The Return of Unirea?

Sergiu CEBAN

In previous years, idle talks and journalistic reports about unification with Romania were considered not only marginal but also out of step with the government’s actual plans. But early this year, the situation changed once again as the issue of unirea returned to the center of public politics and, judging by sociological data, appears to have done so seriously and for the long term

The turning point came in late January, when Maia Sandu admitted in an interview with a British publication that, in a potential referendum, she would vote in favor of Moldova’s unification with Romania. In her view, such a scenario would ensure that our country “remains part of the free world” and does not fall under Russian influence again. The statement, of course, was not unprecedented. Over three decades of independence, our presidents have made a wide variety of statements on this subject, while the unirea movement has remained on the periphery of the domestic political process. However, this time the head of state expressed her personal opinion in such a way that the unionist agenda, in essence, received approval at the highest state level, including in Romania. Within Moldova, the reaction was predictably polarized. Supporters of unification interpreted the president’s remarks as a sign that the issue was finally ceasing to be a taboo subject and was even entering the mainstream political discourse, including taking on an international dimension. Traditional pro-Russian opponents, as expected, accused Sandu of attempting to dismantle Moldovan statehood. The expert community, however, viewed her remarks as a deliberate test of public opinion ahead of a broader discussion. In Romania, the Moldovan leadership’s statements were met with caution, but also with undisguised interest. A number of prominent politicians, from both the ruling coalition and the opposition, stated that if a referendum were held, they too would vote “yes”. This stance is not surprising, since unlike in Moldova, where such statements cause social and political split, the idea of unirea has historically enjoyed broad support among the Romanian public. According to polls, more than half of citizens consistently support the reunification of the two Romanian states. It is no coincidence that, against the backdrop of this wave of statements, specific political initiatives have emerged in Romania, such as Diana Sosoaca’s bill. This document is undoubtedly more closely tied to the lawmaker’s personal political agenda. But the very fact of its emergence can be seen as a counter-effort by certain Romanian forces to bring the idea of unirea into the spotlight and demonstrate that there is a clear demand across the Prut River for more active promotion of this idea. It is also notable how Maia Sandu’s remarks were reflected almost immediately in public opinion polls. A February survey by the polling firm iData recorded a sharp surge in support for unirea – from 32.4% in the fall of 2025 to the current 42.3%. The gap between supporters and opponents of unification narrowed from nearly thirty percentage points to just five. An important point is that about 17% of respondents directly acknowledged that it was the president’s statement that changed their views on this issue. In this case, sociologists have also noted a structural shift in Moldovan society, as the proportion of middle-aged people with higher education – the very group that traditionally formed the core of the pro-European but sovereigntist electorate – has grown significantly among supporters of unirea. In other words, some of those who previously advocated for Moldova’s European path as an independent state are beginning to reevaluate that choice. Moreover, unlike the unionist moods of the 1990s and 2000s, the current surge in interest in unirea is largely pragmatic rather than ideological in nature: people are not choosing the romantic idea of reuniting Romanian lands, but rather very concrete benefits – the EU, security (NATO), certainty, and prosperity. It cannot be ruled out that the main factor driving the rise in unionist sentiment has been disappointment with the pace of our country’s independent path toward Europe. The voter’s logic may be painfully simple: Romania is in the EU, so a united country would automatically be in the EU as well. Why wait 5-10 years for the issue with Ukraine to be resolved when it’s possible to shorten both the time and the distance? Of course, in black and white, Moldova is currently one of the most successful candidates for EU membership among all applicants. In the past year alone, the country has completed technical screening across all six negotiation clusters, held elections that confirmed its pro-European course, introduced roaming within the EU zone as of January 1, 2026, and connected to the European SEPA payment system. Almost every week, Brussels officials are generous with their praise. However, these words are not backed by any specific date or even a clear timeline. Under these circumstances, the narrative of a “long path to the EU on its own” is increasingly losing ground to the narrative of a “fast track to the EU via Romania”. And not because the second option is better, but because it seems increasingly realistic. While politicians debate referendums, the economic and institutional integration of the two countries is proceeding quietly, steadily, and with considerable success. In recent years, Romania has been expanding its presence in Moldova, often surpassing the level of support provided by European funds. Recently, one of the most symbolic and, at the same time, politically resonant decisions by our authorities has been the transfer of the strategic port in Giurgiulesti to the control of a Romanian state-owned company. The Kremlin is watching the ongoing process of “de facto integration” with undisguised concern. Last week, the Russian ambassador in Bucharest called the idea of Moldovan-Romanian unification “economically unsustainable”, arguing that Moldova is too poor for Romania, let alone Europe, to want to shoulder the associated burden. In addition, he appealed to historical memory, calling the double Romanian occupations of the last century a “vaccine against unirea” for a significant portion of Moldovan society. As they say – “dubious, but okay”. It is noteworthy that, since Moscow deemed it necessary to respond officially, unionist tendencies are clearly perceived as a very real threat. For the Russian Federation, this issue goes far beyond the realm of economics or how it is perceived by Moldovan citizens. The real problem is that the absorption of a post-Soviet republic by an EU and NATO member would signify yet another strategic advance by the West in the Northern Black Sea region. If we take an honest look at the state of the unirea issue, it can be described as a “controlled drift”. It is clear that no unification will take place in the coming year – there are neither constitutional mechanisms nor geopolitical consensus, nor economic readiness on the part of Romania and the EU. Yet, despite all this, it is impossible to avoid the direction in which these processes are moving and how they are perceived by Moldovan and Romanian society. The experience of previous decades shows that support for unification has historically been context-sensitive, as it actively grows during times of crisis and uncertainty. Therefore, the current surge, clearly driven by the country’s leader, most likely occurred amid geopolitical instability, war fatigue stemming from the conflict in neighboring Ukraine, and disappointment with the pace of European integration. Consequently, under the current circumstances, political elites are urging people to view unification not through the lens of romantic ideals, but as a matter of geopolitical calculation. In other words, citizens are effectively being asked to trade national sovereignty for security, economic stability, and access to European social standards. The question has been posed. The clock is ticking.