Ignoring Public Interests: The Hallmark of PAS Rule

The paradox of the Moldovan reality is that the political course pursued by the ruling party is not supported by an absolute majority of citizens, yet the public currently has no means of changing it

Supporters of this course view the decline in public support, against the backdrop of a disconnect between the actual state of affairs, the results achieved, and the level of citizens’ well-being, as one of the main risks to Moldova’s further progress toward European integration. That is, the expectations that were shaped by the government’s promises. Analysts and experts close to the regime fear that the benefits promised to the country and its people from moving closer to the European Union will prove insufficient or incomparable to the costs of political decisions made under the slogan of “accelerating EU accession”. In practical terms, these risks imply significant losses for businesses in the near future due to the loss of eastern markets in the CIS countries. It is clear that the demonstrative measures taken to withdraw Moldova from the CIS, motivated by geopolitical logic and aimed at gaining the favor of EU elites, will have very concrete ramifications, regardless of what representatives of the ruling party may say about their absence. One cannot expect a partner to agree to the continued functioning of economic instruments under the previous regime while demonstratively refusing to recognize that partner as such. State policy is the concentrated expression of its economic interests. This is a well-known truth and a dogma; to ignore it, even if out of an obsessive desire to distance oneself from everything associated with the communist past, means ignoring the state’s interests. After all, this is not just about the ruling party’s narratives, which have so far ensured its hold on power. It is about the opportunities our country can offer a hypothetical foreign investor who is utterly indifferent to our provincial domestic political squabbles. It is noteworthy that, to date, the brochures distributed by our diplomatic missions abroad have sought to attract investors by highlighting the unique status of zones that serve as free trade areas with both the EU and the CIS countries. It is clear that a hypothetical company from the Asia-Pacific region, when choosing a location to establish production of goods or services in an Eastern European country, needs to evaluate all the advantages and disadvantages. Why is it more promising to open a business not in Romania, the Czech Republic, or Poland, but specifically in Moldova? Until recently, such an advantage did exist, though, to be honest, it was poorly utilized. A limited market for goods and labor, coupled with administrative barriers and rampant corruption, virtually nullified all the hypothetical benefits of the trade regimes. It got to the point where our own resident entrepreneurs sometimes preferred to move their businesses to neighboring Romania. Predictability and prospects are better there. And it’s hard to expect any drastic changes in this regard in the coming years. The political risks posed by growing public dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country are obvious to the authorities and must be factored in. Hypothetically, in the next election, the ruling party may be unable to maintain its position and ensure continuity in the course toward EU integration, while the opposition, backed by popular support, may adjust foreign policy. Leaving aside Georgia, the examples of Hungary and Slovakia show that even the final stage of integration into European structures does not prevent the search for a balanced approach in international affairs. For many, membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance at this stage does not impose any particular restrictions. The national interest has become the prevailing one, at least for elites with a solid foreign policy background. In this new configuration, Moldova continues to move forward by inertia, following the model of the small countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states; however, obvious challenges are emerging. Western-oriented political elites can no longer count on substantial support through security guarantees and the accompanying institutional benefits. Joining the EU via NATO cannot be considered a viable model in the foreseeable future. Despite all efforts to shift toward a military-political track, Brussels cannot cover all the costs of new candidates during the transition phase to the same extent as before. Hence the recognition of significant strategic risks. However, in our case, these risks do not lie in the immediate future, the next two or three years, if we follow the official pre-election calendar set by the PAS leadership. Public opinion polls already show that the population is fully aware of and feels the negative consequences of the European integration course being forced by the authorities. This affects not only the government’s electoral standing but also citizens’ perception of the European Union itself. According to the latest IMAS poll, the level of trust in the EU stands at just 42%. 51% of respondents do not trust this union. Most citizens continue to associate the process of European integration with their hopes for improved infrastructure (53%), better quality of services in healthcare and education (47%), law enforcement and public order (45%), and the development of democracy and the economy (44-45%). It should be noted that for many years, the public has been led to believe that it is precisely in these areas that Moldova will see tangible results as it moves toward the EU. At the same time, fewer than 40% of citizens pin their hopes for a better life on the European Union. Thus, even now, the negative consequences of European integration in key areas outweigh the potential benefits. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of respondents (72%) realize that moving closer to the EU leads to rising prices, 69% see the prospect of foreigners buying up land and businesses in the country as inevitable, 65% expect further growth in migration, 62% understand that Moldovan farmers will not be able to compete with European producers, 56% are aware of the push for the LGBT agenda and fear the destruction of the traditional family and established values of child-rearing, and 48% see irreversible trends toward the country’s loss of sovereignty and independence. Most notably, only 24% believe that in 10 years’ time the country will be part of the EU, while 56% believe that Moldova will remain a neutral country. In other words, more than half of the citizens either do not believe that we will have membership in ten years, or want the country to remain as it is, where European integration should not mean severing ties with our eastern neighbors. This is not even nostalgia for Soviet times, since respondents aged 18 to 30 have never lived in the Soviet Union. This is likely a rational manifestation of awareness of the regional processes taking place and their real consequences for each individual. A striking example of this is the consolidated (70-71%) opinion that both the EU and Moldova itself need to negotiate with Russia to ensure affordable energy supplies amid the current crisis. And only 20% of respondents accept PAS’ propaganda that such negotiations are unacceptable and are willing to put up with rising energy prices. Meanwhile, none of this is stopping the authorities from implementing their agenda, with its pompous slogans about a “bright future in the EU”, accompanied by impassioned speeches about the importance of finally putting the Soviet past behind us. How far can the situation go, with the growing gap between the public’s demand for peace, tranquility, and prosperity and the ruling regime’s aggressive pro-Western course, which calls for enduring hardships and deprivations in the name of illusory hopes? One can assume that the population still has some patience left. This is precisely what the authorities are counting on – to steer the country as far as possible, as long as society does not openly resist it.