Moldova at the Epicenter of Geopolitical Risks

An increasingly complex and tense geopolitical environment is taking shape around Moldova. A country that for decades has sought to restore its territorial integrity and stabilize its statehood now finds itself at the epicenter of several overlapping processes: the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Black Sea, the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the Western world, and another crisis in the Middle East. While the authorities continue to pursue a path toward European integration, the external environment is evolving rapidly, generating new security risks, particularly in light of the Transnistria conflict. Last week, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri travelled first to Bucharest and then to Brussels, where he held a number of official meetings, including one with European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. A few days later, the trip took on an unexpected dimension. Unconfirmed reports began circulating online that the Moldovan delegation had brought to the European Commission a 14-page unofficial document outlining the basic principles of the gradual reintegration of the Transnistria region. According to preliminary reports, the document exists only in English, has not been publicly discussed within Moldova, and was presented solely to EU diplomats. If the leaks are accurate, it contains a number of innovations: in particular, it makes no mention of a “special status” for the left bank, the “5+2” format is deemed non-functional, and the key role in the settlement is effectively assigned to Western partners. Among the more radical ideas are the possible establishment of an international administration on the left bank along the Balkan model, as well as a scenario in which Moldova could advance toward accession to the European Union without Transnistria, extending European legislation to the region at a later stage. It is hardly a coincidence that, in parallel with Valeriu Chiveri’s trip to Brussels, several European ambassadors travelled to the left bank of the Dniester River. Apparently, before assessing the proposals put forward by Chisinau, European diplomacy deemed it necessary to verify them against the reality on the ground. For Tiraspol, such expanded visits have become a rare occurrence in recent years. Amid a difficult economic situation caused by the halt in gas supplies, the local administration is actively seeking direct channels of communication with the West. This is necessary, among other things, to present its own version of events and, most importantly, to hedge against scenarios in which decisions about the political future of Transnistria are made in Brussels and Chisinau without any participation from the region itself. While our deputy prime minister was holding talks in Bucharest, Romania demonstratively stepped up its geopolitical posture on several fronts. In particular, Bucharest authorized the United States to use the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base to carry out strikes against Iran. The base, located near the Black Sea port of Constanta, is one of NATO’s largest military facilities in Eastern Europe. Such a rapid alignment of the Romanian authorities with Washington directly and unequivocally draws the neighboring country into the Middle Eastern conflict. For instance, after Ukraine dispatched several mobile units to Persian Gulf states to counter drones, Tehran officially declared that Ukraine had become a legitimate target for Iranian armed forces. Romania, in turn, has already been promised an “adequate political and legal response” by the foreign ministry of the Islamic Republic. Thus, the implications for regional security could prove highly significant. Romania is shifting from a nominal NATO ally to an active participant in operations that extend far beyond the Alliance’s traditional Eastern European area of responsibility. This, in turn, increases not only the likelihood of some form of strike against Romanian territory, but also the threat of terrorist attacks targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. Notably, a group of pro-Iran hackers has already claimed responsibility for an attack on the website of Romania’s tax authority. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelensky visited Bucharest last week, signing a declaration on the establishment of a strategic partnership and an agreement on joint defense production. Consequently, beyond the Iranian factor, Romania has effectively chosen to openly position itself as a rear hub for Ukraine’s defense, with all the associated commitments and risks. For us, this essentially means that our closest ally and potential partner in European integration may, in the near term, become simultaneously involved in several conflicts. An even more significant point is that the declaration mentions that Kyiv and Bucharest will “support efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable political solution to the Transnistria issue”. Thus, for the first time, our territorial question has been incorporated into the bilateral strategic dialogue of other states. It is hardly coincidental, in our view, that the day after the visit of European ambassadors to Tiraspol, the Russian ambassador Oleg Ozerov also arrived there. His meetings with local leaders followed the familiar line, emphasizing the need to resume the “5+2” format and the lack of any alternative to the current peacekeeping mission framework on the Dniester River. In other words, Moscow brought a message directly opposed to what Chisinau had taken to Brussels, not new formats and approaches, but rather the preservation of the status quo and a return to a negotiating table at which Russia retains its role as an influential player. Against the backdrop of the usual rhetorical messaging, a more significant development appears to be the “legislative signal” coming from Moscow. Specifically, the Russian government has approved a draft law granting the president the authority to unilaterally decide on the deployment of the Russian armed forces abroad for the protection of Russian citizens. The government commission has already endorsed the bill for submission to the State Duma, and given the political realities of contemporary Russia, there is little doubt that it will ultimately be adopted. Formally, this is merely a legal codification of what already exists de facto, as Russia has long used its armed forces beyond its borders without any meaningful parliamentary constraints. The key nuance, however, is that the final barriers shaping the decision-making threshold are being removed. At the same time, the Kremlin’s intention to secure an unrestricted instrument for rapid and direct military intervention in other countries is being publicly formalized. Therefore, the visit of Oleg Ozerov to Tiraspol, with its demonstrative defense of the current peacekeeping format, and the new Russian law can be viewed as two inseparable signals that should be read together. Despite the increasingly dangerous environment taking shape around Moldova, the authorities still retain a certain room for maneuver. The country has a clear Western vector and an internationally recognized status as a candidate for membership in the European Union. It is precisely the European integration process that creates a framework in which crude military scenarios become significantly more costly and far less viable. However, this available space is shrinking, and rapidly, under the pressure of ever-emerging circumstances. Each of the factors described above may, in isolation, be manageable, but their cumulative effect could prove entirely catastrophic. Geography, unfortunately, cannot be changed, which means that Moldova, situated between Ukraine, Romania, and the Russia sphere of influence, inevitably remains part of a broader geopolitical game. In the near term, the situation around the country will likely be shaped by several key trends. First, the involvement of NATO’s eastern flank in active US military operations could have direct consequences for the countries of the Black Sea basin. Second, uncertainty will persist regarding the war in Ukraine and its long-term consequences. Unfortunately, this conflict also has the potential to spill over into neighboring territories, and not only in military terms but also through technological and environmental impacts, as illustrated by the current pollution of the upper Dniester River. Third, the Transnistria conflict will remain one of the most sensitive issues in regional politics, as even in the absence of direct military escalation, it will continue to influence the strategic calculations of all concerned actors.