Moldova and NATO: A Bid for Limited Membership?

As Moldova continues to move closer to NATO, it risks finding itself in a vulnerable intermediate position: neither enjoying genuine neutrality nor benefiting from full-fledged allied security guarantees

While public attention last week was focused on the pollution of the Dniester and yet another Russian drone crashing on our territory, less visible but no less significant developments were taking place in Chisinau. Analyzing these events inevitably raises a question the authorities carefully avoid: where is Moldova actually heading, and what will become of its neutrality? In early March, Russia struck the Dniester Hydroelectric Power Plant, located in close proximity to Moldova’s border. This time, the consequences for us were serious, as the attack led to a spill of petroleum products into the river, affecting the lives of thousands of people. Shortly afterward, in the Stefan Voda district, a fragment of a Russian drone, apparently shot down by Ukrainian air defense systems, fell on our territory. These two incidents, occurring just days apart, once again underscored how close the line of armed conflict runs to us. One might expect these developments to prompt a policy of maximum caution and restraint. Caught between a warring Ukraine and Romania, which is gradually being drawn into the Middle Eastern crisis, Moldova has extremely limited room for maneuver. Nevertheless, the country’s leadership appears to be guided by a different logic. Instead of exercising foreign policy prudence, PAS continues to openly demonstrate a steady rapprochement with NATO. On March 16, Moldova marked the 32nd anniversary of its accession to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. On this occasion, the capital was visited by an Alliance delegation led by the Chair of the Military Committee, Italian Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone. The visit lasted three days, from March 18 to 20, and was full of high-level meetings. The official held talks with Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii, National Army Commander Vitalie Micov, and even Maia Sandu. According to official statements, “the parties discussed further cooperation, the regional security situation, the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, and defense sector reforms”. The implementation of the Individual Partnership Program for 2025-2028 and initiatives under the Defense Capacity Building Package for Moldova was also reaffirmed. The figure of the visitor himself is also telling. Admiral Dragone has been overseeing NATO military operations since early 2025 and is known, among other things, for stating that ‘”a preemptive strike against Russia could be regarded as a defensive action”, as well as for his view that “the hybrid war with Russia does not cease for a single day”. One can only speculate what exactly was discussed with such an interlocutor by Moldova’s senior officials, and what commitments may have been undertaken beyond the idle language of official press releases. At the same time, a Moldovan parliamentary delegation visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, including members of the committees on national security, defense, European integration, and foreign policy. The visit focused on regional security in the Black Sea area, countering hybrid threats, and NATO priorities following the 2025 Hague Summit. Earlier, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte met in Brussels with Deputy Prime Minister Mihai Popsoi and reaffirmed the Alliance’s readiness to provide Moldova with the maximum possible support. In turn, our top diplomat assured Rutte that he possesses, no less, a “popular mandate” to further deepen cooperation with NATO. It is worth noting that none of the recent electoral cycles explicitly addressed this issue. Military-political rapprochement with the North Atlantic Alliance, while formally maintaining neutrality, is clearly not a choice that automatically follows from the results of presidential or parliamentary elections. Another striking coincidence also merits attention. On March 18, the first day of Admiral Dragone’s visit, the president signed a decree approving a new regulation for the National Security Council, replacing the corresponding document on the Supreme Security Council adopted in 2021. At first glance, this appears to be a routine administrative reorganization. However, a closer look reveals a significant expansion of the body’s institutional powers. The NSC is now defined as a coordinating body among public authorities, tasked with analyzing threats to national security, developing responses to neutralize them, and advising the president. The greatest interest lies in the final, ninth chapter of the new regulation, titled “Special Provisions”. It contains only three clauses, yet in substance it amounts to the creation of a parallel, classified framework for governing national security. Article 67, for instance, grants the NSC the right to have heraldic symbols, insignia, and even its own uniform. This may appear formal, but in reality, it suggests that the body could, at a certain point, cease to be a temporary consultative mechanism and acquire the features of a permanent security structure. Article 65 states that, upon the declaration of a state of siege or martial law, the NSC will operate under a separate classified regulation approved by the president, the contents of which will be unknown to citizens, parliament, and the public. Article 66 further specifies that the standard regulation remains in force only insofar as its provisions do not contradict the requirements of the classified one. In other words, under a state of emergency, the publicly known regulatory framework governing the NSC can effectively be suspended, giving way to provisions approved unilaterally by the president and beyond parliamentary oversight. In essence, this amounts to a legalized mechanism for shifting the country into a form of manual control, where constitutional procedures are formally preserved, but real decisions are made according to classified rules known only to a narrow circle of individuals. This naturally raises the question: why is this necessary, and what is Moldova being prepared for? While the authorities prefer to sidestep these questions, a significant part of society remains concerned about what exactly attracts NATO to a country that formally adheres to constitutional neutrality and possesses an army that can hardly be considered a significant military force at the regional level. The answer, it would seem, does not lie in the realm of military capability. Moldova’s value to the Alliance is прежде всего as a geographic and political position. A country sharing a border with Ukraine, providing a land corridor to Romania, and hosting the unresolved Transnistrian conflict with the presence of Russian troops is a point that NATO would prefer to keep in the “right camp”. Meanwhile, the war in the Middle East has exposed a latent rift within NATO, calling into question the transatlantic unity between the United States and Europe. In this context of turbulence, the Alliance appears to be increasingly intent on consolidating its hold over peripheral regions, minimizing the risks of emerging ‘grey zones’ of uncertainty. Within this logic, Moldova may be viewed not as a полноценный participant in military cooperation, but rather as a transit and buffer element within NATO’s sphere of influence. It would not be surprising if, in closed-door discussions with NATO officials in Brussels and Chisinau, Moldova’s military-political leadership is signaling that, much like in the case of a limited status within the European Union, the country would also be willing to accept a reduced, de facto form of NATO membership, so long as it remains within the West’s geopolitical orbit. Such a model would likely imply not so much formal security guarantees as a gradual integration into the Alliance’s infrastructure through its standards, logistics, intelligence sharing, and participation in joint planning. If such a course is indeed pursued, the country may ultimately find itself in a highly vulnerable intermediate position: no longer truly neutral, yet not protected by full-fledged allied security guarantees. For citizens who deserve an honest public debate, it is essential to understand what this choice actually entails, and to discuss it not in vague terms of Euro-Atlantic standards and democratic partnership, but through the prism of real risks, obligations, and consequences.