European Integration as the PAS’ Business Model

Moldova has opened two negotiation clusters and received a number of positive signals from the European Parliament and the European Commission, yet it has not moved a single step closer to full membership in the European Union

The program of the new government led by Vasile Tofan, approved by Parliament yesterday, includes a pledge to accelerate Moldova’s European integration. This issue invariably resurfaces during electoral cycles or whenever the prime minister and the cabinet are replaced. Yet no government has achieved any meaningful progress, receiving instead little more than symbolic gestures of support from the European bureaucracy, which pursues its own agenda that often runs counter to the policies and interests of the EU’s member states. The opening last week of Negotiation Cluster 6, which covers the chapters on “External Relations” and “Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy”, is a textbook example of misguided goal-setting. The reason is that implementing the relevant provisions of the EU acquis would inflict tangible damage on Moldova’s economic and political interests. Compliance would require the country to fully align with Brussels’ sanctions regime and withdraw from free trade areas of which the EU is not a member, most notably the CIS Free Trade Area, effectively resulting in a further contraction of Moldova’s trade ties. This cluster has little to do with reforms and development. Instead, it is primarily about demonstrating so-called European solidarity by implementing decisions in whose adoption Moldova has no say whatsoever. Chisinau’s task is to demonstrate loyalty to the course set by the European bureaucracy while expecting compensation for the resulting damage from Brussels itself. In addition, this approach requires symbolic gestures, such as joining the so-called “coalition of the willing”, participating in the Crimean Platform, or yet another reported discovery of a Russian drone, followed by summoning the Russian ambassador and issuing ritual condemnations of Moscow. Meanwhile, the individual nation-states are pursuing their own agendas. Germany’s Ambassador to Chisinau, Hubert Knirsch, openly pointed out that the prospects for EU membership depend on the pace of reforms, while also diplomatically but quite clearly signaling that Berlin views PAS’ flirtation with the issue of “unirea” negatively. The nervous reaction from pro-Romanian politicians and the “third sector” clearly exposed the disagreements that are likely to deepen with each passing month as it becomes increasingly evident that Moldova is in no position to sign an accession treaty either in 2028 or even in 2030. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz went even further, arguing that the Western Balkan countries, as well as Ukraine and Moldova, do not deserve full membership. This approach is driven both by domestic political considerations (the approval ratings of the governing coalition and the chancellor himself have fallen to extremely low levels amid the deepening economic crisis and the government’s continued alignment with climate and other elements of the “agenda”) and by concerns over the potential dysfunction of the European Union should it admit new members. In Merz’s view, the fairest option for candidate countries would be “associated membership” – without voting rights, full participation in the formation of EU executive bodies, or unrestricted access to the bloc’s budget funds. At the same time, such a status would still entail the full range of military, political, and other related obligations. Such a proposal clearly does not correspond to the ambitions of the PAS regime, but it could well suit the European Commission, which has become absorbed in its eastward expansion project while ignoring even basic self-preservation instincts. For now, the ruling party is focused on establishing total control in order to eliminate any threats to its rule and, more broadly, reduce the intensity of political competition within the country. The radical and poorly developed administrative reform has no real connection to EU standards; its sole purpose is to strengthen PAS’ position at the local level. This also includes the highly contentious dispute with Comrat. On Monday, under pressure from the diplomatic corps, Maia Sandu received a delegation from Gagauzia. However, judging by the remarks of Valentin Gaidarji, the chairman of the autonomy’s People’s Assembly, the meeting did not result in any genuine dialogue. The presidential administration and pro-government media also emphasised that the talks were being conducted within the framework established by the Constitutional Court, meaning without the autonomous powers of Gagauzia to hold its own elections. If Chisinau succeeds in finally “bending” the autonomy to its will, Brussels will receive a report on yet another obstacle removed on Moldova’s path toward Europe. This could even be followed by a symbolic gesture in the form of opening another negotiation cluster in the EU’s interests (for example, Cluster 2 on migration policy issues, involving