Shifting Global Dynamics and Moldova’s Survival

The introduction of a state of emergency in the country, contrary to actual circumstances and despite internal criticism, is a predictable and even rational response of the system to geopolitical uncertainty

The damaged pylon of the Vulcanesti-Isaccea power line was restored by Ukrainian specialists within four days. The opposition, including deputies who supported the declaration of the state of emergency, is now calling for it to be lifted. However, neither Maia Sandu nor the government appears in any hurry to relinquish the expanded powers. In fact, such a forecast was made at the very stage of introducing the state of emergency. The logic is simple: the main channel for supplying imported electricity to Moldova has been restored, but all other problems remain unresolved and are only worsening. For example, fuel prices show no serious signs of stabilization. In the European Union, concerns are no longer limited to rising costs, but also to the risk of actual shortages. Brussels is even urging citizens to cut back on transport use, flying and traveling less. For our country, which is entirely dependent on external supplies, developments in the Middle East pose a major challenge. Diesel reserves are estimated at about a week of normal consumption or less, and on Monday, diesel was unavailable at 130 filling stations. This time, relying on Romania, as in the case of electricity supplies, will be more difficult due to the specifics of its market and production, including the linkage between diesel and gasoline output and the shutdown of two of its three main refineries. Uncertainty prevails in international relations. Situations that would have been hard to imagine just a few years ago are becoming new trends, including those affecting Moldova. While the opposition issues statements calling for the lifting of the state of emergency, Russian drones are flying through national airspace. Ukraine, in turn, is using the skies of the Baltic states to strike one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, which not only creates additional pressure on the global oil market (at the regional level, the suspension of the Druzhba oil pipeline, used as a tool of pressure on Viktor Orban, is also having a significant impact) but also escalates the conflict. Russia, for its part, has not yet used a casus belli or Washington’s entanglement in Iran to expand the geography of the conflict. Ukrainian drones have recently crashed in Finland, while Russian drones regularly end up in Romania. Thus, de facto, it turns out that no fully functioning boundaries exist: the situation is determined by decisions made in real time and by the degree of countries’ tolerance toward specific developments. Our authorities claim that Ukraine is defending its eastern border from Russia. However, they completely ignore the fact that in modern conditions, direct territorial contact is no longer necessary to carry out an attack. The United States has pursued its objectives in Venezuela and continues to pressure Cuba with minimal use of conventional weapons and means. The campaign in the Middle East is being conducted without any ground component at all. At the same time, Iran is effectively resisting attacks from the wealthy and technologically advanced United States and Israel, relying solely on extensive internal control, resilience, and a willingness to inflict retaliatory damage. Moldova has none of these capacities – neither developed shelters and a functioning civil defense system, nor the ability to operate in a state of autarky and mount a serious response, nor control over strategic trade routes. Moreover, society and the state are unlikely to demonstrate the same level of resilience to destructive strikes as Ukraine or Iran. Therefore, Chisinau should focus exclusively on peace and dialogue, given the erosion of international law and the inability to rely on protection from universal or regional institutions. The ruling party is trying to shelter Moldova in the shadow of the European Union, which is gradually taking on the features of a military-political bloc. Yet even here, the trajectory remains unpredictable. Accelerated political accession is constrained by Kyiv’s parallel application, which in turn largely depends on the elections in Hungary scheduled for the middle of the month. Marta Kos openly states that Moldova’s EU membership without the territory of Transnistria and/or with limited sovereignty is impossible. At the same time, she pays an encouraging visit to Montenegro, a country that joined NATO back in 2017, after which Prime Minister Milojko Spajic promises EU membership by 2028, while the European Commissioner for Enlargement speaks instead of a certain “gradual integration”. It appears that even Brussels, bound by rules and procedures for every political scenario, finds itself uncertain in the face of another wave of enlargement. There is no common framework, and the logic is not sustained even at the rhetorical level. Physical borders between countries are becoming less significant, and the once unquestioned advantage of stronger states, in military, economic, and demographic terms, over weaker ones is eroding. The rules of international trade are also undergoing constant erosion: first Chisinau quarrels with Kyiv for opportunistic reasons, then Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz with global consequences, and ultimately the CIS Secretariat claims that our Foreign Ministry has misinterpreted the organization’s agreements, meaning that Moldova may soon be unable to benefit from the free trade zone within the CIS. The combination of factors creating a situation of unpredictability and the absence of universally workable solutions compels the system to seek conservation and stability. A tool for control and subordination is needed, as seen in Ukraine or Iran. A Commission for Emergency Situations or a National Security Council headed by Maia Sandu may not be the most original or democratic option, but it is entirely consistent with global and regional trends. In Ukraine, the state of emergency in force and elections have been canceled; in Romania, there is severe budget austerity and a brewing political crisis; on the left bank of the Dniester, an “emergency economic situation” is in effect. The PAS regime could hardly miss such an opportunity to consolidate power, especially against the backdrop of a soft, increasingly fragmented opposition that keeps calling for cooperation. Whether the state of emergency will end in 50 days is hard to predict – there are simply too many potential escalation scenarios and pretexts for “tightening the screws”. One thing is certain: any relatively convincing reason will be used by PAS to extend the state of emergency for as long as possible.