Is the “Alternativa” Doomed?

The further things go, the harder it becomes for the rather diverse members of the “Alternativa” bloc to project unity and cohesion within their ranks

Semyon ALBU, RTA: Yesterday, the country took another step away from its historical past: in the final second reading, Parliament adopted laws denouncing three agreements that formed the basis of Moldova’s membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This is a highly symbolic and pivotal event in the process of severing traditional ties to the East, supposedly in favor of the much-vaunted European integration. After all, there is no guarantee of EU membership for us, whereas participation in the CIS is now definitively over. The whole process was accompanied by numerous scandals. For instance, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, it turned out, openly misled the public by claiming that leaving the CIS would have no impact on our trade opportunities – that is, the agreements that were beneficial would remain untouched and we would continue to use them. However, within the Commonwealth itself, this was quickly refuted, with a reasonable observation that it would be impossible to reap the benefits of the organization without being a member. In general, MPs actually had plenty to ponder before making such a crucial decision for the country’s future. But when has PAS ever been guided by Moldova’s real interests? Once again, it chose not to be, personally dismantling yet another opportunity to develop the already visibly shrinking potential of our republic. But today the focus isn’t quite on that. One of the notable episodes in Moldova’s exit from the CIS was the way different parliamentary factions voted. Unsurprisingly, the entire “yellow gang” voted “yes”, as did the faction of the “Democracy at Home” party. The “no” votes came from the Socialists, Communists, and Renato Usatii’s “Our Party”. As for the “Alternativa” faction, it was downright comical: one – Ion Chicu – voted “yes”, three voted “no”, and another three abstained entirely. What a broad pluralism of opinions! But on a serious note, yesterday’s vote served as a clear marker of the state in which the once-promising electoral bloc now finds itself. Let’s recall February of last year, when it suddenly came into being. It was indeed a significant event, noticeably enlivening the political swamp of the time, drenched in yellow paint. One might think the venture was destined for success from the start. Calling this new political force a “dream team” might have been an exaggeration, but the lineup was certainly impressive. First, Ion Ceban, the successful mayor of the capital and founder of the increasingly popular MAN party, with obvious ambitions to rise to the very top of domestic politics. Second, Alexandr Stoianoglo, a man honored with the title of “the regime’s victim” and, more importantly, the “defeater of Maia Sandu on Moldovan soil”. They were joined by Ion Chicu – leader of the PDCM party, not particularly popular but also not widely disliked, remembered relatively well by the public for his time as prime minister, especially compared to the heads of government appointed under PAS. And finally, Mark Tkaciuk – an experienced functionary from the Communist ranks, who in theory added ideological and intellectual muscle to the new coalition. But relying solely on well-known figures, of course, would get you nowhere. What was needed was a fresh, breakthrough political agenda – the very “alternative” capable of rallying the masses of voters disillusioned with both the ruling party and the “old” opposition. The problem, however, is that the eponymous bloc, ironically enough, failed to produce precisely that. In the end, the “Alternativa” program, although it contained some decent ideas and initiatives in places, essentially boiled down to the simple principle of “pro-virtue and anti-vice”. The bloc never really developed a unique identity of its own. Its members repeatedly pledged allegiance to Moldova’s European path, which prompted a straightforward question among most ordinary citizens: why do we need new Euro-integrators when we already have the current ones? At that time, the latter, by the way, had no problems with the European integration process. All the more so when even someone like Ceban, who declares his commitment to the European course at every opportunity, faces EU sanctions. A major vulnerability of the “Alternativa” bloc from the outset was the ideological fragmentation of the forces that comprised it. It included MAN with its pro-European and even pro-Romanian orientation, Mark Tkaciuk with the “leftist” Civic Congress, fragments of the centrist Democratic Party in the form of PDCM, and Stoianoglo, who ran for president with the backing of the Socialist Party. Perhaps, in the minds of the bloc’s initiators, such a political “crazy quilt” could have “attract” voters from all directions, but in practice the opposite largely happened. As a result, in the battle of opposition blocs, even the stale communists and socialists gathered far more votes, while the “Alternativa” secured only a few more mandates than the parties of Usatii and Costiuc combined. Having entered parliament, the “Alternativa” members often continued to act in a disjointed manner, each going their own way. The example of the vote on denouncing the CIS founding agreements is a vivid one, but far from unique. On more than one occasion, representatives of the bloc supported key initiatives of the ruling regime, raising doubts about their opposition stance as such. The same state of emergency, for instance, was approved by six deputies from the bloc, with one abstention and none voting against. Or take Ion Chicu, who refused to back a vote of no confidence in the Munteanu government, arguing that it was “inexpedient in the context of existing crises”. There are also questions regarding the bloc’s frontman, Ion Ceban, whose views increasingly appear to be shifting toward pro-Romanian, almost unionist positions. This looks particularly strange given his past background. Such moves are unlikely to be viewed positively by colleagues like Mark Tkaciuk and Alexandr Stoianoglo, not to mention the broader electorate, which expects greater consistency and integrity in the convictions of its representatives. Otherwise, one might conclude that such convictions are absent altogether. It should be noted that rumors of a split within the “Alternativa” bloc have followed it almost since the first months of its existence. Presumably, not all of them were groundless, given the ideological differences among its members. However, the disintegration of the alliance now appears to be a very real prospect. The Civic Congress may be the first to exit, as it plans to hold an expanded meeting of its executive committee to review the bloc’s current state. Overall, if this quartet does begin to fall apart, there will be nothing surprising about it. In any case, it has not turned into a strong opposition force. After the parliamentary elections, PAS retained a relatively comfortable majority, sufficient to govern the country independently without regard for its competitors. Under these conditions, the only option left for others is at least to act as a united front against what they call usurpers, thereby undermining the legitimacy of their decisions. But this is not happening at the level of a single bloc like the “Alternativa”, let alone the entire parliament. So, what is the purpose?