Under Emergency Rule: What Future Awaits Moldova?

On Tuesday, parliament voted to introduce a state of emergency with the aim of managing energy risks. But is it really only about the desire to cope with mounting crises?

On March 24, at the request of Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu, an emergency evening session of parliament was convened with the aim of introducing a state of emergency in the country. The immediate trigger was the shutdown, during the night from Monday to Tuesday, of the Vulcanesti-Isaccea power line, which supplies virtually all of Moldova’s electricity imports, accounting for around two-thirds of total consumption. According to “photo evidence” presented by Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu, one of the line’s pylons on Ukrainian territory was damaged as a result of a Russian attack. At least Chisinau has already identified a culprit, with officials even stating that Moscow should compensate the costs of restoring the facility. The point is that the pylon itself is on Moldova’s balance sheet, meaning that all repair costs will have to be covered by the company Moldelectrica. The repairs will be carried out by Ukrainian specialists and are expected to take 5 to 7 days, provided that demining of the surrounding area does not cause delays. Meanwhile, due to the specifics of the legislation, the state of emergency was introduced immediately for a period of 60 days. This has already allowed the government, going beyond mere appeals to the public, to announce specific energy-saving measures during peak consumption periods. There are reasonable doubts that the state of emergency will be lifted once the damaged power line is restored. First, the repair of the Vulcanesti-Isaccea power line may take longer than expected. In theory, Kyiv has no interest in delaying it, similar to the Druzhba oil pipeline, which became a tool of pressure on Viktor Orban. There are no elections planned in Moldova, and there is no need to change PAS’ political course (unless there are plans to escalate tensions or create a conflict hotspot, for example, to separate Moldova’s and Ukraine’s Euro-integration efforts). However, technically the task may prove more complicated, and there are no guarantees that drone attacks will not be repeated. Second, flexible methods of influencing life in the country may prove useful for the executive branch, given the ongoing military actions in the Middle East, which have triggered critical consequences for the national economy. The sharp surge in fuel prices has already triggered a transport strike and worsened the already dire situation for farmers. Electricity prices have started to rise, affecting consumer bills. On Wednesday, the National Agency for Energy Regulation postponed the approval of new tariffs until the next session, directly citing the situation with supplies along the Vulcanesti-Isaccea line. Gas prices have also increased significantly, although Chisinau was helped by previously contracted volumes. One way or another, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and other consequences of the US-Israel campaign against Iran forced the government for about a week to consider introducing a state of emergency, which in Moldova would have been difficult without blaming Russia. Previous experiences with states of emergency under the PAS regime point to two key points: that Moscow must be blamed for what is happening. that it is very convenient for the authorities to make decisions through the Emergency Situations Commission. So, in our country a state of emergency was introduced in the fall of 2021 for 30 days under the pretext of a dispute with PJSC Gazprom and negotiations over a new contract. The next one lasted almost two years – from February 24, 2022, until the very end of 2023 – due to the war in Ukraine. At first, it seemed there were fears of the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistrian region, but later authorities simply got used to a convenient tool for making quick decisions in their own interests. Only the 2024-2025 elections and the need to take public opinion into account forced Maia Sandu, Dorin Recean, and others to refrain from extending the state of emergency. But since no votes are scheduled in the near future, a return to emergency powers has become only a matter of time. In this sense, the need to repair the power line became a convenient pretext to channel blame toward Russia. At the same time, the parliament supported the introduction of the state of emergency, understanding the need for flexible risk management in light of the energy crisis caused by the war in the Middle East. If the only problem had been the “Vulcanesti-Isaccea” power line support, the government would not have been able to secure backing from 75 deputies (even the Socialists and Communists did not vote “against”, but merely abstained). It seems the opposition fell into a trap set by Maia Sandu and PAS. While the reasons for introducing the state of emergency (and even the pretext) can generally be justified, any parliamentary oversight mechanisms effectively become inapplicable afterward. Of course, the decision could have been made solely with PAS votes, but then the other parties would not bear responsibility for the government’s subsequent actions, in effect granting it a vote of confidence (especially illogical for forces that did not support Alexandru Munteanu’s government but are now willing to grant it special powers). On the other hand, the intricacies of the political process will soon take a back seat. Even if the “Vulcanesti-Isaccea” line is successfully restarted by the beginning of next week, Chisinau will continue to face the long-term consequences of the Middle East ventures of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Washington has sent a number of encouraging signals regarding the delivery of a peace plan to the Iranian leadership and the involvement of several countries, including Turkey and Egypt, in a mediating role. However, Tehran has so far shown no readiness to cease hostilities or unblock the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, restoring already damaged infrastructure in some raw material-producing countries could take many months. Countries that import not only fuel but also fertilizers and chemical industry raw materials, including Moldova, will suffer as a result. The most interesting question is why the ruling regime now felt the need to have the Emergency Situations Commission at hand: is it a strife for unlimited powers, a “preventive” intention to flexibly support business as suggested to Alexandru Munteanu, or are there already specific projects that require routing through the commission? Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu called electricity purchases from MGRES “very costly”, but clarified that the authorities are considering all options. The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) will soon approve new electricity tariffs, and consumers may be in for unpleasant surprises. After all, in about a month, the verdict for Vladimir Plahotniuc is expected, and such an event is easier to face with a broad and unchecked set of response measures.