost of crude oil has risen on average by 25%, depending on the grade. The most price-sensitive figures at fuel stations reacted almost immediately, increasing by several lei over the course of a week. Moldova, having unilaterally severed its privileged partnership with Moscow, lacks the ability to cap prices as Hungary has done since March 10, and is plunging into a crisis situation. Reports are already emerging of investigations into restrictions at certain fuel stations on the volumes of gasoline and diesel sold to individual buyers. These measures coincide with alarming forecasts from officials and experts, who warn that the rising cost of oil, that is a raw material for numerous industrial sectors, will trigger problems across various industries. For instance, Infrastructure Minister Vladimir Bolea is concerned about road construction and the cost of bitumen produced from petroleum. The situation is even more critical in the agricultural sector, where fuel shortages could coincide with the start of the sowing season. Even worse, Donald Trump, in an attempt to mitigate the problem, calls Vladimir Putin and begins lifting sanctions on the Russian oil sector. Such Washington moves (emergency diplomacy not grounded in leverage) are ideologically taboo in Chisinau and directly contradict not only Moldova’s economic and infrastructure interests but also the core policies of PAS, including its approach to the Transnistrian settlement. The shifts and precedents created by U.S. policy, combined with the neglect of Moldova’s agenda, are becoming a factor of long-term harm to Maia Sandu’s regime.