Crisis of Purpose in the Transnistrian Settlement

The ruling regime, as it saw it, had formulated innovative for Transnistria’s reintegration but the reaction to these proposals turned out to be quite different, both domestically and among international partners

Last week, during Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Bucharest, the presidents of the two countries signed a joint declaration that explicitly states their intention to “support efforts aimed at achieving a lasting political settlement of the Transnistrian issue”. The diplomatic wording itself, with its caveats regarding respect for Moldova’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and European integration, is as standard as it gets. However, the mention of the Transnistrian issue in the bilateral Romanian-Ukrainian context struck a number of commentators as noteworthy. On the other hand, representatives of Romania and Ukraine have previously made similar and even identical statements on numerous occasions. Therefore, the formal record established by Zelensky and Nicusor Dan does not represent some new turning point in the fate of the Transnistrian region, but rather is merely another warning directed at the PAS party. It is a kind of reminder to Chisinau that on the path to the “European dream”, it must not “lose” the pro-Russian enclave on the Dniester. Especially since Maia Sandu and her team have repeatedly asserted that Moldova can join the European Union without Transnistria (arguing that this territory will join as it reintegrates and adapts to all standards, which should not block Chisinau’s plans to achieve membership in the next 3-4 years). Sandu then spoke about how we could join the EU very quickly, but not with a full set of powers (for example, without the right to veto on key issues). All of these options have been repeatedly rejected by Brussels – one need only read the recent comments by Marta Kos, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy. One of PAS’ key associates within the EU establishment explicitly stated that member states “do not support the idea of phased integration or so-called accession without full rights”. In other words, Moldova faces “deep and comprehensive integration”. It cannot be ruled out that this hardline stance, which contradicts the positions put forward by our leadership and pushes back the timeline for potential membership is directly linked to the failure of the Transnistrian settlement. It is worth recalling that the relevant deputy prime minister recently visited Brussels, and Kos’ statements are likely a direct reflection of the conversation that took place between them. Meanwhile, Valeriu Chiveri did not arrive in the EU capital empty-handed, but with a so-called “non-paper” outlining basic approaches to the step-by-step reintegration of the region. By all accounts, Chisinau’s ideas (which, it must be said, were largely derivative and lacking in originality) did not come across as particularly convincing. Worse still, the text (which, for the sake of credibility and to mask its lack of substance, currently exists only in English) was leaked to the media, in a controlled manner, to coincide with the visit to Brussels. These media outlets specialize in reaching audiences interested in the Transnistrian conflict. However, the public and political reaction to its content turned out to be far from what the authors of the idea had predicted. The diplomatic corps accredited in Chisinau largely ignored the non-paper (which is logical, since according to diplomatic norms such texts do not require public comment), while the pro-government press and expert pool lay low, waiting for “guidelines”. Under these circumstances, the initial reactions from the opposition and neutral media outlets were highly critical, emphasizing that nothing new, substantive, or conducive to uniting the two sides had been produced. Indeed, the publication contains no groundbreaking ideas. It includes standard references to the “complexity of the context”, the “divergent interests of geopolitical actors”, “challenges caused by the presence of Russian troops”, and intentions to achieve goals by exerting pressure on the region’s administration and economy. It is also acknowledged that the negotiations have limited chances of reaching a consent and “for this reason, through legislative amendments, uniform rules will be applied that require strict compliance with national legislation”. Particular criticism was directed at the overtly underdeveloped and vague idea of a “transitional period”. In its current form, this proposal would violate the country’s constitutional sovereignty (despite the fact that sovereignty is explicitly identified as one of the principles of reintegration) envisaging that “the governance of the region would be gradually transferred under the aegis of an international administration”. And only then would this “international administration” gradually hand over administrative powers to the central authorities in Chisinau. The mindset of Maia Sandu’s team, which seeks to place the entire country under the external administration of Brussels or Bucharest as quickly as possible (depending on the circumstances and the patron’s willingness to cooperate), is quite obvious. The authors of the document even came up with some justification for this: they claim that the process of European integration narrows the scope for negotiations between the banks of the Dniester, and therefore the EU must assume greater responsibility, not only financial, but also organizational and political for dismantling the “PMR”. But none of these maneuvers could save the regime from well-founded criticism. In the end, it even took crisis-management measures, that is a briefing by Chiveri, who attempted to justify the text that had leaked into the public domain. First, he downplayed its status – “not an act of public policy, does not create political obligations, is not a strategy, and is not a reintegration plan”. Then he distanced himself from the government’s authorship, citing certain “consultations with a select group of national and foreign experts”. It is rather surprising that these same experts did not assist Chisinau in promoting these arguments in the media. The Deputy Prime Minister admitted that Chisinau had not intended to draft any document and merely put it together “with popsicle sticks and glue” to meet Brussels’ expectations that still fell short. According to him, the West is waiting for a plan and the authorities are working on it, but even that will be somewhat “piecewise” rather than “comprehensive, as is expected of us”. In the end, further adding to the confusion, the official attempted to portray the idea of an international administration as both something previously articulated and, at the same time, not fully developed or agreed upon. In other words, the EU could carry out such a mission, which is a novelty, since previously there had only been talk of replacing the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester with a peace-guaranteeing or civilian mission under the auspices of either the UN or, more often, the OSCE. And yet, there had never been any intention of assigning administrative functions to this mission. However, according to Valeriu Chiveri, Moldova must still take responsibility for reintegration, and the non-paper is seen as a tool for securing political, economic, and financial support from partners. And he clearly did not mince words, outlining the purpose of the document – to secure new donor resources, channel them into the so-called “convergence fund”, allocate them at PASs discretion, and attribute any setbacks in reintegration to Tiraspol’s intransigence, Moscow’s military presence, and a lack of resolve and support from partners. Kyiv and Bucharest have already made their positions clear in a joint statement by their presidents. Now Chisinau will be waiting for Brussels to dig in its purse again – according to Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu, as part of the EU’s growth plan, the EU is allocating 189 million euros to us for projects in the energy, infrastructure, and social sectors. The fact that Chisinau has produced a rather incoherent reintegration document, where even the figures in the main text and annexes do not always match, and responsibilities remain undefined, is framed as little more than growing pains. The underlying logic, however, is to keep the Transnistrian issue as a steady source of Western funding and diplomatic sympathy, effectively offsetting any excesses of the ruling regime. PAS and Maia Sandu have refined this approach to a high degree and are likely to continue leveraging the themes of reintegration and the so-called Russian-Transnistrian threat for years to come.