Opinion: “April 7 Was Not a Watershed Moment for Moldova”

Seventeen years after the riots in Chisinau, the country’s leadership continues to put forward conflicting versions of the events surrounding the “Twitter Revolution”

Yesterday, the president and the speaker of parliament commented on the events of April 7, 2009. In the aftermath of the street unrest in Chisinau, the long-standing rule of the Communist Party was overthrown, leading to the formation of the first “Alliance for European Integration”. Although the Party of Communists (PCRM) had secured a parliamentary majority with 50 seats, it was removed from power under direct pressure from Western partners and with the personal involvement in the protests of certain politicians who later became part of the ruling system. The scenario resembled a typical “color revolution”, repeated multiple times in other post-Soviet states both before and after. Yet today, none of those who benefited from these events speak of it in such terms. External interference is ignored, and assessments of the events remain inconsistent and largely irrational. Maia Sandu, for her part, describes April 7 as a “shameful moment in history” and points to the fact that justice has still not been served. Igor Grosu, meanwhile, framed his position in a rather paradoxical way, writing that at the time power was seized by a “mafia octopus” that nearly derailed the country from its “European path”: “It took 10 years to dismantle this ‘octopus’, which had been formed within the Voronin regime”. This statement is noteworthy for implicitly acknowledging both that the Communists were, in fact, steering the country toward a European course (which, incidentally, aligns with the party’s programmatic documents from the mid-2000s) and the mafia-like nature of the regime that emerged after the “Twitter Revolution” – a system of which Igor Grosu himself was a part. It is worth recalling that Sandu served as Minister of Education in the government of Vladimir Filat, while her state secretary (that is, deputy) was the current speaker of parliament. They held these positions precisely during the ten-year period of the so-called “mafia octopus”. It is evident that in his reflections, Grosu is alluding to the so-called “ambassadors’ revolution” of June 2019, seemingly overlooking the undeniable role of Russia in those events and the subsequent de facto coalition government formed by Maia Sandu together with Igor Dodon’s Socialists. Overall, PAS’ attempt to distance itself from its involvement in the early iterations of the “Alliance for European Integration” appears unconvincing and even somewhat comical. Yet it is also predictable, given the fate that befell many of the politicians who helped dismantle Communist rule. Vlad Filat has served his sentence and is now in opposition to the current ruling regime, while Vladimir Plahotniuc faces a potential prison term of up to 25 years. Even Victor Osipov, who at the time represented Serafim Urechean’s Our Moldova Alliance, has been detained. Marian Lupu’s party never quite took off, but at least he, along with leading figures of the Liberal Party such as Mihai Ghimpu and Dorin Chirtoaca, has avoided legal trouble. At the same time, seventeen years is a very long period. Chronologically, the “Twitter Revolution” is now as distant from the present day as it was from the proclamation of modern independent Moldova by the Great National Assembly on August 27, 1991. If one follows the official mythology of pro-European forces, the republic has been governed by pro-European parties and alliances for exactly half of its existence in its current form. This is precisely where the problem for the PAS regime lies, as such a timeframe is more than sufficient to demonstrate tangible results. Yet Maia Sandu and her team continue to refer back to a “toxic past”, meaning not only the Soviet era but virtually any period preceding PAS’s exclusive hold on power. It feels as if the bipolar tendencies of our leadership are soon going to lead them toward overall negative assessments and the so-called “ambassadors’ revolution”, in which Russia played an active role and which temporarily brought PAS into the embrace of the Socialists (Igor Dodon, with whom the ruling party has for years engaged in a kind of tango, shifting him from coalition partner to “pro-Russian scarecrow”, as he too is under the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities). In essence, neither of these revolutions, carried out under the guidance of external powers, became turning points in Moldova’s history. They did not alter the country’s developmental trajectory, but merely brought changes to the personal composition of the political class, affecting rhetoric, administrative competence, and economic conditions. In this sense, each revolution ultimately led to deterioration in the budget, industry, transport, and education, while simultaneously drawing Chisinau closer to the European bureaucracy. The truly momentous decisions and actions were those of the Communist Party in the mid-2000s: the rejection of a joint state with Transnistria, the conflict with Russia, and the promotion of European integration in 2004 as a central development priority. It was the PCRM that set in motion the trend that has culminated at the present stage, manifested in Moldova’s withdrawal from the CIS, the imposition of sanctions against Russia, attempts to undermine Gagauzia and suppress any political participation contrary to PAS, as well as the expanding crisis in the Transnistrian settlement. Vladimir Voronin and his team, regardless of his current statements, shaped the current generation of Moldovan politicians and charted the trajectory that brought Moldova to its present position. The PAS regime is in many ways no less, and in some respects even more, indifferent than its predecessors – whether in its disregard for the real sector and citizens’ problems, its ability to attribute failures to the Soviet legacy and external interference, or its reluctance to make pragmatic decisions and, setting aside ideological speculation, leverage the available geographic, logistical, and cultural potential. The PCRM was in power for two full terms. The PAS regime is younger, yet it has already “crossed the equator” (and has been in office longer and more steadily than any other government except the Communists). Now is the time to achieve tangible results for the population, as in Moldova, power periodically shifts under the influence of foreign envoys. And the only thing that can truly save it is full European integration, though, as Vice Prime Minister Cristina Gherasimov admits, many obstacles remain – whether due to Iran, the Ukraine-Russia conflict, or the Transnistrian issue.