Romania Teeters on the Brink of Political Collapse

Sergiu CEBAN

If the key political forces fail to reach a compromise in the coming weeks, the already protracted crisis could quickly spill beyond the confines of parliamentary confrontation

Romania has crossed an unsettling psychological threshold: 100 days of the longest-running domestic political crisis in its recent history. What appeared in the spring to be a routine parliamentary standoff has now evolved into a systemic crisis. The country’s political elite, which has traditionally portrayed itself as a bastion of European stability on the EU’s eastern flank, has demonstrated a complete inability to compromise even in the face of existential threats. Since May 5, the neighboring country has been operating with a paralyzed executive branch, after the broad pro-European coalition of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Save Romania Union (USR), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), formed last summer, failed to reconstitute itself. The situation has already begun to pose a threat to national security, compounding a cascade of external and domestic challenges. In effect, over the past 100 days Romania’s political system has failed to replace the ousted cabinet, while the government has been operating de facto in a caretaker capacity under the same Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan. Its powers are highly restricted and, most importantly, it lacks the backing of a stable parliamentary majority. President Nicușor Dan, who is constitutionally responsible for forming a new cabinet, has made several unsuccessful attempts to find a prime minister capable of securing the necessary parliamentary majority. His first choice was presidential adviser Eugen Tomac, but he was subsequently forced to withdraw after failing to secure sufficient support. The president then nominated Adrian Veștea, a former first deputy chairman of the National Liberal Party (PNL), but his candidacy likewise ran into a brick wall of intra-party maneuvering. The fundamental problem behind the ongoing deadlock is the deep divergence of political interests among the key parliamentary players. The Social Democratic Party (PSD), whose withdrawal from the coalition and subsequent vote alongside the right-wing AUR party and part of the opposition triggered the crisis, is now open to returning to a broad coalition. But it has imposed tough conditions, one of which is control of the prime minister’s office. The PNL, led by Bolojan, categorically rejects a return to the previous power-sharing arrangement with the PSD, believing that early elections could improve its position and break the Social Democrats’ dominance. The Save Romania Union (USR) is likewise not particularly keen on reviving the previous coalition formula. The AUR party and its leader, George Simion, occupy a special place in this political stalemate. According to the latest opinion polls, AUR has already emerged as the country’s largest political force, backed by substantial electoral support. The sovereignist camp has a direct interest not in resolving the crisis but in prolonging it for as long as possible. Every additional day of political paralysis gives them another argument to use with voters: the old political establishment, they will claim, is simply incapable of governing the country. As a result, AUR is likely to convert public discontent into electoral capital, waiting for the moment when it can dictate the terms following early elections. Nevertheless, by mid-August the political landscape had produced what appears to be the most realistic way out of the impasse: the formation of a minority government. On August 13, PSD leader Sorin Grindeanu openly stated that the next cabinet would most likely be a minority government and that work on its formation would begin once Parliament resumes on September 1. For the political establishment, this is essentially the only way to avoid immediate early elections while retaining some room for maneuver. Even so, such a government would remain a temporary, largely technocratic arrangement. It is reasonable to expect it to suffer the same fate as its predecessors once it has accomplished three key tasks: adopting next year’s state budget, fulfilling Romania’s commitments to the EU, and implementing the necessary fiscal reforms. The alternative scenario is early parliamentary elections. Although this option is supported by only about one-third of voters, it is still being considered as a possible course of action. Nicușor Dan is firmly opposed to dissolving Parliament, citing the complexity of the constitutional procedure. Yet the real reason for this position is likely the fear that elections held amid the current socio-economic discontent would inevitably result in a sharp surge in support for AUR and other anti-establishment political forces. Romania’s traditional political elites therefore face a difficult choice: an unstable minority government on the one hand, or an almost inevitable electoral disaster on the other. The cost of the current political instability is rising sharply as it coincides with a series of other crises. A record drop in the Danube’s water level in August forced both reactors at the Cernavodă nuclear power plant to shut down. Under normal conditions, the plant supplies around 20 percent of the country’s electricity consumption. The government declared an energy emergency, urging households and businesses to make substantial cuts in consumption while urgently increasing electricity imports. What began as a natural phenomenon is effectively turning into a political crisis, as expected tariff increases, restrictions on industry, and the threat of rolling blackouts could trigger a social backlash that would further undermine the standing of the current parliamentary forces. An equally serious challenge is emerging in the security sphere as the war in Ukraine increasingly makes its presence felt. In late July, Romanian F-16 fighter jets shot down Russian drones that had violated the country’s airspace for the first time. On August 11, Romanian forces also destroyed two drones detected in the Black Sea in the immediate vicinity of the strategic Neptun Deep gas project. The broader escalation in the Black Sea basin offers little cause for optimism either, affecting not only energy security but also Romania’s logistical capabilities. In the short term, the most likely scenario remains the formation of a limited minority government relying on ad hoc parliamentary support. Strategically, however, AUR still stands to emerge as the main beneficiary of the prolonged crisis. The longer pro-European forces remain unable to govern the country effectively, the more convincing the sovereignist rhetoric will become. If the key political groups fail to reach a compromise in the coming weeks, the crisis could eventually spill far beyond the confines of parliamentary confrontation. These circumstances would create ideal conditions for the growth of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic sentiment among voters, who may come to view the inability of the current political class to deal with mounting problems as evidence of the failure of the entire existing model of government. It is clear that Chișinău cannot afford to ignore what is happening in its immediate neighborhood. More than that, the conduct of Romania’s current political class appears unlikely to bode well for Moldova. Historically, Romania has been Moldova’s principal strategic ally and its gateway to Europe; today, it is also the country’s only guarantor of energy and economic security. But such inertia and paralysis in Bucharest are now creating concern among Moldova’s ruling elites as well. If Moldova were to find itself in the midst of a serious crisis or face major external challenges, it would be unlikely to count on substantial support from Romania. Against the backdrop of a prolonged domestic political deadlock and a possible interim government focused solely on maintaining minimal stability at home, Romania’s leaders would be less willing or able to take major political decisions in Moldova’s interests. This could affect both practical defense measures and broader discussions about the future of bilateral relations, including the prospect of unification, which would more likely be put on the back burner in the interests of preserving the status quo.