The “Anchorage Anniversary”: Lessons for Moldova

Despite what followed, the summit in Alaska clearly demonstrated how quickly geopolitical winds can shift – something that small countries such as Moldova would do well to keep in mind

August 15 marked exactly one year since Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in Anchorage, a summit that ended without an agreement on Ukraine or a cessation of hostilities. Indeed, Trump himself later emphasized that no final deal had been reached. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to reduce the significance of Anchorage to the absence of a single document. Its main outcome was that Washington and Moscow, despite the complexity of their bilateral relationship, demonstrated a willingness to discuss strategic security issues directly, including the possibility of a major U.S.-Russian bargain. The Kremlin was quick to turn Anchorage into a political brand, while Russian propaganda loudly began referring to the “Anchorage agreements” and the “Anchorage formula” as though they constituted an established framework for peace. Washington, by contrast, took a far more restrained view. Yet regardless of these differing interpretations, the meeting of the two leaders in Alaska brought back into international politics a familiar but somewhat forgotten logic: major powers can simultaneously compete with one another while seeking mutually acceptable compromises. Anchorage should therefore be viewed primarily as a precedent. Its political significance lies in the possibility of opening negotiating channels that, under favorable circumstances, could expand from a specific issue into a broader architecture of agreements. The anniversary of the Alaska summit thus provides analysts with an opportunity to consider how decisions made by major geopolitical actors can affect individual states and local regional flashpoints. This is where the phenomenon of transactional diplomacy, actively practiced by the current White House administration, is worth considering. The idea is not to address each conflict in isolation, but to link different issues into a single negotiating balance. A concession in one area can be offset by an advantage in another. Military issues can be tied to economic matters, sanctions policy to political arrangements, and the status of individual regions to broader security guarantees. In the case of the United States and Russia, such an approach could potentially encompass the war in Ukraine, the European security architecture, arms control, the sanctions regime, energy issues, and the status of various parts of Eastern Europe. But what Washington or Moscow might regard as a separate regional issue and merely one element of a broader negotiating package could become an existential national-security concern for a small state. In this respect, Moldova, situated within the wider fallout of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is objectively dependent on developments in Eastern Europe, while questions of security and foreign-policy orientation are directly linked to changes in the regional environment. It is also important that the Transnistrian conflict cannot be viewed solely as an isolated domestic Moldovan issue, since it involves not only Chișinău and Tiraspol, but also the interests of Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Kyiv. Any change in the overall configuration of relations among the major centers of power will therefore inevitably have a direct impact on Moldova. Against this backdrop, one of the key mistakes made by our authorities is their assumption that the confrontation between Russia and the West will remain a long-term reality, leading them to pursue a strategy of maximum political alignment with Western institutions while reducing contacts with Moscow. Yet Anchorage demonstrated that even after a period of unprecedented confrontation, direct dialogue between the United States and Russia can once again become a political reality. This does not mean that the two powers are destined to reconcile or that they will be able to resolve all their disputes quickly. But the mere resumption of dialogue already creates new room for diplomatic maneuver. The conclusion – and the recommendation to Maia Sandu and the PAS – is straightforward: Moldova must always be prepared not only for prolonged confrontation, but also for a scenario of diplomatic détente. For example, if Washington and Moscow were to reach a broader understanding on European or, at the very least, Eastern European security, Moldova’s current neutrality could become directly dependent on decisions made elsewhere. One possible element of a U.S.-Russian diplomatic arrangement could involve demilitarized areas designed to create “buffer zones” as the basis for a future security architecture in Eastern Europe. In light of the signals coming from Anchorage, this could potentially imply a fundamental U.S. agreement not to expand NATO’s military presence in Europe in exchange for Russian restraint in other regional areas. Within this logic of compromise-building, the Transnistrian settlement could also emerge in a very different configuration. Significantly, recent statements by Sandu that Chișinău intends to raise the issue of Russia’s military presence on the left bank as part of negotiations on Ukraine provide telling evidence that Moldova’s authorities themselves are placing the Transnistrian issue within a broader international framework. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the Anchorage precedent offers Moldova one important lesson: the foreign policy of a small state must be as adaptable as possible, because under certain circumstances Chișinău can easily find itself reduced to a “variable” in someone else’s diplomatic equation. In such circumstances, it would be logical to maintain pragmatic channels of communication with both the West and the East, avoiding rigid isolation from Moscow. This does not amount to political betrayal of Kyiv or a departure from the broader European policy line. Cutting off all channels with Russia would simply mean surrendering the initiative to those who will discuss Moldova with the Kremlin without Moldova at the table. Of course, when it comes specifically to the Alaska summit, subsequent developments have confirmed just how difficult reaching a compromise remains. Most troubling of all, the war in Ukraine is still far from over. A year of negotiations has failed to produce a ceasefire, while diplomatic efforts have effectively reached an impasse. Intense fighting continues on the battlefield, with Russia launching massive strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, including energy facilities, while Ukraine is expanding long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russian territory. The conflict is therefore increasingly taking the form of a war of attrition. To avoid becoming merely a passive subject of other countries’ negotiations, Moldova must therefore actively advance initiatives of its own. This means not only responding to proposals from outside, but also shaping its own agenda and developing concrete proposals on the Transnistrian issue, security guarantees, European integration, and other matters. The authorities should seriously reconsider their approach to foreign policy and diplomacy now. The more thoroughly prepared Chișinău’s diplomatic position is – and the more closely it reflects the objective realities of the present — the harder it will be to ignore Moldova when the time comes for the big bargain.