free access for foreign labor and visa regimes with countries with which Moldova has traditionally maintained close ties). However, in its plans, PAS clearly fails to consider the logic and interests of individual EU member states. Some of them are less tolerant of violations of the law and human rights, while others remain cautious toward Moldova and Ukraine for understandable reasons – namely, their reluctance to import existing conflicts into the European Union. The military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine remains far from ending or even being suspended, partly due to the interests of Western countries, which are refining the technologies of warfare and mobilizing their increasingly disoriented societies around the theme of the “Russian threat”. At the same time, there is little reason to expect that Kyiv will, in the foreseeable future, either retake the occupied territories by force or, conversely, recognize them as part of Russia within the framework of a ceasefire agreement. Consequently, the EU will not be able to admit a country that imports territorial uncertainty into the bloc, since the Union is, first and foremost, a customs union requiring integrated border management. Historical and national disputes between Ukraine and Poland and Hungary should not be overlooked, nor should corruption within the presidential office, the ongoing struggle for power, and periodic cases in which Kyiv has violated the community’s security norms, such as the alleged terrorist attack against oligarch Vadym Iermolaiev. Moldova’s particular case, meanwhile, is linked not only to its parallel membership bid with Kyiv but also to the unresolved Transnistrian issue, the settlement of which is effectively frozen. There is no de facto reintegration process taking place; instead, it has been replaced by growing economic tensions amid a negotiation vacuum, accompanied by constant mutual accusations over historical interpretations and questions of identity. Chisinau is finding it increasingly difficult to “sell” its international partners the illusion of progress in the process of reconciliation between the two banks of the Dniester. At the same time, Tiraspol is increasingly emphasizing that Moldova’s accession to the European Union is impossible without a final settlement of the conflict. The issues of withdrawing Russian troops, removing ammunition from Cobasna, and transforming the peacekeeping mission so that the EU would not have to admit a territory hosting a Russian military base have not moved beyond formal statements. Moscow has already made clear that these issues can only be discussed if political negotiations are resumed, including within the “5+2” format. The central authorities are not eager to pursue this path, since it could expose the lack of a clear strategy and genuine initiatives for finding a settlement formula. In this regard, the program of Vasile Tofan’s government contains no real innovations and demonstrates no willingness to adopt a more flexible approach toward dialogue with Tiraspol. On the contrary, the government’s entire strategy appears to be focused on attempts to increase the amount of resources collected from the left bank of the Dniester through the convergence fund, while fully understanding that Moscow will continue to support the region financially, and Chisinau, remaining in a conditional “out-of-reach zone”, will be able to redirect the incoming funds to serve its own interests. At the same time, PAS openly expresses hopes for Western donor assistance in implementing its reintegration strategy, a process that could be prolonged indefinitely, with the creation of common customs and tax frameworks presented as “successes”. One way or another, PAS continues to pursue its policy without taking into account the objective “anchors” that it does not even attempt to adjust or recalibrate. For the ruling party, the final outcome is less important than the process itself, because it is precisely the process that ensures constant access to credit resources. Thus, for the current ruling regime, European integration has ultimately been reduced to the simple allocation and absorption of funds. Moreover, borrowed funds are being spent primarily on expanding the bureaucratic apparatus in order to create jobs and, in this way, maintain the loyalty of officials from Maia Sandu’s team. Vasile Tofan has already stated in Parliament that he does not intend to reduce the number of civil servants. All shortfalls resulting from poor governance and the irrational use of resources will be covered by PAS, a party with unlimited power and loyal “enforcers”, at the expense of public funds. This will be achieved through a burdensome tax reform, the redistribution of businesses, privatization, and the extraction of financial resources from the regions. The humanitarian consequences and the accumulation of debt under such an experimental model of governance do not appear to seriously concern anyone, since positions on the CVs of PAS officials will allow them to find employment abroad, thereby achieving European integration but only for individual families.