Expert: Anti-Russian Policy Narrows Moldova’s Room for Anti-Crisis Maneuver

Sergiu CEBAN

The authorities are limiting Moldova’s room for man oeuvre with their own hands at a time when the international environment, particularly in the energy sector, requires maximum flexibility and pragmatism

Relations between Chisinau and Moscow have been turbulent for so much time that they no longer come as a surprise. Another drone incident, another summons of the Russian ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive a formal protest note – all of this has turned into routine, everyday diplomatic rituals. In a significant number of such incidents, responsibility does indeed lie with Russia, and Chisinau formally has both the political and moral right to respond. However, if our authorities genuinely want to maintain an impeccable position in this confrontation, they should avoid providing obvious grounds for counterclaims. At the very least, it is strange to demand respect for international law from Moscow while simultaneously demonstrating a selective attitude toward it ourselves. It appears that there is an influential faction within PAS interested in ensuring that tensions with Moscow remain a constant factor. In other words, the goal is not merely to gain a tactical advantage in a specific episode but rather to eliminate even the theoretical possibility of de-escalation. Moreover, some of Chisinau’s actions resemble a deliberate attempt to provoke the Kremlin into severing diplomatic relations. This raises questions about the justification for what appears to be a staged series of incidents that have recently occurred around the Russian Embassy. The detention of diplomatic couriers, lengthy inspections of diplomatic vehicles, the removal of license plates from vehicles belonging to the Russian diplomatic mission, and other procedural obstacles appear to represent a consistent escalation of confrontation. If this is indeed the case, then the timing chosen seems particularly unfortunate, and I will explain why further. It is telling that Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi, judging by his “mitigating” statements, clearly understands where all of this will ultimately lead. He attempts to justify these measures through the principle of “reciprocity”, arguing that Moldovan diplomats are also held for hours by Russian border authorities during inspections. However, international relations are not built on mutually mirroring questionable practices, but on compliance with assumed obligations regardless of the other side’s behavior. Now let us look at the global situation, which is becoming increasingly unstable and unpredictable. The conflict in the Middle East periodically calms down only to flare up again. Black Sea shipping is coming under growing pressure from intensifying Russian-Ukrainian strikes, with oil and petroleum product supplies among those facing potential risks. Meanwhile, the European energy market is entering a phase of serious volatility once again. Gas prices are rising, inevitably driving up electricity generation costs, after which price increases spread across virtually all sectors of the economy. Romania, Moldova’s key energy partner, is already considering various response scenarios, including the use of its own strategic reserves. Against this backdrop, the first worrying signs have begun to emerge in our country. At the height of the harvesting campaign, a diesel fuel shortage suddenly appeared, forcing the government to urgently introduce a state of alert in the energy sector for a period of 30 days. For the new Prime Minister Vasile Tofan, this became the first major challenge almost immediately after taking office. One would assume that, amid such uncertainty, the country would particularly need to preserve the maximum possible room for man oeuvre, including at least the hypothetical option of obtaining some of the necessary resources from Russia. Not necessarily directly or publicly presenting it as a political shift but simply keeping it as a contingency option for the most extreme circumstances. However, it appears that someone is systematically and, most likely, not entirely consciously cutting away this crisis-management tool. Although such pragmatism has been repeatedly demonstrated by various European Union countries, which, even after imposing large-scale sanctions, continued to seek compromise options to ensure their own energy security. However, pragmatism appears to be alien to our decision-makers. The situation surrounding the latest, 21st package of EU sanctions against Russia, which included the company Inter RAO, is particularly telling. It should be recalled that this company owns the MGRES. Consequently, this creates yet another obstacle to resuming electricity purchases from the plant for the right bank of the Dniester. Why did our authorities fail to notify Brussels about this in a timely manner and secure a special exemption, as other European countries regularly do, remains a major question. I would assume that the reason lies in the lack of unity within PAS on this issue (although, to be fair, on which issues is there actually unity?). Some influential factions within the party are clearly prepared to rule out any compromises with Moscow or with intermediaries connected to it under any circumstances. Even at the cost of doubling tariffs for ordinary consumers, and despite the fact that such narrow-mindedness risks completely burying the already tarnished reputation of the policy of “energy independence”. As practice has shown, this course has consistently meant only one thing: a higher price paid out of the pockets of ordinary citizens, whose opinions have never been seriously taken into account. Tofan’s government will have to operate in the coming months under conditions significantly different from the period of relative stability of recent years, as the medium-term outlook promises to be considerably more challenging. And if the international energy system does indeed enter a new phase of crisis, the authorities will be required to demonstrate the ability to make difficult, unpopular, yet pragmatic decisions. Here the question of the internal state of the ruling regime arises once again: while one part of it may be willing to preserve a certain level of interaction with Russia, another seeks to eliminate it entirely, regardless of the prevailing economic circumstances. Such a lack of coordination could prove extremely costly for the country. New electricity tariffs, further increases in gas prices, rising fuel costs, and higher prices for virtually all essential goods could become the factor that ultimately undermines public trust in PAS and Maia Sandu. In international practice, effective energy security is built precisely on having the widest possible range of alternatives, not on deliberately reducing the number of potential partners. Russia will certainly survive yet another round of diplomatic disputes with Chisinau. But what will the authorities do if circumstances develop in such a way that they are simply forced to turn to Moscow? Diplomacy is valuable precisely because it preserves room for negotiations even between states facing the deepest disagreements. If this space is deliberately narrowed by own actions, then at a critical moment the country risks finding itself defenseless in terms of its ability to protect its national interests. Therefore, it is worth considering whether such demonstrative toughness toward Russia is truly necessary at this particular moment.