“Scapegoat” Prime Minister: Job Done and Exit Imminent?

Sergiu CEBAN

Speculation is proving true that PAS needed Alexander Munteanu, brought in from abroad to lead the government, solely to do its “dirty work” and absorb all the public backlash from unpopular reforms

Today marks one month since the start of the joint U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran. In just a matter of weeks, it has thrown the global energy sector into a state of severe turmoil, unleashing a new wave of inflation on consumers and forcing the governments of many countries to revisit the concept of “strategic reserves”. Brent crude oil has broken through the $110-per-barrel mark, while LNG prices have risen by nearly 60%. Therefore, despite the geographical distance from the war in the Middle East, its repercussions are clearly being felt in Moldova as well. However, today we will not be discussing the conflict in Iran, which dominates international media headlines, but rather the fate of the current Moldovan government. Today marks its 150th day in office, providing a fitting occasion to talk about the cabinet, around which the clouds have been rapidly gathering in recent times. As early as February, opposition representatives claimed that Alexandru Munteanu’s government would step down as early as this summer. However, the prime minister’s own reaction was telling: he immediately dismissed rumors of an imminent resignation, calling them mere speculation. In doing so, he cited a single argument: “If parliament deems our work satisfactory, we will continue”. This was said without the confidence typical of political leaders; rather, it sounded like a cautious comment from an ordinary person who is not entirely sure of his own prospects. Let’s start with the obvious question that people preferred not to ask aloud when Munteanu was appointed: why did the ruling party, which enjoys a comfortable parliamentary majority, need to put at the helm of the executive branch a man who is little known in the country, has lived abroad for a long time, and is clearly unfamiliar with Moldovan political realities? Maia Sandu’s explanation about economic experience and technocratic considerations didn’t sound entirely convincing even then, and a few months later – even less so. Almost immediately after the appointment process was completed, some experts began to suggest that the “imported prime minister” was needed by the current authorities not so much to develop the economy or address the problems accumulated by his predecessors, but rather to carry out the “dirty work” for PAS and push through a number of unpopular reforms. Today, this version appears even more plausible. Over the past 150 days, the government has consistently taken precisely those decisions that are bound to hurt its approval ratings: tariff hikes, strict fiscal policy, and the promotion of autocratic administrative changes. As a result, it has been not PAS, but Munteanu and his ministers who have borne the brunt of public criticism all this time. At the same time, there has been a growing sense that the “shadow prime minister” has decided to remain in his seat for a while longer so that his experience can include another substantial achievement. For this reason, it is hard to shake the impression that the Munteanu cabinet was deliberately burdened with the entire heap of problems. Over five months, it has endured several energy shocks, each leaving an increasingly visible political mark. As early as March 4, the authorities were forced to introduce an alert regime in the energy sector following the escalation in the Middle East and the sharp rise in fuel prices. Before citizens had time to absorb the first blow, a second followed. On March 24, due to Russian strikes on energy infrastructure in southern Ukraine, the Isaccea-Vulcanesti power line, the main artery through which the country imports electricity from Romania, was shut down. As a result, the government was forced to declare a full-fledged 60-day state of emergency in the energy sector. At the same time, Moldova was hit by an unprecedented environmental crisis on the Dniester River, with equally serious consequences. Russian shelling of the Dniester Hydroelectric Power Plant in early March led to large-scale pollution of the river on Ukrainian territory due to a leak of petroleum products, which spread as far as the Dubasari reservoir. As is well known, the Dniester provides drinking water to a significant portion of the country’s population, so a number of regions were forced to suspend water supply to consumers for several days. Incidentally, water from the Dniester is also a source for irrigating agricultural land, so the environmental problem of the Dniester is far from over. Formally, none of these problems was directly caused by the government’s actions or mistakes, but it is the government that people now associate with negative emotions, because politics and especially citizens operate according to their own logic. When the water runs out and there is a threat of power outages, people are primarily angry at those currently in power, not at those who are actually to blame. One point is particularly important. While during the PAS’ previous years in power, European integration was its main political asset, in recent months this issue has effectively faded into the background. Following the parliamentary elections, which were accompanied by loud promises of a European future, virtually nothing has happened in this direction –neither an official start to negotiations nor any new encouraging signals from Brussels. In Moldova, where the path to Europe has become in recent years not just a foreign policy course but a part of the government’s domestic legitimacy, such a pause looks like a prelude to an inevitable resignation. It cannot be said that the current government has failed across the board. On the other hand, the breakthrough promised by PAS’ re-elected parliamentary majority has not materialized either. Take, for example, the record budget deficit of 20 billion lei, which Munteanu presented as “investment-driven”. In reality, it has created significant pressure on the public financial sector, and this issue will likely have to be dealt with by the next government. A similar situation can be seen with the administrative-territorial reform, which PAS postponed for several electoral cycles and ultimately handed over to this cabinet. Attention should also be paid to the composition of the ministers. Many of them appear not as independent figures subordinate to the prime minister, but rather as appointees of various party clans and influential affiliated groups, whose bureaucratic careers will likely begin or end along with Munteanu’s own. If the rumors circulating in parliamentary corridors prove true and Munteanu’s government does indeed resign before the end of the first half of the year, it will mean that the ruling regime has decided to pull off a political maneuver in this peculiar way to shed its electoral and political baggage. Why this was done and to whom Munteanu might cede the prime minister’s seat is a complex question. It is unlikely that his successor, among whom Vasile Tofan is listed, will find himself in more favorable circumstances. Another factor is also significant. In recent years, any reshuffling within the executive branch has been increasingly linked to internal “turbulence” within PAS. For the party, establishing a new internal balance has become an increasingly complex and painful process, and the search for compromises all too often results in open conflicts. Moreover, this is not only between individual influential groups but also between the political party’s top leaders. And no matter how hard political advisors try to hide these frictions from the public and the expert community, doing so is becoming increasingly difficult.