Moldova and Russia on the Brink of a Complete Break?

Moldovan authorities are systematically severing their remaining ties with Russia in such a way that any future attempts to restore them would be virtually impossible

Yesterday marked the 34th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moldova and Russia. The occasion took place in an atmosphere that could hardly be called optimistic, but where hope for mutual pragmatism still lingered. The two nations shared neither a linguistic affinity nor a common border – only a shared pre-revolutionary past, several decades of Soviet coexistence, and the need to build new ties on the ruins of what was once a single state. The next three decades of relations were, to put it mildly, mixed. Close economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation was intertwined with political disagreements, including the Transnistrian issue and Moldova’s foreign policy course. Nevertheless, even during periods of acute crisis, the countries tried to maintain channels of communication. Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. On this latest anniversary of the relationship, there are neither joint statements nor attempts to outline any prospects whatsoever. Both sides continue to distance themselves from one another. Consequently, experts are increasingly saying that this is no longer a temporary cooling-off period, but a complete break. Symbolically, on the eve of the 34th anniversary our parliamentarians put a legislative end to the country’s withdrawal from the CIS by voting to denounce the Commonwealth’s founding agreements. 60 out of 101 deputies voted in favor, despite fierce opposition from the Communists and Socialists, who warned of catastrophic consequences. Following parliamentary approval, the documents must be signed by Maia Sandu; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will then submit them to the CIS Executive Committee, and the withdrawal will not take legal effect until a year later. Thus, Moldova will leave the organization by the end of 2027, becoming the third post-Soviet country to do so after Georgia and Ukraine. Beyond its purely legal implications, this step also carries profound political significance. For us, it represents a reaffirmation of foreign policy priorities aimed at integration with the European Union and distancing ourselves from post-Soviet structures. Thus, the authorities are effectively completing their withdrawal from the institutional orbit of the former Soviet space and breaking with a model of relations in which Russia had long remained one of Moldova’s key partners. For Moscow, this is also a significant moment, as it reflects a further reduction of its influence in the region. Withdrawal from the CIS is, of course, not an isolated event, but rather the tip of the iceberg, the base of which consists of a multitude of accumulated contradictions and incidents that merely accelerated the adoption of the final political decision in Chisinau. Over the past few months, Moldovan public opinion has been shaped by several anti-Russian narratives that, taken together, painted a very clear picture. These include the side effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which have led to increased flights of Russian drones over Moldova, accidents on the Isaccea-Vulcanesti power line, and pollution of the Dniester River with subsequent environmental consequences. Undoubtedly, the current escalation is not the first in the history of Russian-Moldovan relations. Exactly twenty years ago, in 2006, Russia dealt one of the most painful blows to the national economy when it imposed an embargo on imports of our wine. According to experts, direct losses to winemakers and related sectors alone amounted to half a billion dollars. However, at that time, the pressure was directed at a single industry, albeit a very significant one. The current crisis, however, encompasses the entire scope of bilateral relations: trade, transportation, migration, security, culture, and so on. Returning from this point will be incomparably more difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, judging by the statements of our authorities, no one is planning to return. Withdrawal from the CIS is even presented as a cost-saving measure, with the argument that the budget could save around 3 million lei in annual membership fees. At the same time, the Moldovan government is trying to sidestep the issue of CIS markets, which remain important for a number of Moldovan industries, primarily the agricultural sector, the processing industry, and logistics. There are no guarantees that post-Soviet countries will agree to conclude bilateral free trade agreements with us. Nor is it a given that the highly competitive European market will be able to fully absorb the products of our manufacturers. Humanitarian issues are no less pressing. Hundreds of thousands of Moldovan citizens work and live in Russia and other CIS countries. Consequently, withdrawal from the organization would call into question the legal framework governing their labor rights, access to social benefits, and the recognition of their professional qualifications. One of the most alarming scenarios is the introduction of a full-fledged visa regime between Moldova and other post-Soviet republics, particularly Russia. Following the decision to denounce the CIS founding documents, the prospect of a visa barrier no longer seems so distant. The current nature of relations between Chisinau and Moscow is largely determined by changes in the foreign policy landscape. As experience shows, the more actively a country pursues European integration, the stronger the impact on its relations with Russia. For the Moldovan elite, this choice is linked not only to economic considerations but also to issues of security and political identity, since, in the context of regional instability, an orientation toward the EU is viewed as the only way to stay afloat geopolitically. For Moscow, such developments signal a further loss of influence in its traditional sphere of interest, while withdrawal from multilateral organizations such as the CIS creates additional tension and reduces the likelihood of compromise. As a result, Russian-Moldovan relations are increasingly becoming part of a broader geopolitical confrontation with no apparent grounds for stabilization or a shift toward a relatively positive trajectory. Currently, there are virtually no signs of this: official contacts have been reduced to a minimum, and mutual rhetoric remains extremely harsh. The Kremlin’s reaction has not yet been made clear, and it is unlikely to openly announce specific retaliatory measures. However, the arsenal of leverage is well known: trade restrictions, energy, the Transnistrian settlement and Gagauzia, support for opposition forces within the country, and so on. Each of these tools has already been used by Russia at various times and with varying degrees of intensity. Most likely, future interstate relations will be shaped by highly contentious issues that are nonetheless of fundamental importance to Moldova. Transnistrian issue will remain a separate and particularly sensitive topic, especially given the Russian military presence, which makes normalization virtually impossible in the near future. The Gagauz autonomy, with its traditionally strong pro-Russian sentiments, will also serve as a political irritant, since Moscow has historically used Comrat as a conduit to exert influence on Moldovan politics, and this channel of influence is unlikely to be closed. Moldova’s withdrawal from the CIS symbolizes not merely another foreign policy step, but the end of an entire era in which the post-Soviet space remained a crucial framework for relations between Moldova and Russia. At the same time, the institutional and interstate split has been designed by the current authorities in such a way that any future attempts to restore ties with Moscow would require colossal political and legal efforts.